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ABSTRACT 
 
Infrastructure projects are an outcome of an organisation’s strategic management process, and 
as such, require aligning with the corporate and or business unit’s missions and objectives in 
order to achieve value-for-money (Kelly, Morledge & Wilkinson 2004).  There is a growing 
comprehension of the importance of procurement in realising value for clients of all types.  
The public sector invests in physical assets to deliver the goods, services and symbols that 
society values (Winch 2002).  The procurement of a construction project in the form of 
hospitals, schools and courthouses enables government to deliver services in the areas of 
health, education and justice. Infrastructure investment in roads and buildings accounts for 
over $59 Billion in 2009-10 Australian State and Territory Government expenditure (ACT 
2009; NSW 2009; NT 2009; SA 2009; QLD 2009; TAS 2009; VIC 2009; WA 2009).  As a 
result of this very considerable investment, the procurement process has the potential to 
deliver very significant public value payoffs to the community.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the practice of infrastructure procurement in 
Australian State Governments in order to analyse how strategic the procurement function is.  
In doing so this thesis examines how Australian State Government agencies procure 
infrastructure projects and the extent to which they view the procurement process as an 
opportunity to deliver more than just a physical facility.  This research contributes to both the 
body of knowledge focused on maximising the impact of public sector expenditure and the 
practice of infrastructure procurement. 
 
Moore’s (1995) ‘Theory of Public Value’ articulates a more proactive and strategic role for 
public sector managers who seek to discover, define and produce public value, instead of just 
devising means for achieving mandated purposes.  An approach to infrastructure procurement 
based on lowest cost tendering that focuses on the core business of building a physical facility 
 xiii
but not necessarily creating additional value as a by-product fails this test.  So, rather than 
purchasing infrastructure at the lowest price, a public sector client might decide to spend more 
to achieve better whole-of-government outcomes.  This might involve pursuing regional 
development or local supplier policies by selecting building contractors who are more capable 
of engaging local small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as subcontractors or suppliers, 
and or training apprentices or providing employment for at risk long term unemployed youth.   
 
This thesis presents results drawn from ten case studies of State Government organisations 
that procure infrastructure:  Five cases who procured building infrastructure are noted as (C) 
throughout the thesis; whilst five cases procured roads infrastructure and are noted as (R) 
throughout the thesis.  Thirty-seven highly experienced project managers operationally 
responsible for the procurement of infrastructure within these organisations interviews were 
interviewed.  A semi-structured interview featuring a mixture of open-ended and closed-
ended questions was designed to explore a range of issues including; how procurement is 
undertaken, value-for-money (VFM), selection criteria, government priorities, public value, 
and supply chain management.  
 
The transcribed interviews were coded thematically using provisional codes developed from 
the research questions (Miles & Huberman 1994, p.58). The qualitative software package 
NVIVO was then used to help enable inductive coding to further develop the provisional 
coding structures including the identification of sub-themes and the nature of linkages 
between themes and sub-themes.  
 
The findings showed that the procurement approaches favoured were risk averse and 
predominantly lump sum traditional featuring separate contracts with designers and 
contractors.  Value-for-money was viewed as a crucial objective of procurement activities by 
 xiv
project managers.  However, the perceptions of value-for-money were relatively restricted, 
and largely defined in financial terms and focused on the creation of value within client 
department domains.  Non-price criteria are used, particularly for the selection of designers, 
but less so for contractors, with lowest priced conforming bids from pre-qualified tenderers 
frequently awarded contracts. Precisely how non-price criteria is an area worthy of 
considerable further investigation.  
 
There are some instances where standardised non-price criteria are included in contracts to 
build in some additional benefits into the way projects are procured.  However, the focus of 
procurement is delivering what Graycar (2007) calls core-business, optimising procurement 
for client departments as opposed to outcomes for government as a whole.  The evidence 
suggests that project managers are not relentlessly pursuing value creation opportunities via 
the procurement process and hence not acting as entrepreneurially or innovatively as Moore 
(1995) advocates.  The data shows that the focus of procurement is often on reducing 
transaction costs, but not on maximising the strategic contribution or value yielding potential 
of procurement.  The evidence suggests that Australian State Governments are not delivering 
the type ‘joined-up’ approach to infrastructure procurement that would create public value 
across a range of policy domains.  There is very little active management of the supply chain, 
or supplier engagement and development related activities undertaken by Government.    
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CHAPTER 1  – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
 
In some jurisdictions, the public sector is serviced by internal ‘direct labour’ organisations 
who undertake construction projects.  However, the public sector worldwide is typically a 
large purchaser of construction projects.  An estimated 40% of the Australian construction 
market is comprised of public sector projects meaning it has a vital role in leading the 
development of a more sophisticated and demanding customer base for construction (Brown, 
Hampson & Brandon 2006; Briscoe, Dainty, Millet & Neale 2004).   
 
One advantage of public sector projects for construction industry participants is the security 
of payment provided by the public sector clients.  The importance of the public sector to 
construction contractors and consultants places the public sector in a powerful position to 
influence the formation of construction sector strategy through to sector operations.  
Governments, through both legislation and procurement activity have, for example, sought to 
improve occupational health and safety standards in all industry sectors, including the 
construction industry.  Reducing the level and cost of workplace accidents and incidents 
produces a public good.  This research seeks to investigate whether the infrastructure 
procurement activity of governments have expanded their reach to the achievement in other 
areas of public good. 
 
The State Governments in Australia no longer physically undertake much construction of 
infrastructure in-house, nor do they have a great deal of internal design capability, and instead 
rely on outsourcing to private sector firms who provide both design and construction services.  
Whilst divesting themselves of the internal capability to design and physically construct 
infrastructure the States have maintained expertise in project management services in order to 
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help Government clients procure and deliver construction projects.  In the building area, 
project managers work with client agencies to procure on their behalf.  However it is 
generally the client agencies’ responsibility to ensure the project has funding from Treasury’s 
and to maintain the asset over the course of its life cycle.  However, roads agencies both 
procure roads for State Governments and maintain the road network in their respective States 
and Territories. 
 
As outlined in the public management literature, Public Value, as espoused by Moore (1995), 
is an emerging perspective on managing in the public sector (Bozeman 2002; Kelly, Mulgan 
& Muers 2002; Smith 2004; Smith, Anderson & Teicher 2004; Stoker 2006; O’Flynn 2007; 
Rhodes & Wanna 2007; Alford & Hughes 2008; Rhodes & Wanna 2008; Alford 2008; Alford 
& O’Flynn 2009).  Moore (1995) describes the mission of those managing within the public 
sector as being concerned with the creation of public value, believing it is the reason why the 
sector exists.  In economics, public good is a commonly used term to describe the benefits 
produced by the public sector.  Procurement of infrastructure projects (buildings and roads) 
by public sector clients is a discipline with considerable complexity both in operationally 
delivering assets, and strategically, in creating value for diverse sets of stakeholders.   
 
Construction projects, and the subsequent built assets, enable Government departments to 
provide goods and services that create public value for society (Winch 2002).  Winch (2002, 
p.5) cites examples of this in the public sector as government investing in schools to provide 
education services and bridges to provide transport services.   
 
The purposes and actions of the public sector transcend direct service provision to embrace 
broader societal aims (Giddens 1998; Donnelly 1999; Anderson 1989; cited in Aulich & 
Nutley (2001, p.5)).  Hence, assessing return on investment in the public sector is frequently 
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multifaceted and, consequently, more difficult to quantify.  Donnelly (1999) contends that it is 
as a provider of services that the public sector achieves its goals.  The New Public 
Management paradigms pursuit of private sector management practices appears to have led to 
the transfer of the prevailing private sector perspective on procurement, focused almost solely 
on cost, to the public sector.  The unique, politically strategic and public value laden nature of 
procurement decisions in the public sector appear to have been somewhat overlooked.   
 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
This thesis adopts a multi-disciplinary theoretical perspective integrating conceptualisations 
derived from four research streams; public sector management, construction procurement, 
transaction cost economics and supply management.  The primary purpose of this study was 
to understand the practice of construction project procurement by project managers on behalf 
of Australian State Government agencies and to explore the link between procurement and the 
creation of public value.  By interviewing procurement officers from both construction and 
roads construction organisations in Australian State Governments, it is hoped to gain valuable 
insight into the way value and value creation are considered, and addressed, during the 
procurement process.  The approaches used by the various state government organisations 
will provide valuable insight into this important area.  The research contributes to the body of 
knowledge focused on maximising the impact of public sector expenditure and informs the 
practice of infrastructure procurement by public sector clients.  
 
1.3 RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH   
 
Currently infrastructure investment in roads and buildings by Australian State and Territory 
Governments accounts for over $59 Billion in their respective 2009-10 budgets (see Table 
1.1). 
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Table 1.1: Australian State Government Investments in Infrastructure (2009-10) 
? the Government remains committed to delivering its significant capital program 
by investing - $18.2 billion (QLD 2009) 
? the Government will spend a record $8.3 billion on public infrastructure. And 
over the next four years, we will invest $23.8 billion in capital works (WA 2009) 
? infrastructure spend of $11.4 billion over four years (SA 2009) 
? over the next four years the Government will invest $62.9 billion in job 
supporting infrastructure. (NSW 2009) 
? $11.5 billion next financial year to fast-track job-creating infrastructure across the 
state.  (VIC 2009) 
? Putting the $2 billion infrastructure program into action to support Tasmanian 
jobs and guide the Tasmanian economy through the Global Financial Crisis (TAS 
2009) 
? In addition to the $1 billion Building the Future program of investment in the 
Territory’s infrastructure, a further investment of $274 million is being made 
through the Governments capital works program. (ACT 2009) 
? Total infrastructure payments will be $1.299 billion in 2009-10.  (NT 2009) 
 
Project managers working for Australian State Governments have an important role to play in 
creating public value via overseeing Government investment in infrastructure projects.  This 
study examines whether public value approaches are practiced by public sector managers 
procuring construction projects. Project managers procuring infrastructure have been largely 
ignored in the academic literature (Thai & Grimm 2000), despite the fact that they have 
considerable influence over significant State funds.   
 
Given the significant investment by Australian State Governments, coupled with the fact that 
infrastructure investments are strategic decisions designed to create benefits for society 
(Winch 2002), it could be argued that research focusing on improving the understanding and 
practice of procurement is worthwhile. 
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Problems facing construction procurement decision makers include the propensity to use 
lowest price tendering, the adversarial nature of relationships between participants, the limited 
attention given to value generation, linking the procurement to creating community value and 
the lack of life cycle costing that considers long term economic and environmental factors.  
Worldwide, there has been an overwhelming recognition that change is needed in the 
construction industry (Latham 1994; King 1996; Egan 1998). Both Latham (1994) and Egan 
(1998) bemoaned the dominant procurement approach of using price based competition for 
awarding tenders and note that it has led to poor outcomes for clients.  Egan (2008) has 
commented that in the ten years since the Rethinking Construction (1998) report 
recommendations progress towards improving the construction industry has been weaker than 
had been hoped. 
 
Using multiple or non-price selection criteria for awarding projects to building consultants 
and contractors is something that has been a focus of research in construction management, 
but its application has also been something that the industry is still grappling with (CRC Final 
Report 2004).  Previous research (CRC Final Report 2004; Dalrymple, Boxer & Staples 2006) 
concluded that there were three important areas worthy of consideration in the pursuit of best 
value public sector procurement of infrastructure:  
? Linking procurement to an organisation’s mission  
? Tendering costs 
? Construction SME Performance Improvement and Optimisation 
 
The research concluded that to procure value there was a need for both flexibility and an 
appropriate fit between procurement, the reasons for existence of the organisation and the way 
that the organisation seeks to deliver its mission.  It was also unlikely that optimal value 
would be obtained in an environment where the client is unaware of the costs of tendering and 
consequently unaware of the additional costs that they as client are carrying as a consequence 
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of their espoused tendering processes. In the event that the client is imposing excessive and 
unnecessary costs on the contractor through the tendering process, then they are adding costs 
without adding value.  Further, the extensive use of the SME construction subcontractors 
means that if that sector is not operating at optimal performance, then waste is inevitable, and 
it is unlikely that a client is procuring best value. 
 
1.4 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
An extensive review of the multi-disciplinary literature areas of public sector management, 
construction management, transaction cost economics and supply chain management has led 
to the formation of the following ten research questions and sub-questions (see Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2: Research Questions – Public Value in Public Sector Infrastructure 
Procurement 
 
Research Question One: How do Australian State Governments procure infrastructure 
projects? 
Research Question Two: What does value-for-money mean to Australian State Governments 
when procuring infrastructure projects? 
Research Question Two (a): To what extent is value-for-money an objective for Australian 
State Governments when procuring infrastructure projects? 
Research Question Three: What selection criteria are used by Australian State Governments 
when selecting both building consultants and contractors? 
Research Question Three (a):  Are non-price criteria used? 
Research Question Four: How is infrastructure procurement linked to Australian State 
Government priorities? 
Research Question Five: How is Supply Chain Management undertaken by Australian State 
Governments when procuring infrastructure projects?  
Research Question Five (a): How are lead contractors and sub-contractors selected?  
Research Question Five (b): How is performance feedback given to lead contractors and 
sub-contractors?  
Research Question Five (c): How does performance affect future contract/project 
opportunities? 
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1.5 RESEARCH METHODS  
 
Based upon the nature of the research problem and research questions this research adopts the 
social constructivist paradigm, employs a qualitative design focused upon exploring the 
perspective of the project managers procuring projects.  This research focuses on the 
procurement of infrastructure (roads and construction) projects by Australian State 
Governments.  The research explores whether procurement is being utilised strategically, how 
non-price criteria are used in contractor selection, and how value-for-money (best value) 
assessments are made in light of government strategies.  Thirty-seven project managers were 
interviewed drawn from ten public sector agencies (five construction and five roads) across 
five Australian states.  Participants were involved in the preparation, evaluation and awarding 
of construction tenders.   
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Chapter two contains the literature review, which grounds the research in the multi-
disciplinary fields of Public Sector Management, Construction Management and 
Procurement, Supply Chain Management and Transaction Cost Economics.  The major trends 
in Public Sector Management are introduced which covers Traditional Public Administration 
(TPA), New Public Management (NPM) and the emerging area of  Public Value Management 
(PVM). Construction projects are examined as an outcome of organisations’ strategic 
planning processes and the approaches used to procure projects are also explored.  
Contemporary thinking from the field of Construction Project Management and Procurement 
is analysed in the light of the public sector client procuring infrastructure.  The Supply 
Management subset of Supply Chain Management is presented, whilst Transaction Cost 
Economics literature provides a lens with which to view the costs associated with tendering 
on both the supply and client side. 
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Chapter three introduces the research methodology and the reasons for choosing the social 
constructivist paradigm and the qualitative case study methodology adopted.  It also outlines 
the approach to data collection and demonstrates the fitness for purpose between the interview 
approach employed, the research questions and the research context. 
 
Chapter four reports the within case results from the data collected from the five construction 
works case study organisations and concludes with cross-case analysis of the five construction 
cases.  Chapter five reviews the within case results from the data collected from the five roads 
agencies and concludes with cross-case analysis of the five roads cases.  Chapter six presents 
the cross-case analysis of both the construction and the roads cases highlighting the major 
trends and discernible differences.  Chapter seven outlines the findings of the research by 
using the research data collected to provide answers to the research questions.  Chapter eight 
focuses on a theoretical discussion of the findings, outlines the contributions of this research 
in the form of policy implications and provides some overarching conclusions.  The findings 
show that there is considerable scope for improving the infrastructure procurement of 
Australian State Governments and that broader public value creation approaches in the form 
of policy by-products are either not considered or inconsistently pursued.  The broader policy 
implications flowing from the research findings provide valuable commentary that inform the 
practice of infrastructure procurement and point to areas in which improvement efforts may 
be directed.  These areas include the challenge of developing the next generation of 
infrastructure procurement managers, rigorously using non-price criteria, using 
prequalification registers to engage in supplier development and delivering policy by-products 
as part of standard procurement approaches.   Further, chapter eight reflects on the research 
journey and considers the limitations of the research and outlines some potential future 
directions for further research.  The structure of this thesis is laid out in Figure 1.1. 
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The literature foundation that underpins this thesis will now be presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically review the extant literature affecting the 
procurement of construction projects by public sector clients.  Literature in the area of public 
sector management, construction management, supply chain management and transaction cost 
economics have been drawn upon as the foundation for this research.  This literature has been 
chosen to situate the research in the context of managing in the public sector tracing the 
development of public sector management and presenting the emerging perspective of public 
value theory.  This study draws upon public value and transaction cost economics as key 
conceptual underpinnings, but as these theories do not present the complete picture, the study 
also draws on aspects of supply chain management.  The literature links the procurement of 
infrastructure by public sector clients to the delivery of broader government policy objectives.  
The decision was taken to exclude the literature bodies of strategic management and public 
policy as well as that covering operational issues of construction project management.  The 
strategy literature was excluded because it is primarily focused on the private sector and 
public sector strategy is covered in the public value literature.  The public policy literature 
was excluded as it is focused on the political level and this research is focuses on operational 
issues within the public sector.  Whilst acknowledging its political context, infrastructure 
procurement does not take place until after projects have been authorised by politicians.  The 
construction project management literature has been drawn upon but this has focused entirely 
on the procurement phase and not on the operational construction of assets.   The outcome of 
the literatures selected is the theoretical framework that has guided both the data collection 
and analysis components of this research.  
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Section 2.2 to Section 2.4 critically reviews the literature on public management approaches, 
the emergence of public value and the jurisdictional interpretations of public value as best 
value.  Section 2.5 establishes the strategic link between public value and procurement, whilst 
Section 2.6 reviews the literature on policy.  Section 2.7 deals with procurement in the public 
sector and Section 2.8 focuses on the procurement of construction by public sector clients.  
Section 2.9 presents the literature on construction management including procurement 
approaches, prequalification and selection criteria. Section 2.10 introduces the literature on 
transaction cost economics whilst section 2.11 focuses on supply management issues.  Section 
2.12 presents conclusions, in the form of research questions identified from gaps in the 
literature bodies of; public value, procurement of infrastructure, policy by-products, supply 
chain management and tendering costs.  This review resulted in the formation of five research 
questions and provided guidance as to an appropriate research methodology for the study.   
 
2.2 PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT 
 
2.2.1 Purposes of the Public Sector 
 
There is considerable debate in the literature over the rationale for the existence of the public 
sector, and the most appropriate role and purpose for government (Pollitt 1993; Aulich & 
Nutley 2001; Giddens 1998, Donnelly 1999).  This debate is also a constant throughout the 
political process with elections providing the opportunity for citizens to select representatives 
whose view of government is more in keeping with their own.  This means that decision 
making in the public sector is based on a range of beliefs and values determined by a 
particular government at a particular time (Aulich & Nutley 2001, p.5).  As a result, the 
appropriate role and scope of government will change from place to place and from time to 
time (Aulich & Nutley 2001, p.5).   
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Table 2.1: Reasons for existence, functions and purposes of Government 
Anderson (1989) Giddens (1998) Donnelly (1999) 
Provision of basic economic 
infrastructure: institutions, rules 
and arrangements 
Provide means for the 
representation of diverse 
interests 
a builder of community pride 
 
Provision of various collective 
(public) goods and services 
 
A forum for reconciling 
competing claims of these 
interests 
the community governing itself 
 
Resolution and adjustment of 
group conflicts 
Create and protect contexts for 
policy debate 
a promoter of choice 
 
Maintenance of competition 
 
Provide public goods for 
collective security and welfare 
the builder of diversity 
 
Protection of natural resources 
 
Regulate markets in the public 
interest  
a channel for learning 
 
Provision for minimum access 
by individuals to goods and 
services of the economy 
Foster social peace  an arena for voice and focus 
 
Stabilisation of the economy 
 
Promote the active development 
of human capital in citizens  
 
a basis for citizenship 
 
 Sustain an effective system of 
law 
an active political process 
 
 Have a directly interventionist 
economic role 
an expression of pluralism 
 
 Have a civilising aim the provider of services 
 Foster regional and trans-
national alliances and pursue 
global goals 
 
Sources: Anderson 1989; cited in Aulich and Nutley (2001, p.5); Giddens (1998, pp.47-48); Donnelly (1999) 
 
 
Table 2.1 highlights three perspectives on the functions and purposes of the public sector. 
Donnelly (1999) suggests that the purposes and actions of government transcend direct 
service provision to embrace broader societal aims.  This is a view in keeping with Anderson 
1989; cited in Aulich and Nutley (2001, p.5) who focuses on seven functions of government 
and Giddens (1998, pp.47-48) who proposes eleven broad reasons for the existence of 
government.  Donnelly (1999) presents the purpose of local government as defined by Society 
of Local Authority Chief Executives and Senior Managers UK (SOLACE).  These three 
perspectives highlight the broad reasons for existence of many public sector organisations as 
well as the complex and multifaceted nature that characterises the public sector. 
 
Moore (1995) describes the mission of public sector organisations as being to create public 
value.  Economists refer to this as public good.  Clearly, Government does not exist to return 
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profits to shareholders.   Friedman (1970) espoused the classical or narrow view of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) which considers the primary role of business is making money 
for its owners.  This has been tempered more recently by embracing a broader 
conceptualisation of value, the consideration of stakeholders (Freeman 2008) and the 
recognition that there may be environmental and social imperatives (Elkington 1998) which 
must be taken into account in the pursuit of profit.  The Australian Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) (Sections 180-181) outlines directors’ duty to exercise their powers and discharge their 
duties with the degree of care and diligence, in good faith in the best interests of the 
corporation and for a proper purpose.  Whilst there is considerable subjectivity as to what is a 
proper purpose of a corporation, there is little doubt that the pursuit of profit remains 
fundamental to the business enterprise’s reason for existence (Dalrymple, Hilmer, Karney, 
Edgeman & Geroy 1999). 
 
Moore (1995, p.44) cites two reasons for government intervention 1) market imperfections 
that means there is a technical problem in the organisation of a market to supply the service 2) 
there is a critical issue of justice or fairness at stake that must be honoured.  Aulich and 
Nutley (2001, p.5) note that one rationale for public sector action is that markets fail to 
provide certain socially desirable goods and services, and are imperfect in the provision of 
other goods and services.  Aulich and Nutley (2001, p.6) note the welfare role of government 
and believe it is now apparent that governments have moved beyond the minimalist view that 
argues the state should only do what cannot be done by the market.   
 
2.2.2 Managing in the public sector and the business enterprise 
 
There is considerable debate in the literature as to how the practice of management differs in 
public and private sector organisations (Rainey & Chun 2005; Rainey & Bozeman 2000; 
Boyne 2002; Boyne, Jenkins & Poole 1999; Perry & Rainey 1988).  Rainey and Chun (2005) 
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note the blurring of the sectors and the fact that many hybrid public-private organisations 
have come into existence since the introduction of New Public Management.   
 
Relying solely on the public versus private and for-profit versus non-profit distinctions does 
not capture the full dimensionality of the public-private debate and offers little insight into 
how management is practiced in both (Perry & Rainey 1988; Rainey & Bozeman 2000; 
Rainey & Chun 2005). Rainey and Bozeman (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of past 
research to investigate some of the commonly articulated differences between public and 
private organisations: goal complexity and goal ambiguity; organisational structure; 
formalisation of personnel and purchasing processes; and work related attitudes and values. 
 
Governments are held accountable by a wider community of stakeholders with a greater 
variety of interests than business enterprises (Feldman 2005). Moore (1994) describes these 
stakeholders as ranging from clients, staff, political representatives, advocates, taxpayers and 
citizens.  Rainey and Bozeman (2000) note the prevalence in the literature of the assertion that 
public agencies have particularly vague, hard-to-measure, multiple, and conflicting goals. 
Public organisations have multiple goals, either because they are assigned multiple programs 
or because enabling legislation contains multiple objectives (Boyne, Meier, O’Tooler Jr & 
Walker 2005).  The multi-objective nature of the public sector (Anderson 1989; Giddens 
1998; Donnelly 1999) means that return on investment is considerably more complex to 
establish as no single indicator can capture all the complexities of public organisational 
performance in the twenty first century (Boyne et al. 2005).  Alford and O’Flynn (2009) state 
that it is an objective fact that much of the value emanating from government activity is 
difficult to measure, intangible, jointly consumed, or difficult to attribute effect to cause in its 
production.  The boundaries between the organisations and the external environment are more 
permeable and there are more rules and constraints (Boyne 2002).   
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In the private sector, revenue generated from selling products and services is used to measure 
the value of what an organisation produces (Moore 1994).  Without this information the 
private sector would have greater difficulty measuring performance.   
 
Boyne (2002) lists the internal characteristics of public organisations as: more bureaucracy; 
more red tape; and lower managerial authority.  A fundamental difference between the public 
and private sectors is that the public sector is held to account via the democratic electoral 
process (the ballot box). Public organisations are controlled by political forces and not market 
forces (Dahl & Lindblom 1953; cited in Boyne 2002; Rainey & Chun 2005).  The public 
sector, on which public management depends for authorisation and funding, responds to 
political influences (Rainey & Chun 2005).  
 
Gray and Jenkins (1995) comment that neither the study nor practice of public administration 
or management can be divorced from politics, and that the public sector is an instrument of 
politics in which political values dominate (Caiden 1994; cited in Gray & Jenkins 1995).  
Feldman (2005) concludes that whilst political decisions will be made that determine how 
much government to have, and what government should do, the important thing to focus on is 
the management of effective public organisations to achieve effective use of public resources. 
 
2.2.3 Challenges in Public Sector Management 
 
Feldman (2005) comments that whilst managing in the public sector has significant overlap 
with managing in the private sector it presents challenges that are integral to the political 
nature of the public sector. Moore (1995, p.9) notes that there is no challenge in ensuring the 
survival of the public sector, and the challenge is, instead, to make it efficient, to reduce costs 
and to adapt to changing political demands or new substantive tasks.   
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Rainey and Bozeman (2000) find that public and private sector organisations are converging 
on many issues but differ more strongly on formalisation of personnel procedures, purchasing 
processes and other centralised administrative procedures.  Survey responses from both public 
and private sector managers on the clarity and measurability of their goals have shown little 
differences in responses (Rainey & Bozeman 2000).  Rainey and Bozeman (2000) 
acknowledge that, perhaps the survey approach is too simple to address this dimension, and 
that it is possible that public managers respond in socially desirable ways due to the perceived 
negativity sometimes associated with the public sector.    
 
Meta-analysis research seeking to take stock of what has been empirically found in terms of 
the differences between private and public sector management has painted a somewhat 
muddied picture (Perry & Rainey 1988; Boyne 2002).  Boyne (2002) presents perhaps the 
most comprehensive overview of the research on the distinction between public and private 
sector management.  Boyne (2002) cautions against over-reliance on data comparing USA 
public and private organisations in the literature, given the USA’s distinctive political culture.  
Further, Boyne (2002) comments on the reliance placed on Barry Bozeman and Hal Rainey 
when setting the research direction, and the data sets they have generated, much of which was 
collected in the 1970s and early 1980s before the rise of NPM. 
 
Boyne (2002) suggests that it would be inappropriate to draw definite conclusions from the 
available literature, but comments that those who view public management as distinct from 
private have focused on the external issues of: complexity; permeability; instability; and 
absence of competitive pressures.  Boyne (2002) contends that the public and private sector 
organisations are different in important aspects and this has an impact on the transferability of 
management techniques from the private sector.  However, the evidence that public and 
private sectors are fundamentally different on all important respects is limited (Boyne 2002).   
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The fundamental challenge lies in establishing how, and on what grounds, the practice of 
management differs between the sectors and to work out what approaches can be transferred 
from the private sector.  Rainey and Chun (2005) believe the agenda is to determine when, 
where, and how public management performs well. 
 
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT THEORY 
 
The literature articulates three broad Public Sector Management paradigms which trace the 
three major developments on organising and managing in the public sector (Stoker 2003; 
cited in Smith 2004). 
? Traditional Public Administration - Politically provided inputs; services monitored through 
bureaucratic oversight. 
? New Public Management - Managing inputs and outputs in a way that ensures economy and 
responsiveness to consumers. 
? Public Value Management - The overarching goal is achieving public value that in turn involves 
greater effectiveness in tackling the problems that the public most care about; stretches from 
service delivery to system maintenance. 
 
The evolution of the state created conditions that challenged the prevailing Public 
Administration paradigm and was not matched to the new circumstances (Gow & Dufour 
2000).  Albury (2005) states that:  
‘One size fits all’ services, if they ever existed, are not suited to an ever-more diverse and 
heterogeneous society with rising expectations of 24-hour/ seven-days-a-week access, tailored 
provision and service quality. 
Gray and Jenkins (1995) comment that the links between theory and practice have been weak 
and the contribution of academics to practice and reform have been severely limited.  The 
development of theory in the area of public sector management has trailed practice.  In other 
words, theory has been developed when the conditions encountered by the public sector 
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changed.  This is what happened when the stable conditions from which public administration 
theory emerged was challenged when bureaucrats were suddenly faced with more dynamic 
conditions that required changes to the service provision mixture.   
 
Albury (2005) notes that it is not clear in the literature whether there is agreement about what 
paradigm public sector management is currently operating in.  Further, it is not clear whether 
all three approaches remain valid and whether the three paradigms co-exist simultaneously or 
whether they are mutually exclusive.  Stoker (2006) describes the relationships between the 
paradigms as confusing and complex.  Stoker (2006) describes periods of paradigm transition 
as involving new approaches working alongside features of administration and management.  
Gray and Jenkins (1995) comment that Public Administration and New Public Management 
are competing visions that are in many ways separate and distinct.  Gow and Dufour (2000) 
comment on the lack of an integrated theory for both Public Administration and New Public 
Management and believe that both paradigms have a contribution to make to the field but that 
the lack of a common thread makes comparing them difficult.  
 
2.3.1 Public Administration  
 
The traditional role of the public sector was that of Public Administration in which elected 
representatives determine what the public sector should do, and the bureaucrats administered 
programs in the areas prescribed.  There is a clear separation between the development of 
strategy performed by politicians and the administrative oversight of its operation by 
bureaucrats.  The focus of bureaucrats is to maintain the efficiency of these politically set 
directions.  Public Administration was the dominant paradigm during which the conditions 
encountered by the public sector were somewhat more stable (Lynn 2005), for example pre 
World War II and before antibiotics were developed. 
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PA is based on the acceptance of a political model of parliamentary government and a 
professional bureaucratic model of the public sector (Gray & Jenkins 1995; Lynn 2001).  The 
public administration paradigm as described by Hood (1995) has two management doctrines: 
Keep the public sector sharply distinct from the private sector in terms of continuity, ethos, 
methods of doing business, organisational design, people, rewards and career structure.  
Maintain buffers against political and managerial discretion by means of an elaborate 
structure of procedural rules designed to prevent favouritism and corruption and keep arms-
length relationships between politicians and entrusted custodians of the public service 
“trusts”. 
Gow and Dufour (2000) criticise PA on the grounds that it is unable to explain the reality of 
public organisations in a context of downsizing or to provide tools to improve their 
operations.  Moore (1995, p.74) notes that the classic tradition of Public Administration does 
not focus a manager’s attention on the issues of the public value produced by the organisation 
and instead assumes that these issues have been addressed in the forming of the organisation 
through either legislation or policy mandate.  The equilibrium required for effective Public 
Administration was found to be no longer present and a more proactive role for bureaucrats 
using private sector management approaches was proposed (Gow & Dufour 2000).  
Management was identified as a missing ingredient in the Public Sector and it was envisaged 
that bureaucrats would manage rather than just administer.    
 
2.3.2 New Public Management 
 
Gray and Jenkins (1995) comment that NPM was a replacement for PA based on the 
perceived failures of the traditional approach.  Gray and Jenkins (1995) comment that the 
erosion of PA and practice of NPM has developed at a remarkable pace and by the 1990s had 
emerged worldwide.   The basis of NPM lay in lessening or removing the differences between 
the public and private sectors and shifting the emphasis from process accounting to 
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accountability for results.  It reflected higher trust in markets and lower trust in public 
servants who were seen as budget maximising bureaucrats, and whose activities therefore 
needed to be costed and evaluated by accounting techniques (Hood 1995).  Hood (1995) 
describes the shift from PA to NPM as entailing a shift from: policy making to management 
skills; a stress on process to a stress on output; orderly hierarchies to an intendedly more 
competitive basis for providing public services; fixed to variable pay; and a uniform and 
inclusive public service to a variant structure with more emphasis on contract provision.   
Scholars describe the paradigmatic shift away from the traditional Public Administration 
models of organising public sector services to the management models of the private sector 
(Gray & Jenkins 1994; Hood 1995; Gow & Dufour 2000; Pollitt 2001).  
 
Charih and Rouillard (1997, p.27; cited in Gow & Dufour 2000) note that an underlying idea 
of NPM is the separation of the policy formulation activities performed by elected 
representatives from the operations or service delivery activities of the bureaucrats.  However, 
whilst NPM purports to reinstate the distinction between politics and administration, many 
managerial functions in the public sector are indeed political.   
 
NPM entails more than just private sector management practices and a series of management 
techniques and instead implies values and cultural change (Gow & Dufour 2000), and a re-
conceptualisation of accountability (Gray & Jenkins 1995).  It is clear that NPM advocates a 
changed role for the state/public sector as a facilitator and minimalist regulator for market 
systems (Gray & Jenkins 1995).  Pollitt (1993, p.48) comments that the UK Thatcher and US 
Reagan Administrations came to power by expounding the idea that government had grown 
too big, too expensive and too inhibiting of individual enterprise.  The Thatcher 
administration made cuts in government services and sold nationalised industries to the 
private sector.  O’Flynn (2007) describes the way in which government is viewed, constructed 
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and arranged under NPM as being firmly rooted within an economic frame and that small 
government is better.  Pollitt (1993) comments that the core labour intensive public services 
(education, health care and the civil service itself) within the remaining state structures has 
increased, and that to privatise these seems full of practical difficulties.  Pollitt (1993, p.48) 
states that to reduce these services is also difficult because properly financed and run public 
schools and health services are very popular in electorates. 
 
Gow and Dufour (2000) contend that NPM is a paradigm but that it is not based on superior 
theory to that of PA.  Luke, Kearins and Verreyene (2008) comment that not enough attention 
has been paid to how far a public sector organisation can, or should, go with respect to 
pursuing private sector management approaches under the banner of NPM.  Luke et al. (2008) 
feel that limited attention has been paid to identifying and understanding where the outer 
limits or boundaries lie with respect to roles, responsibilities, and acceptable ‘commercial’ 
behaviour in a NPM context.   
 
Meier and Hill (2005) note that Westminster (UK, Australia & NZ) approaches to NPM begin 
with a question as to what should be the proper scope and role of Government.  They note that 
US approaches lacked this rationale and just simply acted to contract out public sector 
services. Gray and Jenkins (1995) state that NPM is often used to redefine the role of the 
public sector, which is a highly political issue, rather than simply improve management 
within current structures.   
 
Criticisms of NPM have focused on the increased transaction costs often associated with 
contracting out (Entwistle & Martin 2005; cited in O’Flynn 2007), and the erosion of 
responsibility and accountability due to decentralisation (Minogue 2000; cited in O’Flynn 
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2007).  As a consequence of two decades of experimentation and an appreciation of NPMs 
shortcomings, a new discourse on public management is emerging (O’Flynn 2007). 
 
2.3.3 Public Value Management  
 
Moore’s (1995) seminal ‘Theory of Public Value’ states that the reason the public sector 
exists is to create public value and that the successful practice of public management should 
increase the public value produced by public sector organisations in both the short and long 
run.  However, it is noted that whilst a conceptual definition of public value is clear, the 
measurement of its realisation is not so clear (Moore 1995, p.10).   
 
Public Value is a philosophy of public management in which public managers should think 
and act strategically to create public value and success is drawn from initiating and reshaping 
public sector enterprises in ways that increase their value to the public (Moore 1995, p.1).  
The concept of strategy applies meaningfully to the public sector when considering that a 
public sector organisation might have a distinctive competence wider than its current use and 
that public sector executives should connect their performance to the aspirations of citizens, 
overseers and clients (Moore 1995, p.70).   
 
Public sector managers are discouraged from acting entrepreneurially in their organisations 
because citizens suspect civil servants of acting in their own self interest (Moore 1995, pp.18-
19).  Moore (1995, p.19) contends that society denies its public sector the key ingredient on 
which its private sector specifically relies to remain responsive, dynamic and value creating: 
namely, the adaptability and efficiency that come from using the imagination of managers to 
combine public demand with access to resources and control over operational capacity to 
create value.  Public Value presents a more modern view of the public sector executive, 
embracing accountability and viewing public managers as explorers commissioned by society 
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to search for public value, and in doing so are expected to use their initiative and imagination 
(Moore 1995, p.299).  Under the public value paradigm multiple objectives are pursued by 
public managers including narrower service objectives, broader outcomes, and the creation 
and maintenance of trust and legitimacy (Kelly Mulgan & Muers 2002).  Kelly et al. (2002) 
believe that public value provides a broader perspective from which to assess public sector 
performance incorporating outcomes and the means used to deliver those outcomes, as well as 
issues of trust and legitimacy.  In exploring and defining public value, the emphasis given to 
consultation and participation has increased, which, in turn, has raised expectations and 
placed bureaucrats under greater pressure (Smith 2004).   
 
O’Flynn (2007) describes public value as moving away from the ideological position of 
market versus state provision.  Stoker (2006) views public value as a framework for post 
competitive collaborative network forms of governance.  Stoker (2006) states that the 
governance of the public realm involves networks of deliberation and delivery in pursuit of 
public value.  It can be fleshed out by four propositions: 
? Public interventions are defined by the search for public value  
? There is a need to give more recognition to the legitimacy of a wide range of stakeholders 
? An open minded, relationship approach to the procurement of services is framed by a 
commitment to a public service ethos 
? An adaptable and learning-based approach to the challenge of public service delivery is 
required 
 
In describing public value Alford and O’Flynn (2009) comment that it focuses on: a wider 
range of value than public goods; more than outputs; and what has meaning for people, rather 
than what a public sector decision-maker might presume is best for them. 
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2.3.3.1  Strategic Triangle 
 
Moore (1995, p.20) postulates that public value involves looking to the value created and to 
the efficacy and propriety with which it is created.  It also encompasses engaging in the 
politics surrounding their organisation to help define public value as well as engineering how 
their organisation operates.  The Strategic Triangle (Figure 2.1) encourages public sector 
organisations to: declare the overall mission or purpose of the organisation in terms of public 
value; offer an account detailing the sources of support and legitimacy that will be utilised to 
sustain society’s commitment; and explain how the organisation will be organised and 
operated to achieve declared objectives 
 
Figure 2.1: Moore’s (1995) strategic triangle 
 
Substantive Valuable 
 
Authorising environment 
Value 
Operational 
capability 
Task environment 
Legitimacy 
and support 
Legitimate  
& Politically  
Sustainable 
 
Operationally and administratively feasible 
 
Source: Adapted from Alford and O’Flynn (2009) 
 
In developing a strategy for the public sector, a manager must be able to satisfy three tests 
(Moore 1995 pp.70-71): produce things of value to overseers, clients and beneficiaries at low 
cost in terms of money and authority; be able to continually attract both authority and money 
from the political authorising environment; and accomplish these valuable, authorised 
activities by the existing organisation with help from others who can be induced to contribute 
to the organisation’s goals.  Moore’s (1995) strategic triangle tests whether a strategy is 
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substantively valuable, legitimate and politically sustainable, and operationally and 
administratively achievable.  This framework allows public sector managers to examine their 
political and task environments to see whether there is support for them to change their 
organisational purposes in the interest of creating additional public value (Moore 1995, p.71). 
Alford and O’Flynn (2009) note that managers need to maximise the degree of alignment 
between the three elements when crafting and implementing new strategy.  Managers have to 
review the public value produced by their organisations intermittently as this is the challenge 
of defining public value somewhat independently of political support for, and legitimacy of, 
the organisation.  Public managers also have to consider that things will change as new 
political demands emerge.  
 
2.3.3.2 Authorising Environment  
 
Public managers must be able to articulate a vision that has accommodated the aspirations of 
the authorising environment, as well as their views based on professional or administrative 
experience (Moore 1995, p.305).  They need to be responsive to, and engage in, two way 
communication with their authorising environment but should not hide their views on what 
they think is publicly valuable and instead seek to test the value of their operational and 
administrative theories (Moore 1995, pp.299-300). 
 
Politics is the final arbiter of public value in the same way that private consumption decisions 
are the final arbiter of private value (Moore 1995, p.37).  Moore (1994) comments that the 
most important people involved in defining public value are citizens and their representatives 
acting through the collective processes of government.  In this light, what public managers 
must seek to satisfy are the collective aspirations expressed through the political process 
(Moore 1994).  The political system resolves collective citizen preferences by authorising 
managers to spend public resources (Moore 1995, p.39).  Moore (1994) posits that politics 
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authoritatively defines what is publicly valuable and thus it is in learning to read, respond to, 
and shape political aspirations that managers can learn to create public value.  
 
2.3.3.3 Strategy 
 
Moore (1995, p.57) argues that, despite the ambiguity surrounding the concept of public 
value, public managers need an account of the value their organisations produce with both a 
story and demonstrated accomplishments.  If a public manager is unable to provide an 
account for the value, then the legitimacy of their enterprise and their capacity to lead it is 
undermined (Moore 1995, p.57).  Moore (1995) proposes three dimensions along which 
feasible strategies might vary: 
? Level of abstraction – Moore (1995, p.97) believes there is an optimum level at which a 
Public Value Strategy should be expressed.  Moore (1995, p.97) believes that the greater 
certainty there is about an organisation’s mission the more concrete the public value 
strategy can be expressed, and conversely the more conflict about the mission the more 
abstract the strategy should be. 
? The degree of risk and exposure – articulating an organisation’s strategy involves an 
element of risk as it establishes the terms the authorising environment will use to assess it 
(Moore 1995, p.99).  How big a gamble a particular strategy is can, in principle, be 
measured by comparing its political and operational requirements to the existing political 
and administrative realities. 
? Whose vision and purposes? – The extent to which the strategy is viewed as a statement of 
public purpose rather than the goals of a public manager.  Working assumptions made by 
managers that can be explored through consultation with citizens, overseers, clients and 
beneficiaries.   
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Rhodes and Wanna (2007) suggest looking at public value along two dimensions, between 
operational behaviour and normative vision and between high and low levels of risk (as 
illustrated in Table 2.2 & Table 2.3).   
 
Table 2.2: Forms of Public Value 
 
Source: Rhodes and Wanna (2007) 
 
Table 2.3: The Public Value Ladder 
 
Source: Rhodes and Wanna (2007) 
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Rhodes and Wanna (2007) conclude that the lower risk innovations pursued under a public 
value approach can work.  They describe this as initiatives at a relatively low level by 
officials who are best placed to see the possibilities.  Rhodes and Wanna (2008) comment that 
they believe Moore’s (1995) prescriptions can work well when there is a pre-existing measure 
of social acceptance for a policy and low levels of risk and conflict.  Rhodes and Wanna 
(2008) believe that the more risk encapsulated in an innovation, the more public managers are 
being asked to take action that represents the public values of the community and the 
decreased likelihood of effective change or innovation.  Rhodes and Wanna (2008) cite Gains 
and Stoker (2008) who argue that Westminster systems make public value easier to adopt in 
local settings, for instance at a local government level and for localised decision making.  
 
2.3.3.4 Innovation 
 
In Moore’s (1995, p.211) view, managers should seek, find and exploit opportunities to create 
public value.  In principle, greater value can be produced by: 1. Increasing the quantity or 
quality of public activities per unit of resource expended; 2. Reducing the costs in terms of 
money and authority used to achieve current levels of production; 3. Making public 
organisations better able to identify and respond to citizens’ aspirations; 4. Enhancing the 
fairness with which public sector organisations operate; 5. Increasing their continuing 
capacity to respond and innovate. 
 
Moore (1995, p.213) comments that innovation requires capital and entails risk to clients, 
citizens and managers. To raise the capital and reduce the risks, managers have to engage 
their political environments for authorisation.  A manager’s authority to innovate depends on 
how much political credibility they enjoy.  Moore (1995, p.233-4) distinguishes between 
different types of innovation:  
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? Policy or program innovation – define new ways of using an organisation’s resources to 
accomplish its overall mission. 
? Administrative innovations – new methods for organising, accounting for, or controlling 
the organisation’s operations 
? Strategic innovations – seek to redefine the basic purposes or core technologies of an 
organisation 
 
Moore (1995) advocates taking a strategic perspective on these administrative systems and 
evaluating the contribution they make to the organisation’s overall strategy.  Analysis focused 
on an organisation’s product, production processes and administrative systems in light of its 
overall strategy will generally identify important gaps in what the organisation produces and 
the incongruities in the way it is organised (Moore 1995, p.232).  These gaps present both 
opportunities for management led innovation and become a focus of thought, planning and 
investment (Moore 1995, p.232).  Moore (1995, p.233) notes that how much innovation is 
required to improve performance is dependent on both the political and task environments the 
organisation operates in.  Moore (1995, p.233) states that in many public sector organisations, 
employees are unaccustomed to innovation and authorisation for innovative initiatives is held 
by top level managers.   
 
2.3.3.5 Public Value Debate 
 
The Public Value debate has primarily focused on the prominent role espoused for public 
managers and its applicability under the Westminster political system (Rhodes & Wanna 
2007; 2009a; 2009b; Alford 2008; Alford & O’Flynn 2009).  The most extensive critique is 
presented by Rhodes and Wanna (2007) who posit that the primacy of party politics and the 
public interest lie at the heart of their argument against the public value approach.  Rhodes 
and Wanna (2007) postulate that Moore’s (1995) public value suggests that public managers 
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can supplant party politics, and is too bound in the USA political context.  Their view is that 
public value is risky in Westminster political environments where political appointment of 
public officials is not the norm. 
 
However, Alford (2008) states that Moore (1995) is not arguing for managers to usurp the 
authority of elected politicians and the significance of authorising is that it acts to legitimise a 
manager’s autonomy to shape public value.  It is the arena within which managers’ ideas are 
tested and modified by their political masters. 
 
Alford (2008) posit that Rhodes and Wanna (2007) have ignored a central concept of Moore’s 
(1995) approach by not critiquing the strategic triangle.  Alford (2008) views Westminster 
systesms as comprising authorising environments in which politicians hold greater sway 
which means that managers need to re-balance the trade-off between value and political 
imperatives. 
 
Rhodes and Wanna (2007) deem that there needs to be clear demarcation between politicians 
and managers and that each has distinctive rights, responsibilities and bases of legitimacy and 
that any theory must cover their separateness.  Moore’s (1995) view presupposes an 
institutional environment in which managers exercise a degree of autonomy and 
entrepreneurialism atypical of public servants in the Westminster system, and not welcome by 
political masters (Rhodes & Wanna 2007).  However, they note that public value has 
resonated forcefully in Westminster derived systems such as the UK, Australia and NZ 
(Rhodes & Wanna 2007).  Other scholars have commented that public value could apply in a 
Westminster system or the USA (Smith 2004).   Alford and O’Flynn (2009) view public value 
as calling for the voices of managers to be heard in the policy process, but not privileging the 
ideas of managers over others.  
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Rhodes and Wanna (2007) comment that public value has contributed positively to both the 
perception of public managers, and public managers’ perceptions of themselves, as well as 
helping to restore legitimacy to intervention and innovation.  However, Rhodes and Wanna 
(2007) argue against downgrading the ‘primacy of party politics’ and criticise the notion that 
public managers should play the role of platonic guardians deciding the public interest.  
 
 Rhodes and Wanna (2007) criticise public value on the grounds that it does not distinguish 
whether it is a normative theory describing what managers should do, or an empirically 
derived theory of what they actually do.  Alford and O’Flynn (2009) conclude that public 
value has focused on trying to provide an account of what managers actually do, but also what 
they should do.  
 
Rhodes and Wanna (2007) consider the public value view is too positive in its 
conceptualisation of the public sector, ignoring the dark side of the state (obligations, 
taxation, fines etc), describing them as benign organisations that exist to create public value.  
Further, ideas such as hierarchy, strong cabinet government, majority party control of the 
executive and ministerial control of officials, fit poorly with the public value approach 
(Rhodes & Wanna 2007).  Rhodes and Wanna (2007; 2009) see an inherent danger in public 
managers serving as platonic guardians and arbiters of public interest.  Rhodes and Wanna 
(2007) note that in Westminster systems the politicians set the direction structures for the 
politics of a public sector organisation.   
 
Rhodes and Wanna (2007) describe public managers engaging in the political management 
espoused by Moore (1995) as being in a high risk game that may damage their career.  
Rhodes and Wanna (1997) comment that, because in Moore’ s (1995) conception, the 
authorising environment and policy process are separated, the description does not represent 
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what actually happens in political life.  Ministers and politicians are not merely end-users of 
public value that has been designed by line managers, but are themselves initiators of public 
choices (Rhodes & Wanna 2007).  Rhodes and Wanna (2007) deem the second major 
problem with the public value approach is that public managers should not be given the right 
to choose between conceptions of public good, and there is little attention paid to how they 
are to be held accountable for the decisions they take. 
 
Alford (2008) deem Rhodes and Wanna’s (2007) viewpoint as too limiting on the role of the 
public manager and instead views Moore’s (1995) ideas as compelling for reinvigorating the 
field of public administration.  Rhodes and Wanna (2008) respond to Alford’s (2008) critique, 
by noting that the role advocated under Moore’s (1995) strategic triangle is the primary task 
of the prime-minister and ministers, while non-elected public managers advise.  Rhodes and 
Wanna (2008) view prime minister and ministers as the dominant actors in the public 
manager’s authorising environment and their political views take precedence over managers 
and management.  Alford and O’Flynn (2009) comment that public value can be both used to 
diagnose the existing situation (e.g the value currently being produced, where the authorising 
environment stands and the existing operational capabilities).  But it can also help structure 
thinking about how things should be done, the value the organisation should produce and how 
far the authorising environment and organisational capabilities allow new missions to be 
pursued.  Alford and O’Flynn (2009) view public value as offering a framework for analysing 
how public managers behave, and assessing how they incorporate these factors into their 
management practice.   
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2.3.4 Conclusions - Comparing and Contrasting the Three Paradigms  
 
Table 2.4: Management Paradigms and the Challenges of Efficiency, Accountability, 
and Equity 
 
Source: Stoker (2006) 
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Table 2.5: Approaches to Public Management 
 
Source: Kelly and Muers (2002 cited in Smith 2004) 
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Table 2.6: Paradigms of Management 
 
Source: Kelly and Muers (2002; cited in Stoker (2006)) 
 
Table 2.4, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 describe the key differences between the three paradigms 
of managing in the public sector.  Stoker (2006) concludes that each narrative of management 
has its own perspective on human motivation and resolves the challenges of efficiency, 
accountability and equity in its own way.  Stoker (2006) also contends that in both TPA and 
NPM the trade-off between democracy and management is perceived to have the potential to 
go wrong and create significant problems.  Stoker (2006) highlights the limitations of the 
different approaches in Table 2.7 below. 
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Table 2.7: Dilemmas Associated With Management Narratives 
 
Source: Stoker (2006) 
 
Moore (1995, pp.20-21) states that maintaining a rigorous distinction between policy and 
administration is both theoretically and practically impossible.  Smith (2004) comments that 
policy, politics and public management are deeply intertwined.   
 
In theory, Traditional Public Administration discourages bureaucrats from exercising their 
managerial imaginations but in practice resourceful public managers with agendas of their 
own have played a role in shaping the public interest.  As a result of this Moore (1995, p.21) 
advocates an approach in which formal channels are created through which managerial ideas 
about opportunities to create value are captured.   
 
Rhodes and Wanna (2007) note that for many scholars, public value encouraged a more 
positive view of government and public service provision and innovation, particularly post-
NPM.  Moore (1995, pp.30-31) describes the tension between allowing democratic politics to 
determine what is worth producing in the public sector and the vulnerability of democratic 
politics to corruption of various kinds.  Moore (1995, p.32) notes that allowing the political 
process to determine the best allocation of public resources will appeal to those who value 
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politics as the best way of creating collective will, and see democratic politics as the best way 
of reconciling individual and collective differences.  However, those who have seen too much 
corruption to trust the integrity or utility of the political process find the idea, that public 
value should be determined politically, unpalatable.  Problems with completely politically 
defined and driven public value have been that: political mandates come loaded with special 
interests; at times incoherent mandates that are inconsistent with one another.  In other times 
political mandates shifted, destroying investments already made and momentum gained.   
 
2.3.4.1 Procurement 
 
Under the public administration paradigm the focus of procurement activities is on delivering 
policy objectives as determined by politicians, however it assumes a relatively stable and non 
changing mandate for the public sector.  Under new public management activities previously 
undertaken by the public sector were privatised or outsourced.  Procurement was pursued via 
competitive tendering and frequently characterised by lowest cost procurement, sometimes 
compulsory competitive tendering.  The risks of this procurement approach included 
decreased quality and continuity of service, as well as losing sight of the policy objectives 
sought.  Under the public value paradigm the focus of procurement is broadly on achieving 
government objectives and recognises the manager’s role in seeking and creating value.  The 
challenges appear to be in designing more complex contracts that require more skill on the 
supply side to deliver and the evaluation activities associated with delivering more complex 
contracts.   
 
2.4 JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES TO PUBLIC VALUE  
 
Public Value approaches in a public sector context have been introduced in a number of 
jurisdictions throughout the world most recently under the umbrella term ‘Best Value’ to 
 38
replace the discredited Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) process.  Kelly, Mulgan 
and Muers (2002) appear to have embraced Moore’s (1995) work for use in the UK public 
sector.   
 
In the 1980s-90s, the many public sectors experienced marketisation phases (O’Flynn 2007), 
under which value-for-money expenditure of Government funds was deemed to be achieved 
through Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT).  This was based on the logic that market 
competition would deliver services for the lowest cost, and hence best value was achieved 
through competition and accepting lowest bids.   
 
Domberger and Rimmer (1994) conclude that the introduction of contracting has yielded 
significant benefits for public sector organisations in terms of costs, but that quality 
decreased.  However they note some of the methodological difficulties in this area, with 
variable accounting practices meaning reliable cost data is difficult to obtain and hence, 
comparisons between jurisdictions are difficult.  Domberger and Rimmer (1994) conclude 
where public services have been tendered, and public providers are required to bid against 
private providers (see Sheffield & Coleshill 2001) that the process of competitive bidding 
rather than simply transferring functions from the public to the private sectors is the key 
source of widespread efficiency gains.   
 
The concept of best value has attracted varying interpretations throughout the world and been 
primarily employed at a Local Government level.  The three jurisdictions presented in this 
section (UK, Scotland and Victoria, Australia) have been selected because they have 
experienced all three paradigms of public sector management.  Each of these jurisdictions 
have experienced a period of public administration, the move to new public management and 
now public value management.  
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2.4.1 UK  
 
The UK Thatcher government was elected in 1979 and introduced CCT for local government 
services shortly after in 1980.  This was undertaken on the basis that the market would deliver 
efficiency, effectiveness and value for money. There was recognition that CCT had not 
delivered the benefits promised (Domberger 1994; McAdam & O’Neill 2002; (Lavery, 1999; 
Warner & Hebdon, 2001; both cited in Ancarani 2009)): improved quality, lower costs; and 
continuity of service provision. 
 
Once elected, the Blair New Labour UK Government had a clear manifesto commitment to 
introduce Best Value practices to Local Government partly to replace the CCT system 
introduced by earlier conservative governments and also as part of a modernisation agenda 
(Wisniewski & Stewart 2001).  The new initiative of best value in the UK was announced in 
1997 with a promise to abolish compulsive competitive tendering (CCT) and to introduce a 
new concept for local government (McAdam & O’Neill 2002; Bovaird & Halachmi 2001).  
Bovaird & Halachmi (2001) describe the introduction of best value legislation in the UK as a 
very high profile initiative. 
 
Bovaird and Halachmi (2001) comment that local authorities, working together with their 
local communities, must negotiate the meaning of best value.  This was reflected in the UK 
Local Government Best Value legislation which required authorities to undertake community 
consultation to negotiate the meaning of best value with the local communities they service 
(Bovaird & Halachmi, 2001).   
 
In England, ‘best value’ is a statutory duty on which councils plan, review and manage their 
performance in order to meet the needs and expectations of their citizens who use their 
services (Communities & Local Government 2010).  The emphasis of ‘Best value’ was to 
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introduce robust performance measurement (Comprehensive Performance Assessment – 
CPA) into Local Authorities with a view to driving continuous improvement and the delivery 
of high quality services.  The CPA framework is similar to an Excellence Model (EFQM 
2010; ABEF, 2010; Baldrige 2010).  As of 2008 the CPA has been replaced with a 
comprehensive area assessment (CAA) and encouraging Local Authorities to enter into Local 
Strategic Partnerships with other parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, 
community and voluntary sectors and forming Local Area Agreements.  Local Area 
Agreements (LAAs) set out the priorities for a local area agreed between central government 
and a local area (the local authority and Local Strategic Partnership) and other key partners at 
the local level (Communities & Local Government 2010). 
 
2.4.2 Scotland  
 
In Scotland, the newly elected Scottish Executive placed a duty of ‘best value’ on local 
government services with a requirement that their approach to ‘best value’ be amenable to 
audit by Audit Scotland (Wisniewski & Stewart 2001).  Martin (1999) describes the 
development of best value in Scotland as separate from, but similar to, that implemented in 
other parts of the UK.  Scotland has forged its own path with ‘best value’ in the public sector 
(Curry 1999; Wisniewski & Stewart 2001, 2004; Jaconelli & Sheffield 2000; Sheffield & 
Coleshill 2001; Magd & Curry 2003; Donnelly 2004) perhaps because of the newly formed 
Scottish parliament and the fact that the largest component of its budget is expended in Local 
Government activity. These circumstances perhaps led to the joint agreement (A Partnership 
for a Better Scotland 2003) between the leaders of the Scottish Labour Party and the Scottish 
Liberal Democrats, which were two of the major, and opposing political parties.  
In the next four years we are determined, together, to improve public services and tackle the 
real issues that matter to people in Scotland. 
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People deserve and expect public services that are of the highest possible quality and offer the 
greatest choice.  We will continue to use the record levels of investment to secure new and 
better facilities, particularly for our schools and hospitals.  We will also match this investment 
with continued reform so that our public services are designed and delivered around the needs 
of individuals and the communities within which they live. 
In Scotland, all Local Councils began to implement the Best Value performance management 
framework from 1998 onwards (Scottish Office, 1998; cited in Martin, 1999).  Martin (1999) 
felt that, as the details emerged, it has become increasingly clear that, far from sweeping away 
CCT, the Best Value regime would seek to build on it.  ‘Best value’ was enshrined in 
legislation in Scotland under the Local Government in Scotland Act (2003) placing a statutory 
duty on local government.   In Scotland Best Value is structured around ten key principles 
(Best Value Scotland 2009): commitment and leadership; responsiveness and consultation; 
sound governance arrangements at strategic, financial and operational levels; sound 
management of resources; use of review and options appraisal; competitiveness, trading and 
the discharge of authority functions (specific to Best Value in Local Government); 
accountability; joint working; sustainable development; equal opportunities. 
 
Since 2002, a non-statutory duty of Best Value has been placed upon those public service 
organisations in the Scottish Administration with Accountable Officers (Scottish Executive 
departments, Executive Agencies and Non-Departmental Public Bodies's (NDPDs) (Best 
Value Scotland 2009).  This draws other public bodies into the quest for best value although, 
in late 2005, the decision was made not to legislate Best Value for the Scottish Executive.  
Best Value is still legislated in Local Government and the Government is assessing the best 
way to move forward in Central Government (Best Value Scotland 2009).  A large part of the 
Scottish initiatives appear to be aimed at instilling a culture of continuous improvement in the 
public sector. 
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2.4.3 Victoria, Australia  
 
The Kennett Liberal Government in Victoria, Australia introduced Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering (CCT) in a local government context which was pursued aggressively from 1994-
1999.  CCT under the Kennett regime required local governments to expose 50% of their 
budget to outsourcing via CCT (Hobam 1995; cited in Van Gramberg & Teicher 2000).  The 
Bracks Victorian State Labor Government, elected in 1999, replaced CCT with a ‘best value’ 
regime that came into effect at the start of 2000.  Similar to the introduction in the UK, best 
value in Victoria was designed to remove the inflexibility and rigidity of CCT while ensuring 
that local councils remained accountable for their expenditure with an obligation to ensure 
that they seek the best value in providing services (Local Government (Best Value Principles 
Act) 1999). The Bracks Government objectives in introducing legislation for the best value 
principles were to foster: local accountability; whole-of-organisation response; consultation 
on performance; best value outcomes; benefits, not costs; and encourage innovation. 
 
Best Value legislation in Victoria required local governments to consult with the communities 
in developing and planning the services they offer, and reporting upon how services are 
performing, as well as planned improvement activities (Local Government Victoria 2004).  
The 2003 Annual Report details meetings between the commission and councils and suggests 
that most councils were happy with the principles and flexibility of the approach and would 
prefer there is no change (Best Value Commission 2003).  One recommendation of the report 
calls for the benefits of best value to be more widely promoted across the sector (Best Value 
Commission 2003).   
 
By the end of 2005 all local government services had been reviewed against the six best value 
principles, as per the plan (Best Value Commission 2007).  The legislation still required local 
governments to apply the principles and to report annually to their communities on Best 
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Value performance but councils were to have discretion as to how they report.  The overall 
conclusion from the review was that the work of the Best Value Commission (BVC) can be 
viewed as complete and that continuous improvement in local governments should continue 
to be supported through the work of the peak bodies (Local Government Professionals – 
LGPro; Municipal Association of Victoria – MAV; Victorian Local Governance Association 
– VLGA) (Best Value Commission 2007).  
 
2.4.4 Best Value Conclusions 
 
Best value is flexible and varied but has common characteristics; responsiveness, continuous 
improvement, accountability etc.  The evidence from Best Value approaches used in various 
jurisdictions is that Value has to be defined and articulated locally on a case by case basis.  
The evidence from other environments and other jurisdictions is that ‘best value’ regimes are 
flexible, rather than prescriptive and they require to be matched to the environment in which 
they are used.  They have been sufficiently described and detailed to enable the system to be 
audited by an external auditor.  Implementing Best Value approaches has been viewed as a 
means of creating a culture of continuous improvement within Government.  Community 
consultation is a crucial component of being able to demonstrate best value in any public 
sector environment.  The various Best Value interpretations embody the ideas of Moore 
(1995) with public managers being encouraged to engage with communities to define value, 
and then seeking the authorisation of politicians. 
 
As Best value is not prescriptive, there is a great deal to consider when seeking to address 
‘best value’ in construction procurement.  This appears sometimes to be absent from elements 
of the construction literature where they have attempted to create models that can be applied 
universally.  However, the primary focus of these schemes is not on the public sector client 
decision making.  Love et al. (2008, p.773) states that:  
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a procurement framework needs to be able to guide the decision maker rather than provide a 
prescriptive solution.  
 
2.5 PUBLIC VALUE AND PROCUREMENT  
 
If the purpose of the public sector is defined in terms of creating public value, and the sector 
is increasingly outsourcing (Domberger 1998) then procurement should be viewed as having a 
potential contribution of growing importance. Furthermore, the Government’s overall 
objective to create public value should be viewed as central when in partnership with the 
private sector.  Hence, procurement provides Government with a lever from which it can 
create public value. 
 
Porter’s (1985, p.33) value chain is an important lens through which organisations can 
examine the ways in which they create value (competitive advantage).  It analyses sources of 
value creation by examining the internal activities an organisation performs and the 
interaction between these activities.  The value chain distinguishes between supporting and 
primary activities and classifies procurement as a supporting activity but recognises the effect 
it can have on the rest of the organisation (Porter 1985, pp.40-44).  Porter’s (1985) value 
chain acknowledges that the makeup of activities performed by an organisation will differ 
according to its sector.  In the public sector procurement becomes more of a primary activity 
used to strategically deliver policy objectives.  As the public sector has increasingly adopted 
outsourcing and contracting out approaches, procurement of these goods and services has 
become a more important component of the public sector’s value chain.  In the case of 
infrastructure project procurement, and partially as a function of the level of expenditure, 
procurement becomes very much a primary activity as part of the public sectors value chain. 
This necessitates different skill sets for both managers and operations in the area of designing 
contracts (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006). 
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2.6 POLICY AND DECISION MAKING 
 
There are many different perspectives on how public policy is formulated or develops (see 
Hill 1997, p.99-123).  Hogwood and Gunn (1984, pp.49-61) distinguish between descriptive 
models of how policies are made, and prescriptive models of how policies should be made.  It 
is clear from the descriptive viewpoints that policy making is a complex process involving a 
network of actors who may be required to bargain, negotiate and compromise in order to 
reach consensus.  Clearly, politicians are important actors influencing the development of 
policy, as a product of both their elected powers and their responsibility to be accountable to 
those that elect them.   
 
In Australia, one prominent manner in which policy develops is via political promises, which 
are often a prominent feature of an election campaign, and Governments frequently claim 
mandates for their policies once elected.  Political promises are translated into policy and the 
administration is then charged with delivering or operationalising policy and translating it into 
action.    
 
One way in which public policy is legitimised is through the budgetary process. When 
politicians vote in parliament to spend taxpayer funds they legitimise public sector 
intervention and activity.  Thus, there is a well defined set of budgetary processes that 
authorise and legitimise public sector activity.   
 
2.6.1 Policy by-products 
 
Graycar (2007) comments that what is notable in the area of tackling problems in the public 
sector are that the things that work best are often by-products of another policy or practice 
domain.  Graycar (2007) believes it is often these unintended consequences of policy making 
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that make the biggest impact, but notes that policy makers are often not well equipped to 
recognise or capitalise on these by-products of policy making.  
 
Taking procurement as an example, Government concern with regional development is often 
focused on sustaining regional centres, providing regional activity, and retaining youth in the 
regions.  Commonwealth and State governments in Australia prioritise both these areas in 
their policy documents.  Furthermore, the Victorian State government’s regional sustainability 
policy intents are outlined in the Moving Forward: Update The Next Two Years 2008-2010.  
The report describes the goal of developing and facilitating investment in rural and regional 
Victoria in selected industry sectors as one of its key strategies to ensure the sustained 
economic growth and development of regional Victoria.  Amongst other items, the Victorian 
Government’s 2009-10 budget details infrastructure investment in regional Victoria of some 
$580.5 million ($150.2 million for regional hospital building program; $88.3 million for 
school developments; $342 million for transport links).  All of these initiatives are explicitly 
linked to employment creation in statements by various Ministers:    
the 2009 State Budget will also provide a boost to regional economies and jobs through 
construction, with this budget alone securing up to 35,000 Victorian jobs - Minister for Health, 
Mr Daniel Andrews (Victorian Budget 2009) 
 
An approach to procurement based solely on lowest cost will be silent on the equity and 
community engagement within projects, on the economic development of regions, and on the 
retention of youth in regional centres.  However, employment is clearly a policy by-product 
being sought by the Minister. 
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2.7 THE PROCUREMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR 
 
As Donnelly (1999) notes, it is as a provider of services to citizens that the public sector 
achieves many of its broader objectives, and is often judged on the provision of these 
services.  Outsourcing of government services has become commonplace in many developed 
and developing nations around the world (Domberger 1998, p.22).  Increasingly as a means of 
delivering services to the communities they serve, Governments are exploring partnerships 
with the private sector that may range from outright privatisation, contracting out, or the use 
of private finance to provide social infrastructure (Hall 1998).   
 
Essentially, the principle underlying any procurement is a ‘make or buy’ decision (Walker, 
Stark, Arlt & Rowlinson 2008).  In the public sector, make or buy decisions are politically 
charged issues and are often viewed as a means to privatise the provision of public services 
(Domberger & Rimmer 1994).  Domberger (1998, p.3) believes that the success of 
outsourcing initiatives lies in two key strategic choices made by organizations.  These are the 
location of the organisational boundaries, in terms of deciding what the organisation should 
produce itself and what it should contract out.  The second is the structure (nature) of the 
organisational relationships.   
 
Domberger and Rimmer (1994) note that basing the decision solely on economic 
considerations is easy, although frequently not the main or only, consideration in the public 
sector.   Social objectives, accountability, equity considerations and the security of supply are 
reasons why public production can be preferred to private (Domberger & Rimmer 1994).   
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2.7.1 Differences between Public and Private Procurement 
 
Many scholars acknowledge the fundamentally different reasons, and factors influencing 
procurement in the public sector (Domberger & Rimmer 1994; Domberger 1998; Donnelly 
1999; Murray 2001; Staples & Dalrymple 2006; 2007; 2008).  Murray (2001) addresses this 
fundamental difference stating that, in the private sector, business criteria are ‘return on 
investment’ delivered through profit maximisation, sustainable competitive advantage, 
survival and growth.  Murray (2001) states that the goals of local government purchasing are 
value for money/best value, Local Agenda 21, environment, local economic development, 
quality of life, quality, customer focus in service delivery and cost reduction.  Murray (2001) 
contends that the strategic goals of local government are fundamentally different from those 
of private sector organisations.   
 
Murray’s (2001) survey responses from chief executives uncovered a gap between the current 
and potential contribution of procurement to local government strategy. Murray (2001) views 
this gap as providing a major strategic opportunity for local government purchasing 
professionals to add value and should therefore be the focus of purchasing strategies, along 
with the maintenance of other contributions.  Value-for-money was found to be the primary 
objective of purchasing in local government, although it was not a strategic goal of local 
government (Murray 2001).   
 
Murray (2001) believes the contingency school of procurement (for example, Rajagopal & 
Bernard 1993; Watts et al. 1995; Carter & Narasimhan 1996; Carr & Smeltzer 1997; all cited 
in Murray 2001) holds a view that purchasing's role should directly flow from the wider goals 
of the firm and not be limited or restricted by former traditions.  Purchasing's strategic 
contribution, according to the contingency school, lies in integration with the explicit goals of 
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other functions (Carter & Narasimhan, 1996; cited in Murray 2001) and developing 
appropriate synergistic purchasing strategies.  
 
The objectives of local governments are wider ranging and fundamentally different from 
those of other sectors.  As a result, local governments might actually be doing themselves a 
disservice, and potentially delivering sub-optimal performance in attempting to transfer the 
private sector procurement rationale to government (Murray 2001).  Murray (2001) states that 
the objectives of private sector purchasing are inappropriate and inadequate for local 
government.  However, the strategies pursued by private sector organisations can be 
appropriate, but may be inadequate. 
 
2.8 PROCUREMENT OF CONSTRUCTION BY PUBLIC SECTOR CLIENTS 
 
In Australia, competitive tendering and contracting (CTC) has embraced alternative means of 
procuring public sector facilities to the traditional reliance upon an in-house team delivery 
approach (Steane & Walker 2000).  The direct nomination (negotiation) approach to selecting 
building contractors and consultants is a prevalent selection approach used in the private 
sector. However, given the imperative for accountability in the public sector, the selection of 
building consultants and contractors is primarily undertaken via either restricted tendering 
involving prequalification, or open tendering of public works (Hinds 1993). 
 
Kelly et al. (2004, p.159) believe construction projects are an outcome from an organisation’s 
strategic management process, and, as such, require aligning with the corporate and/or 
business unit’s missions and objectives to achieve value-for-money.  The public sector invests 
in physical assets to deliver the goods, services and symbols that society values (Winch 
2002).  The procurement of a construction project for example hospitals, schools, and 
courthouses is an indirect activity that enables government to deliver services in the areas of 
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health, education and justice.  It has been recognised that designing contracts is a very 
complex task and requires public managers to make many public value laden decisions 
including a vendor’s obligations and tasks (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006).  
 
2.8.1 The Nature of Public Sector Construction Projects   
 
Much of the construction in the public sector is undertaken so that public services such as 
education and health can be provided.  In both of these arenas, there are private sector 
providers of both education and health services.  However, in the public sector, there are 
many projects where there is really no analogue in the private sector e.g. heritage buildings, 
war memorials, national parks etc.  Construction projects within these areas are procured with 
well defined purposes, are well established as a legitimate use of public funds, and 
undoubtedly create public value.  Winch (2002, p.5) describes the investment in physical 
assets leading to the provision of goods, services and symbols as broadly creating new value 
in society, which may then be exploited for both private benefit and public good.   
Palaneeswaran et al. (2003) consider the prime objectives of public sector construction 
contractor selections should include proper delivery of good products and services, 
minimisation of risk and maximisation of value-for-money. 
 
2.8.1.1 The Procurement Process 
 
In addition to the public value created by investing in a new building or road, the procurement 
process used to attain the asset can also be viewed by public managers as an opportunity to 
create additional public value.  The pursuit of policy by-products via the procurement process 
has been prominent in many government’s responses to the Global Financial Crisis.  For 
example, the Australian Federal Government’s National Building Economic Stimulus Plan 
outlined $800 Million of investment in Community Infrastructure designed to stimulate 
 51
economic activity in regional and local community infrastructure (Economic Stimulus Plan 
2009):  
This rapid injection of funds into local communities will support local jobs to specific 
communities over the short and long term (Economic Stimulus Plan 2009) 
O’Flynn (2007) believes that a more pragmatic approach to selecting providers to deliver 
public services creates more opportunities for the maximisation of public value.  In the case of 
construction projects, instead of procuring on the basis of the lowest price, a public sector 
client might decide to spend more to achieve a better alignment with government strategy and 
objectives.  For example, this might involve pursuing regional development or local supplier 
policies by selecting building contractors who are more capable of engaging local small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as subcontractors or suppliers, and or training apprentices 
or providing employment for ‘at risk’ long term unemployed youth.   
 
The private sector influenced New Public Management (NPM) approach to procuring in the 
public sector procurement has sought to purchase at lowest cost, focusing on cost efficiencies 
for particular departments or agencies and less on the basis whole-of-government 
effectiveness. O’Flynn (2007) suggests that public value requires a more ‘joined-up’, 
collaborative approach, accepting that government activity is interconnected and 
interdependent.  Palaneeswaran, Kumaraswamy and Ng (2003) present common principles of 
public clients as public accountability, value-for-money, transparency, open, equitable and 
fair competition, confidentiality and propriety, integrity and probity. 
 
2.9 CONSTRUCTION PROJECT PROCUREMENT 
 
Construction project procurement has become an area of increasing research focus.  Tookey, 
Murray, Hardcastle and Langford (2001) comment that one strong presumption in managing a 
project is that if you have selected the right procurement system, it will contribute to 
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successful project outcomes. Much research focuses on judicious contractor selection 
believing that it will lead to successful project outcomes (Holt et al. 1995).   
 
One of the key themes identified in the construction management literature, predicated on this 
logic of selection decisions leading to successful outcomes, is the types of selection criteria 
being used.  There is a plethora of research proposing potential models to help make decisions 
about contractors, but somewhat of a shortage of empirical testing of these proposed models 
and frameworks.  There is also commentary on prequalification where a two stage approach is 
used with the first stage being prequalification and the second stage bidding.  Other important 
strands include discussions of the contractual approaches applied (Kumaraswamy & Dulaimi 
2001; Keniger & Walker 2003), transaction costs (Walker, Rowlinson & Stark 2008, pp.7-9) 
the management of supply chains (Palaneeswaran, Kumaraswamy & Zhang 2001; Dainty, 
Briscoe & Millet 2001; Dainty, Ison & Briscoe 2005; Cox & Ireland 2002; Love, Irani & 
Edwards 2004; Fearnie & Thorpe 2007; Vrijhoef & Koskela 2000; Humphreys, Matthews & 
Kumaraswamy 2003), and client and individual purchaser knowledge (Cousins, Lamming, 
Lawson and Squire 2008). 
 
There is significant commentary in the literature advocating a move away from procurement 
decisions based solely on price, beginning with Latham (1994), Egan (1998) etc.  In the 
public sector, low bid based selections have been common (Palaneeswaran, Kumaraswamy & 
Ng 2003). Wong, Holt and Cooper (2000) note that there is a growing urge for a shift from 
‘lowest-price wins’ to ‘multi-criteria selection’ practices in the contractor selection process. 
Waara (2004) notes that public sector clients increasingly use other criteria than lowest price 
when awarding construction contracts.  
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2.9.1 Contract Types 
 
The traditional approach to the procurement of construction projects (Design-Bid-Build) 
involves separate contracts between the client and the architect/structural/civil engineer and 
between the client and the lead contractor/builder (Ngowi 2000; Heisse 2002; Walker & 
Hampson, 2003, pp.13-15).  Walker and Hampson (2003, pp.13-15) describe this approach as 
involving discrete design development, tender, contract award and construction delivery 
phases.   
 
In recent times, non-traditional procurement approaches have been introduced that seek to re-
integrate the segregated design and construction functions into Design & Construct, also 
referred to as Design & Build, procurement routes (Kumaraswamy & Dulaimi 2001; Walker 
& Hampson 2003, pp.16-19). Walker and Hampson (2003, p.19) note that non-traditional 
procurement methods allow for earlier contractor involvement in the design process which 
enables accumulated building expertise to be available to the design team.  Design & 
Construct approaches provide for an organisation to be contracted by a client to manage both 
the design and construction phases as a single point of contact.  Walker and Hampson (2003, 
p.16) note that, in many instances, the design and construction contractor subcontracts, or 
enters a joint venture with a design firm.   
 
There has also been a growing interest and use of relationship based contractual approaches 
(Alliance, Management Contracting, Construction Management) (Rowlinson, Walker & 
Cheung 2008, pp.295-297; Walker, Hampson & Peters 2000).  Additionally there has been 
increasing attention given to the use of Public-Private-Partnerships(PPP)/Private-Finance-
Initiatives(PFI)/Build-Operate-Own-Transfer (BOOT) schemes where a consortium entity 
contracts to finance, design and construct, as well as operate an asset for a period of time 
(Walker & Hampson 2003, p.15; Parker & Hartley 2003).   
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However, it should be noted that text book definitions of procurement routes have been found 
to be too prescriptive to be meaningful to clients (Tookey et al. 2001). Tookey et al. (2001) 
interviewed major participants (client, contractor, quantity surveyor, architect and engineering 
consultants) familiar with the initial stages of 12 projects.  Tookey et al. (2001) found that the 
procurement approaches used did not fit comfortably with the text book definitions and were 
hybrid approaches featuring amendments to mitigate risk and operational techniques used to 
‘get the job done’. 
 
Walker and Hampson (2003, p.13) explore procurement between construction owners and 
contractors through a cost risk relationship perspective in Figure 2.2.   
 
Figure 2.2: A Construction Cost Continuum for Project Delivery 
High High 
Contractor Cost Risk 
Owner Cost Risk
Traditional 
Lump Sum
Fixed $/Time
7. Full cost 
Reimbursable
2.
Design + 
Construct
or
Turnkey
4.
CM
PM
3.
Novation
5.
On-call
multi-task 
contracting
6.
Guaranteed
maximum 
price (GMP)
1.
BOT BOO
BOOT (total package)  
Source: Walker and Hampson (2003, p.13) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2.10 the non-traditional approaches have redistributed the cost 
risks from the contractor to the client.  Non-traditional procurement approaches involve a 
shared risk profile between contractor and client when compared to traditional procurement in 
which the contractor carries most of the risk. 
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2.9.1.1 Selection of Procurement Approach  
 
For projects that are deemed to have minimal complexity and a design brief that is 
unambiguous then a traditional procurement approach is frequently deemed appropriate 
(Walker & Rowlinson 2008, p.32).  When a project has uncertain elements, or a degree of 
complexity that is not incorporated in the design documents then a procurement approach that 
integrates design and construction phases is more likely to be considered a viable strategy.    
If the design documents detail accurately exactly what the client wants built, then it can be 
felt that there is little to be gained by getting the contractor involved at an early stage to offer 
advice on constructability.  In reality, there is always a grey area in design documentation; 
however clients select procurement approaches based on a complex array of factors to arrive 
at what they perceive as the best approach to a particular project (see Walker & Rowlinson 
2008, pp.43-54).  
 
2.9.2 Selecting Contractors and Consultants  
 
Wong et al. (2000) found from a survey of UK construction clients, that there was an 
increasing use of principal selection criteria (PSC) and that ‘lowest-price’ is not now 
necessarily the client’s principal selection criterion, but rather, the realisation that cost has to 
be tempered with evaluation of PSC in any attempt to identify value-for-money.  Despite this, 
evaluation criteria themselves largely remain unchanged. This can be seen from the consensus 
towards contractors’ financial, managerial, technical, health and safety, quality and past 
performance aspects (Wong et al. 2000).  Wong et al. (2000) found nine main PSC categories 
were identified. These categories are: manpower resources; equipment resources; project 
management capabilities; geographical location knowledge; location of home office; 
contractor’s capacity; project execution capabilities; technical-economic analysis; and other 
relevant PSC (for particular types of work). 
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Wong, Holt and Cooper (2000) note that public sector clients are more compelled to select the 
lowest price due to public accountability, although it is not always the only selection criterion.  
Wong et al. (2000) found that the ‘lowest-price wins’ principle was far from the best-
perceived option.  Wong, Holt and Cooper (2000) results showed that the UK client side was 
moving towards a ‘value’ rather than ‘lowest-price’ judgment, consistent with that of Holt et 
al. (1995); Jennings and Holt (1998). Further Wong et al. (2000) shows that clients want the 
best possible ‘value’ from contractors and there is a realization that lowest-price does not 
necessarily achieve this.   
 
In contractor selections, time, cost, and quality parameters are frequently the criteria used to 
define the desired value (Palaneeswaran et al. 2003).  Palaneeswaran, Kumaraswamy and Ng 
(2003) comment that the client’s focus on best value selection approaches normally relies on 
the constructor's track record, information such as past performance, past experience, safety 
records and claims history.  Best value depends upon sound “selection” strategies which 
ensure that the outlined project procurement objectives, including client/user demands are 
met. 
 
A growing chorus of critics note that the low bid paradigm has not worked (Kashiwagi & 
Byfield 2002; Gransberg 1997; Gransberg & Ellicott 1996; Scott 1995; Latham 1994; Egan 
1998; Wong et al. 2000).  It has produced low quality work, adversarial working conditions, a 
high incidence of contractor-generated change orders, claims, litigation and increased project 
management costs.  Construction cost containment becomes the major focus of effort, and 
other considerations become secondary (Gransberg & Ellicott 1996). 
 
Palaneeswaran, Kumaraswamy and Ng (2003) identify performance of 
contractors/consultants, ability to incorporate non-price elements that would add value, as 
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well as unwelcome claims to compensate for unrealistically low bids as some of the issues 
involved in low bid approaches that may not lead it to be a good approach economically.  
 
Scholars describe procurement approaches moving away from selecting contractors on the 
basis of lowest cost towards approaches considering multiple selection criteria (Gransberg 
1997; Kashiwagi & Byfield 2002; Palaneeswaran et al. 2003; Wong et al. 2000).  Gransberg 
(1997) describes quantifying non-price criteria (qualitative data) by ranking each category 
against the other proposals and assigning weighting criteria to each category.  Palaneeswaran 
et al. (2003) describes an approach where non-price criteria are quantified into equivalent 
dollar values but portray it as a difficult task involving a great deal of subjective assessment.   
 
2.9.3 Purchasing Strategy  
 
Ellram and Carr (1994) propose three distinct types of purchasing strategies ranging from 
implementing a strategy developed elsewhere in the firm through supporting strategy of other 
functions within the firm to driving the strategy of the firm (see Table 2.8). 
 
Table 2.8: Comparing Ellram and Carr (1994), Reck and Long (1998) with Cousins et 
al. (2006) 
Ellram & Carr (1994) Reck & Long (1998) Cousins, Lawson & Squire 
(2006) 
---- ---- Celebrity 
---- Passive ---- 
Implementing Strategy Independent Undeveloped 
Supporting Strategy Supportive Capable 
Driving Strategy Integrative Strategic 
 
----- indicates where categories between the conceptualisations do not correspond with one another. 
 
Reck and Long (1988) classify purchasing into a four stage typology which evaluates the 
competitive role of purchasing to any company (seeTable 2.8).  Cousins, Lawson and Squire 
(2006) build upon the theoretical typologies developed by Ellram and Carr (1994) and Reck 
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and Long (1998) by surveying 151 manufacturing firms using a survey that comprised a 
mixture of pre-existing scales from prior research assessing involvement in strategic planning, 
internal integration; status and purchasing skills.  Cousins et al. (2006) found that purchasing 
configurations vary along four dimensions; strategic planning, status, internal integration and 
skills level (see Table 2.8), concluding that three of the four categories match well with three 
of the categories proposed by Reck and Long (1998).  However, Cousins et al. (2006) 
category of celebrity purchaser does not fit with Reck and Long’s (1998) and refers to 
purchasers who are likely to have high levels of status in the eyes of top managers but are less 
skilled and knowledgeable when compared with the other purchasing categories. Cousins et 
al. (2006) postulate that celebrity purchasers may reflect a purchasing function which 
concentrates on hard negotiations with many suppliers and is assessed based on the price 
savings achieved. Thus, through delivering savings, the function is seen as valuable, but they 
have contributed little to developing the purchasing function within the organisation.    
 
2.9.3.1 Organisational Client Characteristics 
 
Kelly et al. (2004, pp.156-159) distinguish between clients based on their level of knowledge 
of the industry, how the asset will be used in relation to organisational strategy, the volume of 
work and the regularity with which they are procuring.  However, Kelly et al. (2004, p.150) 
suggest that the public sector split into knowledgeable and less knowledgeable raises certain 
issues.  For example, a small government science agency that has occupied its buildings, 
which are now out of date, for 30 years, is likely to be an infrequent procurer.   Kelly et al. 
(2004, p.158) suggests that a fourth dimension of client characteristics is the economic 
demand place into the industry in terms of volume, frequency and regularity, coupled with the 
extent to which standardisation may exist from project to project. 
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2.9.3.2 Individual characteristics 
 
Murray (2002) undertook a case study of a government purchasing unit and presents five roles 
that purchasing officers have taken as process experts to assist in the achievement of value-
for-money.   
? Researchers – identify and review best practice, then articulate as guidance notes that others 
can apply 
? Detectives – search for evidence to ensure that best value for money is obtained 
? Teachers – provide specific, targeted training aimed at improving understanding and practice 
? Doctors – provide a surgery for those who meet with specific problems and require 
‘customised’ answers to comparatively unique problems 
? Architects – design the bespoke process that others subsequently implement with varying 
levels of ‘hands on’ support. 
 
Murray (2002) believes that it is clear that delivering value for money is accepted as the 
primary UK public sector purchasing objective.  However, Murray (2002) notes that it is 
surprising that for a strategic objective of public policy, there have been no clear guidelines 
developed for operationalising this, somewhat amorphous concept, in a practical sense.  
National Audit Office (1999, p.6; cited in Murray (2002)) articulated value for money 
principles for procurement as: have a procurement strategy; plan early and agree 
requirements; actively manage contracts; think about supply chain; seek continuous 
improvement; and monitor performance 
 
Murray (2002) comments that these add little to improving purchasing’s strategic 
contribution. Telgen and Sitar (2001; cited in Murray 2002) have highlighted the switch of 
purchasing professionals’ focus from the objectives of cost savings and efficiency to that of 
the creation of value.  Such repositioning creates a need to question how a twenty-first 
century purchasing unit should seek to contribute to the achievement of best value for money.  
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Fundamentally their research (Telgen & Sitar, 2001; cited in Murray 2002) indicated that the 
stage of maturity of the purchasing function is a critical factor affecting the value added 
potential. 
 
The APCC (2008) report titled Building Government Procurement Capabilities outlines 
aspirational capability standards for procurement staff working within Government.  The 
report articulates a three tiered taxonomy of people working within Government in 
procurement (APCC 2008) varying according to their level of procurement responsibilities:   
? Buyers – easily secured goods and services at low value and low risk, often purchased 
by contracts established by others. 
? Procurement practitioners - specialising in procurement as a major function of their 
position.  The focus is on compliance with procurement policy and operational aspects 
of developing and managing contracts efficiently and effectively. 
? Procurement professionals - individuals who specialise in strategic procurement, 
involved in tactical and strategic projects.  They exercise responsibilities that focus on 
delivering best value-for-money outcomes; lead project teams in the development and 
management of complex procurements. 
 
2.10 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS  
 
Williamson’s (1975; 1985) research built upon Coase’s (1937) seminal work on the boundary 
of the firm and focused on the contract as the key element in transactions involving the 
transfer of goods or a service between separate parties.  The focus is obtaining cost 
efficiencies through the governance structures employed by firms (Williamson 1975; 
Williamson 1985; Poppo & Zenger 1998).  The extent to which firms prefer to make or buy a 
product or service and engage in arms length or relational contracting determines the choice 
between hierarchical governance, market based exchanges or strategic alliances (Walker & 
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Weber 1984; Williamson 1981; both cited in Memeli, Chrisman, Chua, Chang, & 
Kellermanns forthcoming).  As a result, the key decision is whether to internalise transactions 
and create hierarchy within an organisation or whether to transact via markets (Williamson 
2005).   
 
Walker, Stark, Arlt and Rowlinson (2008) state that at the heart of any procurement is a 
make-or-buy decision.  When deciding to outsource, a firm will contract with another 
organisation and there will be costs involved in this transaction (Fill & Visser 2002).  
Williamson (1985) distinguishes between contracting costs incurred both before and after 
reaching a contractual agreement.  Ex ante are contracting costs incurred before reaching a 
contractual agreement include drafting, negotiation and safeguarding of an agreement, whilst 
ex post are contracting costs incurred post agreement and include  maladaption, correcting 
misalignments, set up, operating and bonding costs (Memili et al. forthcoming).   
 
Williamson (1985; 1991) describes concepts influencing governance decisions as bounded 
rationality, opportunism, asset specificity, and trust and risk preferences.  Parker and Harley 
(2003) describe bounded rationality as buyers and sellers making rational decisions but under 
conditions of incomplete information (information asymmetry). Williamson (1985) comments 
that opportunism refers to the incomplete disclosure of information.  Williamson (1985) notes 
that opportunism from agents where contracts may be incomplete may take the form of 
deception with regard to the ability of an agent to fulfil the terms of a contract or the 
willingness to expend the required effort (Memili et al. forthcoming).   
 
Chiles and McMackin (1996) note that because of behavioural uncertainty, opportunism can 
never be ruled out, which means management’s risk preferences also influence make or buy 
governance decisions.  Chiles and McMackin (1996) note that these risk preferences develop 
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based on personal and organisational factors.  Memili et al. (forthcoming) comment that firms 
with greater risk aversion are more likely to select hierarchical governance than firms with 
lower risk aversion. 
 
Williamson (1981) contends that asset specificity, in the form of site specificity, physical 
asset specificity and human asset specificity, is the most important dimension for describing 
transactions.  Once a public sector client has appointed a contractor, the parties will be in an 
exchange relationship for a considerable period of time, which means that the supplier is 
locked into the transaction, and the public sector client cannot turn to alternative sources of 
supply (Williamson 1981).  High asset specificity leaves a firm vulnerable to opportunism, as 
there are few other competitors capable of providing the service and uses for the asset 
(Williamson 1975; 1985).  Memili et al. (forthcoming) state that when asset specificity is high 
the cost of governing transactions through market mechanisms may exceed the benefits of 
flexibility and reductions in capital investments and overhead through outsourcing.  As a 
result, where these cases arise it is expected that hierarchy will be the preferred governance 
structure instead of outsourcing.  However, this assumption is not supported by evidence in 
the public sector that has increasingly outsourced supply of many assets with high specificity, 
of which construction is a prime example. 
 
2.10.1 TCE and New Public Management 
 
The introduction of NPM was based on the belief in market forms of governance (Hood 1995; 
Gray & Jenkins 1995) and was also used by politicians to redefine the boundaries of 
government, thereby reconceptualising what is a legitimate activity for governments to 
undertake, and what is not (Pollitt 1993, p.48).  For Government, the consideration of 
Williamson’s (1979) transaction costs in the public sector largely became the consideration of 
whether public agencies produce themselves (make) or contract out (buy) (O’Flynn 2007).  
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Government was encouraged to match its transactions to its government structures (O’Flynn 
2007).  O’Flynn (2007) states that: 
The most efficient structure is that which best matches specific transaction characteristics (i.e. 
the levels of frequency and asset specificity) with governance structures allowing for 
economising on the costs associated with bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset 
specificity; and an overall reduction in the cost of transacting. 
 
There is evidence to support the view that competitive contracting regimes have resulted in 
increased transaction costs due to higher costs of contract preparation, monitoring and 
enforcement (Entwistle & Martin 2005; O’Flynn & Alford 2005; both cited in O’Flynn 
(2007)). Parker and Vaidya (2000; cited in Parker & Hartley 2003) believe that sourcing 
decisions should not be seen as a function of considering transaction costs and economies of 
scale, but rather should take account of costs, internal capabilities and strategic goals.  Figure 
2.3 summarises the make or buy decision integrating the transaction costs perspective with 
that of the resource-based perspective (Parker & Hartley 2003). 
 
Figure 2.3: Transaction costs versus internal capabilities in the ‘make or buy’ decision 
 
Source: Parker and Hartley (2003) 
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2.10.2 The Nature of Transaction Costs in Construction 
 
In the construction industry, transaction costs are referred to as the cost of tendering or 
tendering costs.  Where contract variation claims are submitted to cover grey areas in 
contracts, it has been suggested that contractors submit low bids to win a project and then 
submit variations as a means of making a profit.  The contract variation game has been a 
staple of the industry for a long time.  Walker and Hampson (2003, p.14) note that the main 
criticism of the traditional lump sum approach has been that it invites a confrontational 
approach over disputes arising out of contract variations and what might be a fair price for 
these.   
 
Transaction costs associated with preparing tender documentation and submitting bids for 
construction projects occur for both the public sector client and for the contractors and 
consultants bidding for the project.  As the successful lead contractor subcontracts 
components of the project, additional tendering costs are incurred by the lead contractor in 
preparing tenders and assessing bids from subcontractors, whilst tendering costs are incurred 
by subcontractors down the supply chain bidding on those projects.   
 
The Giles NSW Royal Commission (1992) into Productivity in the Building Industry in NSW 
found that there were anti-competitive and collusive tendering practices amongst bidders 
including the surreptitious receipt and payment of special and unsuccessful tenderers’ fees.  
Further, the Giles NSW Royal Commission (1992) found that the cost of tendering on the 
contractor side is significant.  Whilst there has been interest in quantifying tendering costs on 
the supply side, so far little empirical data has been presented.  Hughes, Hillebrandt, Lingard 
and Greenwood (2000) note that costs associated with tendering are frequently quoted as ½ to 
1%, and 2-3% on PPP projects, although there is little empirical basis to support this 
assertion. For a relatively complex $20 million infrastructure project where the design and 
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schedule of quantities is provided, it has been estimated that the cost of tendering by lead 
contractors is in the region of 0.5% value of the contract for each contractor tendering 
(Dalrymple, Boxer & Staples 2006).  Thus, in a case where there are six lead contractors 
bidding the total cost is 3% of the contract’s value, or $600K.  This does not include the 
transaction costs to the subcontractors and suppliers further down the chain of supply.   
 
In some respects this inability to quantify tendering costs on the supply side stems from the 
sensitive commercial in-confidence nature of proposal development from the contractor’s 
perspective (Hughes et al. 2002; Dalrymple, Boxer & Staples 2006).   
 
Palaneeswaran et al. (2003) reports that pre-bid contractor selection tasks such as 
certification, prequalification, short listing to an optimum number of bidders/proposers are 
potentially significant in contributing to the ultimate best value. 
 
There appears to have been little research that seeks to understand either quantitatively or 
qualitatively the transaction costs incurred on the client side, within Governments, when 
tendering projects.  There appears to have been little consideration given to the costs incurred 
on the client side incorporating the preparation and assessment of tenders and the 
administration of prequalification or supplier registers.   
 
2.11 SUPPLY MANAGEMENT  
 
Supply Management is a subset of the broader Supply Chain Management discipline.  It 
focuses on the buying, purchasing and procurement activities.  Kraljic (1983) argues that 
purchasing needs to be become supply management which is presented as making the 
function more integrated with the overall business systems.  
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2.11.1 The Construction Supply Chain  
 
Currently, the public sector in Australia undertakes little of its construction in-house and 
instead engages with the marketplace to harness the necessary skills and expertise.  Dainty et 
al. (2001) describe the construction supply chain as complex, having a main contractor at the 
centre of the hub, with links to the client, but then many subcontractors who are generally 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).   
 
As at the May quarter of 2007 the Australian construction industry employed some 937,300 
people (9.0% of the Australian workforce) and contributed 6.7% to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (ABS 2008).   The ABS (2008) describes the public sector as playing a key role in 
initiating and undertaking engineering construction activity (roads, bridges, water and 
sewerage, etc.), and building activity relating to health and education. 
 
The supply chain is fragmented, often featuring a principal designer architect or engineer, a 
lead contractor and then a huge variety of SMEs that do most of the work on site.  ABS 
(2008) statistics show that the construction industry has the second highest percentage of 
workers engaged on an 'own account' basis and constituted 22.5% (210,600) of persons 
employed in construction in May 2007 compared with 8.8% for all industries.  It has been 
estimated that SMEs make up 99% of firms in the industry (ABS 2010).   
 
The importance of the construction supply chain in creating value for public sector clients 
cannot be overstated (Fernie & Thorpe 2007; Blayse & Manley 2004).  Due to the need for 
transparency, public sector construction projects have traditionally been subject to an open 
tender process and projects are awarded by clients on the basis of lowest cost, in which the 
contractor submitting the lowest bid wins the job (Palaneeswaran, Kumaraswamy & Ng 
2003).  However, rarely does the lowest bid end up being the lowest cost (Gransberg 1997; 
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Gransberg & Ellicott 1996) with quality issues such as cost and time overruns, and defect 
issues often occurring (Walker & Hampson 2003).  Further, this approach has frequently 
resulted in an adversarial and fractured working relationship between the client and contractor 
(Latham 1994; Kumaraswamy & Dulaimi 2001; Dainty, Briscoe & Millet 2001).  Both the 
project-oriented processes of construction and the fragmented nature of the subcontract 
industry have contributed to these tensions (Dalrymple & Bryar 2006).   
 
The public sector is described as having a vital role to play in leading the development of a 
more sophisticated and demanding customer base for construction (Egan 1998; Latham 1994; 
Kenley, London & Watson 2000).  However, findings from the UK indicate that the 
relationship between government clients and building contractors was perceived to be rigid, 
adversarial, and contained wasteful duplication (Holt & Rowe 2000).  Respondents felt 
leadership was lacking from the public sector client side.  The literature in the construction 
supply chain management area calls for improved relationships between team members in 
project delivery systems (Walker & Rowlinson 2008).   
 
Holt and Rowe (2000) investigated the supply side experience of working with government to 
ascertain impressions of the UK government departments as clients and to determine how 
their role can be improved.  Respondents acknowledged that the government was making 
moves to improve construction procurement but they had yet to be fully realised.  All 
respondents felt the government client could speed up the process of procurement and 
production and reduce down time (Holt & Rowe 2000).  Holt and Graves (2001) conclude 
that there needs to be greater ownership of projects from public sector clients, greater risk 
sharing with suppliers, and that value approaches to procurement have a long way to go. 
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2.11.2 Selecting Subcontractors  
 
Dainty et al. (2001) interviewed members of the construction supply chain (contractors, 
subcontractors and suppliers) for their perspective on the project delivery process.  They 
found that the primary criterion in subcontractor appointments focused on cost issues rather 
than identifying the added value that a supplier could offer.  Subcontractors were critical of 
contractors for accepting lowest price even when they knew there had been an error by the 
subcontractors, and noted the adversarial relationships created through the competitive 
tendering process resulted in serious problems with regard to payments in the construction 
phase of projects (Dainty et al. 2001).  Other issues were found to be the scheduling of work, 
lack of IT integration between supply chain parties, the challenge of managing main 
contractors: payment, involvement at an early stage, expecting quotes on complex work 
quickly, and lack of knowledge exchange (Dainty et al. 2001).  Dainty et al. (2001) conclude 
that there is general mistrust within the SME companies that make up the construction supply 
chain and that if significant performance improvements are to be realised the benefits of 
supply chain management must be extolled to SMEs to engender their trust. 
 
2.11.3 Supplier Development  
 
Krause (1999), Krause, Scannell and Calantone (2000) defines supplier development as: 
Any effort by a buying firm with a supplier to improve the supplier’s performance and/or 
capabilities and to meet the buying firm’s short and/or long term supply needs 
Krause (1999) explores the antecedents to improving suppliers by surveying 1504 purchasing 
managers.  Krause (1999) concludes that cultivating top management support for supplier 
initiatives can make internal perspectives of supplier relationships more strategic.  Further, 
that effective communication between clients and suppliers, incorporating both formal and 
informal information, addresses service performance (Krause 1999).  Supplier’s commitment 
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to strategic relationships can be fostered by clients communicating the need for continuous 
improvement and taking joint-ownership of supply problems with suppliers (Krause 1999).   
Fostering this type of attitude within the buying firm may be the first step to dedication of the 
buying firm’s resources to help the supplier (Krause 1999).  
Interestingly, relationship continuity was not an important predictor of the buying firm’s 
involvement in supplier development (Krause 1999). Cousins et al. (2008, pp.75-87) state that 
supplier development activities may range from limited to extensive.  They describe limited 
efforts as including informal supplier evaluation and performance improvement requests, 
whilst extensive might include training the supplier’s personnel and even investment in the 
supplier’s operations.  These practices are well established in the auto industry (Cousins et al. 
2008, p.76).  Cousins et al. (2008) contend that one of the advantages of supplier development 
is that buyer pressure can act as a catalyst for process change with suppliers.  Krause, 
Scannell and Calantone (2000) present four strategies of supplier development; 1) competitive 
pressure, 2) evaluation and certification systems, 3) incentives and 4) direct involvement.  
Cousins et al. (2008) note that the first three of Krause et al.’s (2000) strategies involve using 
external markets to drive supplier development improvements.  Direct involvement is an 
internalised strategy involving direct investment by the buyer in their supplier’s activities 
(Cousins et al. 2008).  Krause et al. (2000) found that direct involvement was the most 
effective strategy, although incentives and supplier evaluation and assessment provide a 
facilitating role in driving the success of this strategy. 
 
2.12 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This section draws together conclusions on the literature reviewed in the areas of public 
value, infrastructure procurement; value-for-money; policy by-products; supply chain 
management; and transaction cost economics.  These conclusions inform the theoretical 
framework and research questions outlined in the Chapter 3.   
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There has been a growing interest in Public Value approaches to managing in the public 
sector (Moore 1994; Moore 1995; Bozeman 2002; Kelly et al. 2002; Smith 2004; Smith et al. 
2004; Stoker 2006; O’Flynn 2007; Alford & Hughes 2007; Rhodes & Wanna 2007; Rhodes 
& Wanna 2008; Alford 2008; Meynhardt 2009; Bozeman 2008; Jorgensen & Bozeman 2007).  
Public Value does not require that the public sector merely imitate the private sector but it 
provides perspective on the public sector which is both post-bureaucratic (Public 
Administration) and post-competitive (New Public Management) (Smith 2004; O’Flynn 
2007; Stoker 2006; Luke et al. 2008). It views both the elected representatives (politicians) 
and public sector managers as being involved in defining and creating public value.  O’Flynn 
(2007) describes the public value approach as entailing considerable change as it provides a 
new way to think about government activity, policy-making and service delivery.  The focus 
of public value seems to be on encouraging innovation in the public sector, however politics 
is risk averse and may impede innovation, impose constraints on managers and may not 
encourage the quest for public value (Rhodes & Wanna 2007; Potts 2009).   
 
Public value related approaches under the umbrella term of best value have been used in 
England, Scotland and Victoria, Australia in a local government context. Their use has shown 
that they require a non-prescriptive, flexible approach.  They cannot be prescriptive as this is 
contrary to the spirit of community consultation and negotiating the meaning of value locally. 
 
With the suggestion that the practice of management in the public sector is, or has, moved 
into a post-NPM era there has been little empirical evidence that explores this explicitly.  
There is considerable debate as to whether public value is an appropriate approach in the 
Australian Westminster based system (Alford & Hughes 2007; Rhodes & Wanna 2007; 
Rhodes & Wanna 2008; Alford 2008; Alford & O’Flynn 2009) but again little empirical data 
that explores this issue. 
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Overall the literature is somewhat devoid of qualitative research that focuses on how public 
sector clients procure from the perspective of those who procured.  From the literature 
surveyed, the following five themes appeared to be elements influencing the value equation 
when procuring infrastructure projects in the public sector: 
? Procurement of Infrastructure 
? Value-for-Money 
? Policy by-products 
? Supply Chain Management 
? Transaction Costs 
 
2.12.1 Procurement of Infrastructure 
 
There is a great deal of evidence in the literature that best value, or value-for-money in 
Construction Project Procurement is important (Kenley et al. 2000; Jennings & Holt 1998; 
Tookey et al. 2001; Holt et al. 1995; Palaneesweran et al. 2003; Wong et al. 2000; Love et al. 
2008; Egan 1998; Latham 1994; Walraven & de Vries 2009; Kashiwagi & Byfield 2002; 
Gransberg; Scott 1995; Kelly et al. 2004; Morledge et al. 2006, pp.51-52).  The way in which 
procurement is undertaken shapes any value that can be created.  There is a gap in the 
literature understanding how infrastructure procurement is undertaken operationally by public 
sector clients.  Hence, the research question that emanates from this literature is: 
Research Question One: How do Australian State Governments procure infrastructure 
projects? 
The use of prequalification approaches and the consideration of non-price criteria as part of 
the selection process has been broadly advocated in the literature (Waara 2004; Jennings & 
Holt 1998).  Similarly, there are theoretical papers advocating value based contractor 
selection approaches as the way forward for construction procurement and proposing models 
that will aid the decision making process of selecting contractors (Palaneeswaran et al. 2003; 
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Wong, Holt & Cooper 2000; Chan, Yung, Lam, Tam & Cheung 2001).  However, there is 
very little empirical evidence based on testing the application of these models.  In addition, 
there has also been a move towards more non-traditional procurement approaches founded 
more on relationship based principles (Walker & Hamson 2003), however Egan (2008) 
comments that many parts of the industry have ignored the ‘Rethinking Construction’ 
recommendations and most public sector clients still run lowest cost tendering.  There is a gap 
in the literature as to what selection criteria public sector clients are using.  These issues of 
selection criteria, relationship based and value based contracting generate the following 
research question and associated research question: 
Research Question Three: What selection criteria are used by Australian State Governments 
when selecting both building consultants and contractors? 
Research Question Three (a):  Are non-price criteria used? 
 
2.12.2 Value-for-money 
 
Much of the literature equates a definition of value with either competitive advantage (Porter 
1985) or quality (Feigenbaum 1991, p.9; Juran & Gryna 1988, 35 E.6).  Juran and Gryna 
(1988, 35 E.6) acknowledged the financial approach by viewing value as being equal to 
quality divided by cost (value = quality / cost).  Walters and Lancaster (1999) describe value 
as a utility combination of benefits delivered to the customer less the total costs of acquiring 
the delivered benefits.  Value-for-money has clearly been of growing interest to those in the 
public sector as lowest cost procurement approaches have been abandoned in favour of value 
based approaches in the UK and Victoria, Australia.  Value-for-money has been found to be a 
primary driver of procurement activities in the UK public sector (Murray 2001).  However, in 
a public sector infrastructure procurement context there is little in the literature that seeks to 
understand exactly what value-for-money means to the public sector client side of the 
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construction supply chain.  The review of this literature leads to one main, and one associated 
research question: 
Research Question Two: What does value-for-money mean to Australian State Governments 
when procuring infrastructure projects? 
Research Question Two (a): To what extent is value-for-money an objective for Australian 
State Governments when procuring infrastructure projects? 
It would seem that whatever definition of value-for-money is employed will have a profound 
impact on the way in which an organisation procures 
 
2.12.3 Policy by-products 
 
Procurement of infrastructure is an activity that presents a significant opportunity for the 
public sector to create public value as defined by Moore (1995) both via the assets procured 
and the manner in which it is done.  Graycar (2007) postulates that it is policy by-products 
that often have the biggest impact in the public sector environment.   Under this type of logic 
a public sector procurement approach would seek to create additional public value through 
identifying policy by-products as part of the procurement process.  Further, the alignment of 
Government wide strategies and policy objectives with public procurement activities seem to 
be an important part of creating public value and receive little coverage in the literature.  The 
issue of the aligning policy objectives with infrastructure procurement formed the basis of the 
following research question:   
Research Question Four: How is infrastructure procurement linked to Australian State 
Government priorities? 
The recognition and pursuit of policy by-products through the procurement process would 
influence the manner in which the public sector procures.  Cousins et al. (2006) believe that 
the skills and experience of people procuring are important in terms of integrating the 
purchasing function with the activities of the firm and making it more strategic.  Murray 
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(2001) believes there is a gap between the contribution procurement is currently making to 
strategy in the public sector and its potential contribution.   
 
2.12.4 Supply Chain Management 
 
Australian State Governments operate largely on the basis of an outsourced model of 
construction (Furneaux, Brown & Allan 2008).  Consequently, significant value may be 
created on public projects by the supply chain.  The construction supply chain is widely 
acknowledged as being fragmented, with much of the work performed on site by very small 
subcontracting businesses, and almost entirely predicated on price based competition, which 
has led to litigious and adversarial working relationships.   
 
The pursuit of best value requires the elimination of unnecessary waste in the supply chain 
and recognises that if the construction supply chain is performing sub-optimally then a public 
sector client cannot be procuring best value. For public sector clients, the need for 
transparency and accountability underpins the procurement process.  The manner in which the 
public sector interacts with its supply chain via the tender process has caused Dalrymple, 
Boxer and Staples (2006) to wonder if the procurement process adds costs to both the client 
and the supply chain without proportionate addition of value. 
 
In recent times D&C, partnering, alliancing and various types of hybrid approaches have 
sought to integrate the design and construction disciplines by facilitating communication 
earlier in the process.  The aim of these interactions is to investigate what, if any, 
constructability benefits can be achieved from that dialogue.  However, even when non-
traditional approaches are used there is still the suggestion that lead contractors act as a 
barrier for the rest of the supply chain experiencing better working arrangements (Dainty et 
al. 2001).  There is little empirical research that seeks to understand construction project 
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delivery from the perspective of supply chain management.  This leads the research to ask the 
following major research question and three underlying research questions: 
Research Question Five: How is Supply Chain Management undertaken by Australian State 
Governments when procuring infrastructure projects?  
Research Question Five (a): How are lead contractors and sub-contractors selected?  
Research Question Five (b): How is performance feedback given to lead contractors and sub-
contractors?  
Research Question Five (c): How does performance affect future contract/project 
opportunities? 
 
2.12.5 Tendering Costs 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that lead contractors bemoan the costs involved with preparing 
tenders on large projects.  Given the historically adversarial relationships in much of the 
construction supply chain, opportunism and profiteering from contract variation has been 
commonplace (Fisher & Morledge 2002, pp.210-213; Bower 2000).  There is little in the 
literature focusing on the transaction costs involved with public sector procurement of 
infrastructure.  If public sector clients are procuring construction projects in a way that 
unnecessarily wastes supplier resources, then it is unlikely they will be obtaining best value.  
There is also little evidence in the literature that public sector clients consider the transaction 
costs for them arising from the tendering and prequalification stages.  The transaction cost 
economics literature has influenced the development of research questions one, three and five.  
 
The five major themes emphasised in this conclusions section have heavily influenced the 
development of the research questions (see Figure 3.1) and the theoretical model (see Figure 
3.2) outlined in Chapter 3.  Chapter 3 describes the methodology that is employed to address 
and answer the research questions. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND 
RESEARCH METHODS  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research in terms of theoretical 
framework, paradigmatic approach, the methodology and the methods of data collection 
adopted. Section 3.2 describes the theoretical framework.  Section 3.3 justifies the 
paradigmatic approach adopted and Section 3.4 explains the case study methodology 
employed.  Section 3.5 explains the methods of data collection including the semi-structured 
interview approach and document analysis.  Section 3.6 highlights issues of unit of analysis, 
trustworthiness, triangulation, ethics and the data analysis techniques used. Section 3.7 
presents conclusions about the approach adopted and an awareness of the limitations of this 
approach.   
 
An extensive review of the multi-disciplinary literature in the areas of public sector 
management, construction management, transaction cost economics and supply management 
has led to the emergence for this study, of the following five research questions and five sub-
questions.  Figure 3.1 highlights the literature streams from which specific research questions 
emerged. 
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Figure 3.1: From Literature to Research Questions 
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3.2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Figure 3.2 presents the Theoretical Framework guiding the research and illustrates that there 
were a number of elements identified in the literature that appeared to be important when 
considering the Procurement of Infrastructure Projects in the Public Sector.  Figure 3.3 
highlights the links between the research questions and the theoretical framework.  On the 
right hand side of the theoretical framework is a continuum which ranges from the lowest cost 
procurement approach at the bottom to a public value yielding approach at the top.  A lowest 
cost approach to procurement will still create public value as the facility will enable a 
Government Department to provide goods and services.  However, at the top of the 
continuum the public value approach recognises that the procurement process has the 
potential to create additional public value as well as just creating a physical facility.  It was 
expected that the approaches used will vary along the continuum somewhat, depending on 
four factors: value-for-money, policy objectives, tendering costs, and supply chain 
management.   
 
3.2.1 Definition of value-for-money 
 
A definition of value-for-money focused solely in terms of lowest price predicates a 
procurement approach based on lowest cost tendering.  A procurement approach based on a 
broader definition of value-for-money might consider factors other than price, and may be 
focused on creating additional benefits for communities, that are in keeping with Government 
policy intents.  Those employing a broader definition of value-for-money are more likely to 
consider non-price criteria in the selection process, and might consider linking procurement 
activities to Government priorities identified in strategic plans; or even thinking across 
agencies by adopting a whole-of-government approach. 
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3.2.2 Policy Objectives 
 
Policy objectives refer to the extent to which Government views the procurement process as 
an opportunity to create additional value.  By investing in infrastructure projects, Government 
is contributing to achieving policy intents within particular Government Department domains.  
For example, by building a school they are contributing to policy domains within a 
Department of Education.  However, when procuring construction projects Government also 
has the opportunity to create policy by-products via the procurement process, so additional 
value can be created via policy by-products in the procurement process, which might for 
example involve rewarding contractors who train apprentices or have good OH&S track 
records, or adapting designs so that facilities can be used for community purposes and 
activities when not required by the school 
 
Best value in Public Sector construction project procurement is achieved when the outcomes 
are at worst neutral in their effect on other government policy intents.  Clearly the intention of 
Best Value Public Sector Procurement is to not undermine any other government policy 
intentions.  For example, Government concern with apprentice training is often focused on 
skills development, and the concern that trades people will be in short supply as a result of 
demographic change (Schubert 2005; Colebatch 2005).  The Victorian State Government 
outlines ‘Vocational Education and Training’ policy intents in the Maintaining the 
Advantage: Skilled Victorians (2006) report.  The report details $241.47 million investment in 
the Vocational Education and Training Sector that will employ 5,500 apprentices and trainees.  
A procurement approach based on lowest cost tendering will be silent on, and not address, 
apprenticeships and training.  It may also have a negative impact on Government policy 
intents by rewarding contractors who do not train apprentices. 
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3.2.3 Supply Chain Management  
 
This element of the Framework refers to the approach taken to supply chain management.  At 
the top of the continuum are more relationship based, non-traditional approaches to 
procurement and managing the supply chain, recognising that the Government will have to be 
prepared to spend a little more in managing the supply chain in order to achieve outcomes it is 
satisfied with.  At the opposite end of the continuum is an approach in which the supply chain 
is not actively managed, which is more in keeping with a lowest cost tendering approach, pre-
Toyota Just-In-Time (JIT), and the traditional approach to construction procurement. 
 
3.2.4 Tendering Costs - Transaction Cost Economics 
 
At the top of the Framework are the Government agencies that target projects to appropriate 
contractors rather than merely inviting a large numbers of bids from contractors without 
consideration of what value, if any, such an approach adds for them as clients. At the bottom 
are Government agencies that invite bids from large numbers of contractors and both sides 
waste considerable resources in the tendering process.  For industry, these costs are incurred 
in the preparation of bids, while for Government they occur in evaluating and assessing the 
bids received.  In the construction industry, the cost of tendering is not well understood but 
both sides agree that efforts should be taken to optimise this cost on both the client and 
contractor side.  Tendering processes that add undue costs without yielding commensurate 
value are an impediment to procuring best value for Government clients.   
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Figure 3.2: Theoretical Framework – Public Value in Public Sector Infrastructure 
Procurement 
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Figure 3.3: Linking Theoretical Framework to Research Questions 
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3.3 PARADIGM 
 
The general approach to the research is known as the research paradigm.  Kuhn (1962) 
proposed the concept of the paradigm as the overarching set of beliefs a social scientist takes 
(Crotty 1998, pp.34-35).  A paradigm is the philosophical stance informing the methodology 
and thus providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria (Crotty, 1998, 
p.8).  There has been ongoing debate in the literature as to the number of paradigms.  Two 
broad overarching research paradigms or philosophies are proposed; positivistic (quantitative) 
and interpretive (qualitative) (Neuman, 1997; Cavana et al. 2001), which Collis and Hussey 
(2003) call the phenomenological paradigm.  The qualitative paradigm is more subjective in 
nature and involves seeking to understand the phenomenon being investigated from the 
perspective of the human participants (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007). 
Qualitative researchers have emphasised the need to understand processes at the 
organisational level and have argued that survey-based methods are unable to probe these 
processes effectively (Stake 1995 cited in Smith 2000). 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, pp.19-23) further articulates four paradigms that inform 
qualitative research; post-positivism, social constructivism, advocacy/participatory and 
pragmatism.   
 
3.3.1 Justification 
 
From the research questions to which answers are sought, the choice of the social 
constructivist paradigm has been adopted.  This research is seeking to socially construct 
meaning via semi-structured interviews with project managers.  It is seeking to understand 
Australian State Government infrastructure procurement through the experience of project 
managers.   
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This research does not start with a theoretical hypothesis that is to be tested.  Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2007, p.21) comments that constructivist researchers generate or inductively 
develop a theory or pattern of meaning.  Theory building in qualitative research is commonly 
associated with grounded theory, where theory emerges and is derived from empirical data 
(Glaser 1992).  Layder (1998, p.169) opines that grounded theory privileges data over prior 
theory, and that adaptive theory simultaneously privileges data and theory.  Layder (1998) 
posits that it is the importance of the relationship between prior theory and data collection and 
analysis that gives adaptive theory a distinctive stamp.  In this study, adaptive theory is being 
used, where existing theoretical ideas and models in the discipline areas of public sector 
management, construction management, transaction cost economics and supply chain 
management have been used to inform and guide the research questions and focus (as outlined 
in the Theoretical Framework see Figure 3.2).   
 
It was felt that in order to understand the complex process that is public sector infrastructure 
procurement, the researcher needed to be immersed in the area to enable the research to 
address valid questions.  The researcher also had previous research experience in the area that 
would have made using a pure emergent approach to grounded theory somewhat unrealistic 
(Glaser 1992). 
 
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
 
Research methodology refers to the procedural framework within which the research is 
conducted.  There are many factors to be considered when choosing an appropriate research 
methodology, with the topic to be researched and the specific research questions being the 
primary drivers. 
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Yin (2003, p.13) states that a case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly defined.  
This research is using a case study methodology.  The broad nature of the research, combined 
with the exploratory focus of the research questions justifies the adoption of a multiple case 
study approach as the chosen research strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Creswell 1998; Smith 
2000; Yin, 2003).   
 
Smith (2000) comments that a theoretical model may be developed which directs the data 
gathering process. However, other concepts may be important within the cases studied that 
might emerge from studying contextual issues related to the cases.  Smith (2000) contends 
that a strength of the case study approach is its relatively open-ended nature which allows 
both concepts to be investigated and concepts to emerge from the data.  The case study 
process is inductive, working from data to a theory that can explain the processes observed 
(Funnell 1996 cited in Smith 2000).  Although, as explained with employing adaptive theory, 
case study does not necessarily start with a blank theoretical slate of the Glaser (1992) 
grounded theory approach.  Yin (2003, p.13-14) comments that case study inquiry benefits 
from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide the research. 
 
Jensen and Rodgers (2001) advocate the use of case studies in Public Administration because 
they satisfy the recognised need for conditional findings and in-depth understanding of cause 
and effect relationships that other methodologies find difficult to achieve.  Woodside and 
Wilson (2003) comment that the focus of case study research is on developing a deep 
understanding of the actors, interactions, sentiments and behaviours occurring for specific 
processes. 
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3.4.1 Justification - Multiple Case Studies  
 
This research adopted a multiple case study design in order to examine the procurement 
practices of Australian State Government organisations.  Cases in the form of roads and 
building procurement agencies were selected in order to examine differences that arose out of 
the differing contextual conditions.  It also could have used data collection approaches more 
frequently associated with quantitative methodologies perhaps employing a survey approach 
which could have been distributed more widely, but perhaps not probed quite as deeply into 
the identified issues from the literature.  This research focused on the practice of procurement 
by project managers and it was thought a survey would be more likely to reflect the project 
manager’s perception of government procurement policy.    
 
Yin (2003, p.53) encourages the use of multiple case studies believing that single case designs 
are vulnerable by having only one source of data.  Given the contexts of each of the multiple 
cases are likely to differ to some extent, if the conclusions drawn are common then the 
external generalisability is expanded as a result of using multiple cases (Eisenhardt 1989).  
Yin (2003) suggests that the results from a multiple case study approach are more robust and 
compelling.   
 
As Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, p.76) notes, selecting cases requires the researcher to 
establish a rationale for the purposeful sampling and selecting of cases and gathering 
information about cases.  For case study research, the selection of cases is done using a 
replication logic for sampling rather than a random approach, as case studies should be treated 
like multiple experiments and not like multiple respondents to a survey (Yin 2003).  Yin’s 
(2003) replication logic suggests that each case must be selected so that it either: predicts 
similar results which would result in literal replication; or predicts contrasting results for 
predictable reasons which would result in theoretical replication 
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All ten of the procurement agency cases were selected using literal replication logic as there 
was no pre-known reason why the results between the cases would be different. 
 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION  
 
When designing research, it is often necessary to consider other factors, such as access to 
participants, response rates, or ethical issues.  These factors often shape the research methods 
employed and the challenge is to optimise the research design to account for these factors.  
Crotty (1998, p.6) states that methods are the activities used to gather and analyse research 
data.  Research data can be collected in many different ways and should provide insight into 
the issue or problem being investigated.  It is necessary to choose a data collection method 
that has synergy with the assumptions of knowledge embedded in the research paradigm 
selected.  It is also crucial to select a data collection method that will shed light on the issue or 
problem in question.   
 
Stake (1995; 2006) views a case study not as a methodology but as a frame within which 
many approaches to collecting data can be used.  Whilst the data collected are usually 
qualitative, quantitative approaches can be used, or a mixed method approach can be used 
(Smith 2000).  Smith (2000) comments that, frequently, case study data collection involves 
interviews with a variety of informants in an organisation as well as the collection of relevant 
documentary evidence. 
 
This research adopts the constructivism paradigm and a multiple case study methodology.  
The focus is on exploring and describing phenomena rather than testing hypotheses.  It uses 
interviews, which are among the most widely used approach in qualitative methods.   
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Richards and Morse (2007, p.107) prefer to describe the process of obtaining qualitative data 
as making data rather than collecting or gathering.  Whilst acknowledging the Richards and 
Morse (2007, p.107) perspective that static data does not exist waiting to be collected and is 
instead made or created by the research interacting with participants/informants the 
researchers own personal preference is somewhat post-positivist to talk in terms of data 
collection.  
 
Data collection was organised over three main phases: 1) Telephone based semi-structure 
interviews; 2) Semi-structured face-to-face in depth interviews; 3) Document analysis. 
 
3.5.1 Telephone based semi-structured interviews 
 
Cavana et al. (2001) suggest that telephone interviews are best conducted when it is more 
convenient for both parties, are of shorter duration and the respondents are spread over a wide 
geographical area. Such was the situation for the first phase of the data gathering. The 
telephone interviews were in the range of five to twenty minutes and the respondents came 
from a variety of locations (Five Australian States). 
 
During November and December of 2007 ten construction procurement agencies were 
identified as potential case study sites and contacted by telephone and short semi-structured 
interviews were conducted.  These interviews focused on operational aspects of procurement 
within the organisations in terms of the approaches used.  This process instilled confidence in 
the researcher that the methodological approach and research questions, to which answers 
were being sought, were valid.  It also enhanced the researcher’s knowledge and contributed 
positively towards the researcher’s perceived credibility in the eyes of interview respondents. 
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3.5.2 Semi-structured interviews  
 
In the second phase, more in-depth face-to-face interviews were conducted in the participant’s 
workplace.  The time period during which this was undertaken was influenced by the various 
constraints, which necessitated that blocks of interviews be done when visiting each location.  
All interviews were audiotaped with a portable digital voice recorder and notes were taken 
during the interview.  The average length of time per interview was 66 minutes and the 
interviews ranged from the shortest at 44 minutes to the longest at 123 minutes.  Open-ended 
questions were used in a stem-plus-query design (Cavana et al. 2001, p.139) which allowed 
room for other issues to emerge, and for the researcher to prompt and probe, based on the 
answers provided by participants.  The pattern of the interview was designed to be a series of 
funnel sequences (Cavana et al. 2001, pp.142-143) starting with a broad unstructured open-
ended question and then proceeding to more structured less open questions and closed 
questions directly related to research questions (see Table 3.1).   
 
Table 3.1: Value-for-money Subsection of Interview 
Open-ended question:  I am very interested in value-for-money. Would you tell me about 
Value for Money?   
Closed question focused on a research sub-question: To what extent is purchasing value-
for-money an objective?  
Open-ended question focused on a research question: What does value-for-money mean to 
your department?   
 
The pattern of the interview was used in order to get the interviewee into the rapport zone (see 
Figure 3.4) so that they would speak honestly and openly (Delahaye 2005, p.179).  
Responding was undertaken to demonstrate active listening skills on behalf of the interviewer 
(Cavana et al. 2001).  The interview protocol is presented in Appendix C. 
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Figure 3.4: The pattern of an interview 
 
Source: Delahaye (2000, p.166); cited in Cavana et al. (2001, p.139) 
 
The interview pattern was piloted on a respondent from one of the cases with whom the 
research had a previous research relationship.  The pilot study did not become part of the 
main study and instead was used to validate the interview format.  The pilot respondent 
indicated that the questions being asked were reasonable and provided the researcher with 
confidence in the interview approach.     
 
Woodside and Wilson (2003) state that triangulation includes probing by asking participants 
for explanations and interpretations of operations data.  This was done by asking project 
managers to respond to short scenarios focused on an operational context (see Table 3.2) 
designed to re-explore information discussed earlier in interview. 
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Table 3.2: Scenario from Interview Approach 
A: SCENARIO: The Department of Education wants to build a Primary School in (a regional 
town).  Stage 1 of the project is estimated to cost $9.5 million 
? How would you procure in this case? 
? What would Best Value be in this case? 
? What Government priorities that you would seek to advance? 
? Who would determine these priorities? 
 
B: The policy changes decreeing that all Schools should all have solar panels which will 
reduce the running costs for hot water and electricity in conjunction with supporting 
environmental technologies (holding tanks for hot water etc).  By installing the solar panels 
for this project the budget is exceeded by $600,000.  
? Which decision do you take? 
? Who would determine the priorities? 
 
3.5.2.1 Respondent Recruitment 
 
Cavana et al. (2001) describe purposive sampling as being confined to specific types of 
people who can provide the desired information.  They further describe judgement sampling 
as involving subjects who have expert knowledge and are in the best position to provide 
information.  Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, p.125) describes purposeful sampling as 
selecting individuals and sites for study because they can purposefully inform an 
understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon of the study.  Directors of the 
procurement agencies were contacted via telephone and the researcher was introduced and the 
purposes and objectives of the research were explained.  A follow up email to these directors 
contained a plain language statement further explaining the project (see Appendix E) and 
requested email addresses to enable the researcher to contact project managers.   
 
The interview based method was designed to elicit responses from project managers about 
how procurement was undertaken rather than policy and procedural documentation that 
describe how procurement should be undertaken.  Data was collected at A(C) and A(R), 
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before proceeding to case B(C) and B(R), C (C) and C(R), D(C) and D(R), and E(C) and E(R) 
(see Table 3.3).  Data collection was conducted in a focused data collection phase between 
February and July 2008. 
 
Table 3.3: Data Collection Schedule 
Order  State Construction Roads 
1 A A(C) A(R) 
2 B B(C) B(R) 
3 C C(C) C(R) 
4 D D(C) D(R) 
5 E E(C) E(R) 
 
Thirty-six hours of interview data were generated containing approximately 320,000 words.  
Data collection and analysis proceeded simultaneously (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  Interview 
tapes were transcribed in full and data was loaded into NVIVO for broad bucket coding 
(Bazeley 2007; Richards 2005).  All of the 37 interviews were transcribed verbatim, 22 
interviews were transcribed by a professional transcription service and 15 were transcribed by 
the researcher.  The external transcription service was used to save time.  However, the 
transcription undertaken by the researcher was built into the design in order to immerse the 
researcher in the data.   
 
3.5.3 Secondary Data  
 
Content analysis of the State Government Documents including State Strategic Plans, State 
Budgets, and Policy and Procedures documents on construction project procurement was 
undertaken.  This was primarily to get an overview of the various policies.  The Strategic 
Plans were studied to look at the articulated strategies for Governments and to identify 
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Government Priorities.  Budgetary information was studied to gauge the level of spending on 
infrastructure, and to assess whether this expenditure was linked to regional, training 
objectives or policies.  Policy and process documentation on procurement, for example on 
prequalification was examined in order to gain some insight in to how construction projects 
are procured by State Governments. 
 
3.6 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
 
A multiple case study is a holistic design when there is only a single unit of analysis and an 
embedded design where there are multiple units of analysis (Yin 2003).  Case studies do not 
always use the organisation as the basic unit of analysis, and may instead use the individual, 
as is often done in medical research, or a group or number of organisations that share 
common characteristics (Funnell 1996; cited in Smith 2000).  Jensen and Rodgers (2001) 
comment that in Public Administration the unit of analysis tends not to be an individual 
person and generally a larger entity (organization, institution, policy etc).  In this case the unit 
of analysis is the procurement agency, because the focus of the research is the way policy is 
deployed through procurement, as illustrated in Figure 3.5.   
 
Figure 3.5: Case Study Design  
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Source: Yin (2003, p.76) 
 
 94
Whilst the data has been collected from individual public sector managers responsible for 
procuring infrastructure, it is assumed that their views are methodologically representative of 
the organisation.   
 
3.6.1 Trustworthiness and Triangulation  
 
Triangulation in qualitative research can mean drawing on multiple data sources in a multi-
method design, but it also refers to ensuring trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Cavana 
et al. 2001).   In qualititative research trustworthiness is crucial and somewhat of a proxy for 
validity.    Lincoln & Guba (1985) highlight four criteria against which the trustworthiness of 
qualititative research can be assessed; credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability.  These criteria have parallels in positivistic quantitative research as internal 
validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity.   
 
This research addressed credibility by undertaking a systematic approach to data collection 
and analysis as well as employing various approaches to triangulation.  Collis and Hussey 
(2003) describe triangulation as the use of different research approaches, methods and 
techniques in the same study.  This research uses theoretical triangulation by employing a 
multidisciplinary theoretical framework to guide the data collection and explore the 
phenomenon. Yin (2003, pp.98-98) believes that triangulation of data can be used by 
engaging multiple sources of evidence.  In this research both primary data in the form of 
interviews and secondary data in the form of document analysis were undertaken.  Whilst 
some documentary analysis was undertaken the primary data being used was interview data, 
as fundamentally the project was interested in the operational perspective on procurement 
rather than a policy perspective.  To overcome this reliance on the interview data, the research 
further uses triangulation of data by having multiple respondents from within cases 
(approximately 3-4 interviewees for each case).  Multiple respondents were interviewed from 
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the chosen case organisations to enable triangulation of responses to confirm and deepen the 
information gathered (Woodside & Wilson 2003). This enabled the research to confirm the 
findings, but also showed some inconsistencies that showed the researcher that approaches to 
procurement were not quite as uniform as sometimes thought. 
 
Some checking of responses was entered into by email and telephone where information was 
not fully clear in interview transcripts.  Patton (2002) comments that inconsistencies in results 
should not be viewed as lessening the credibility of results and triangulation is actually to test 
for consistency.  Given the indepth nature of qualititative research external validity is not 
possible or desirable and instead transferrability is important to enable comparison with other 
studies. Lincoln and Guba (1985) comment that qualitative researchers must couple their 
findings with a description of the time and context in which they were found. Whether 
findings can be viewed as transferable depends on the time and context in which they were 
found and is an assessment made by others.   
 
Dependability in qualitative research refer to the acceptability of the process.  Confirmability 
refers of the research is about the data being internally coherent.  In pursuit of dependability 
and confirmability the senior supervisor engaged in an audit of the data analysis approach and 
the second supervisor reviewed the accounts of the case studies created.   
  
3.6.2 Ethics 
 
Another element in ensuring academic rigor is adherence to ethical requirements.  This 
research was conducted in accordance with University ethics guidelines.   Each participant 
was emailed a plain language statement (See Appendix E) describing the area of interest, 
purpose of the research, expected duration of the interview and their rights as participants.  
An informed consent form was then signed prior to the interview (See Appendix F).  All 
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participants agreed to be taped, and as per University regulations digital files of the interviews 
will be stored in a secure location for five years and destroyed after this time. The risk to 
participants was minimal in this research.  
 
3.6.3 Analysis of Data 
 
The purpose of the data analysis is to understand the creation of public value by Australian 
State Governments when procuring infrastructure.  Systematic data analysis was undertaken 
to increase the likelihood of producing trustworthy account of the research (Pettigrew 1990; 
Lincoln & Guba 1985).  The use of computers to analyse qualitative data has become standard 
practice and Nvivo 7 was used to manage the data (Richards & Morse 2007, Bazeley 2007). 
 
Data reduction is an important step in the analysis of qualitative data as it can be challenge to 
make sense of such a large volume of data. Following the guidelines of Yin (2003) on general 
strategies for analysing case studies the researcher used theoretical propositions which helped 
focus the analysis and was the first step in reducing the data.  Reduction and display was 
enabled by Nvivo 7 following the steps laid out by Dey (1993) were undertaken including: 
reading and annotating, creating categories, assigning categories, linking data, making 
connections and producing an account.  
 
The interview transcripts were read and studied as advocated by Dey (1993), and the 
researcher was immersed in the data as part of the research design through transcribing 40% 
of the interview transcripts.  Next, annotations were made of elements deemed interesting, 
needing further classification, or justifying the categories created through the analysis 
process.   
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The next step was creating and assigning categories and this is done in Nvivo by creating 
either free nodes, in which there is no presumed relationship or connection, and tree nodes in 
which there are heirarchical structures in which parent node serve as connecting points of 
subcategories or types of concepts (Bazeley 2007).  Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Beverland, 
Kates, Lindgreen and Chung (2009) describe axial coding (tree nodes) as reassembling the 
data into a set of categories, sub-categories, properties and dimensions.  The process of 
coding the interview transcripts involves highlight chunks of text and assigning the text to a 
node, and sections of an interview can be assigned to multiple nodes.  Microscopic and 
thematic analysis of the interview transcripts to code the data was undertaken to reveal both 
open (free nodes) and axial codes (tree nodes) (Richards 2005; Cavana, et al. 2001; Miles & 
Huberman 1994, pp.90-101; Strauss & Corbin 1998, pp.58-59).   
 
A combination of a priori codes drawn from the research questions were used as a starting 
point but also inductive codes were drawn from the data.  Using the grounded theory 
approach of open coding can supplement the ideas of theoretical framework.   
 
Interviews were then further reduced adhering to advice from Miles and Huberman (1994) 
who encourage the qualitative researcher to consider how their data might be further reduced, 
and graphically presented enabling conclusions to be drawn.  Particular emphasis and thought 
was given to how to display the data and Figures 4.2, 4.3 & 4.4 provide examples of the types 
of diagrams developed. 
 
Approximately one year was spent refining the analysis and writing the results chapters which 
Dey (1993) descibes as producing an account of the research.  The researcher aimed to 
produce an account that satisfied Dey’s (1993) criteria as interesting, accessible and rigorous.  
This iterative process of analysis and writing helped to clarify and integrate concepts and 
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relationships.  Participant names and organisations were anonymised in the writing phase in 
order to protect their identities.  Cross case analysis whereby a systematic comparison of 
cases investigated similarities and differences between cases was undertaken (Yin 2003).  
 
In presenting diagrams for each case assessments were made by the researcher as to the value-
for-money knowledge of interviewees based on responses to the questions about value-for-
money.  These responses were then mapped onto the value-for-money matrix framework 
derived from the literature as either high, medium or low.  This mapping exercise was also 
informed by the responses on the contractual approaches being used with the higher 
frequency of traditional procurement undertaken by a project manager corresponding with a 
lower usage of non-price criteria.   
When cross case comparisons were undertaken the individual responses from project 
managers were aggregated to form an overall case perspective.  Similarly for the theoretical 
framework that is used heavily in the presentation of results and analysis the researcher made 
assessments based on aggregating individual responses to the research questions to form an 
overall case perspective against the literature framework.  
 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Exploring the meaning of value-for-money necessitated the use of the social constructivist 
paradigm as the research undertaken sought to construct meaning gained from the insights of 
respondents.  The nature of the research was considered too complex to be effectively 
operationalised in a survey; hence the qualitative interview based approach adopted was 
considered appropriately matched to the research questions.  It was felt that this semi-
structured approach was the best way of collecting rich data from public managers that 
allowed the theoretical elements of the framework to be explored but also allowed concepts to 
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emerge from the data.  The interview approach highlighted in Appendix C was used to ensure 
some repeatability in procedures to enable cases to be compared.   
 
A multiple case study approach means that the conclusions drawn and theories developed are 
stronger than they would be with one single case.  However, there are limitations as to the 
conclusions that can be drawn and the  
 
Content analysis of policy and strategy documents has also been undertaken, but because the 
research focuses on the operational activities of procurement, there is significantly less 
emphasis placed on these documents than there is on the accounts of project managers.   
 
Chapter 4 presents the results for the construction cases and concludes with cross-case 
analysis of the themes emerging from the construction cases.  The construction cases 
comprise government agencies who procure construction projects which can range from 
frequently procured buildings like schools and police stations to larger scale, less frequently 
procured projects like hospitals and prisons.  
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CHAPTER 4 - WITHIN CASE RESULTS - CONSTRUCTION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents within-case results for the five construction works cases [A(C), B(C), 
C(C), D(C), E(C)] drawn from Australian State Governments.  Sections 4.2-4.6 present the 
results and analysis of the individual construction cases, whilst section 4.7 focuses on the 
conclusions drawn from the cross case analysis of the construction cases.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 are structured and presented around the five primary research questions.  For 
case A(C) a detailed case analysis containing excerpts from the semi-structured interviews is 
presented.  For cases B(C), C(C), D(C) and E(C) a summary case analysis is presented with a 
smaller selection of quotes.  Detailed case analysis was undertaken for all cases using the 
same approach outlined in case A(C) from which the summary of results presented here was 
then developed.   
 
4.2 CASE A (C)  
 
4.2.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.1 the project managers interviewed in Case A (C) were highly 
experienced having have spent their whole careers in the public sector, with an average of 35 
years experience. A(C)2 has over 35 years experience procuring construction projects, A(C)3 
has 25 years experience, whilst both A(C)1 and A(C)4 have more than 15 years experience.   
Three of the participants hold Bachelor degrees; A(C)2 (Engineering), A(C)3 (Architecture) 
and A(C)4 (Building), with A(C)2 also holding a Masters degree in Business Administration.  
A(C)1 holds an Associateship in Architecture.   
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Figure 4.1: Case A (C) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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4.2.2 Procurement Operations 
 
Case A (C) is an internal government department that provides construction and procurement 
services to client departments on a fee for service basis.   
We’re one of the main service providers to government for procurement of capital works 
projects – Interviewee A(C)4. 
Departments lodge a request for project funds from Treasury, which is then submitted to 
Cabinet for approval.  Client departments are not tied to using the delivery agency, and have 
the option of engaging a private sector project management firm to procure construction for 
them.  Many departments opt for internal delivery due to established working relationships.  
Within the delivery department there are project managers specialising in procuring 
construction projects for specific client areas e.g. health, education, corrective services etc.  
An overarching legislative and policy framework guides the construction procurement 
process.  
And now everything is fairly tightly prescribed within that as to how agencies procure projects  
… and it's much more tightly controlled than it used to be.  The guidelines are mandatory for 
these client agencies – Interviewee A(C)2. 
As can be seen from Figure 4.2, large projects are procured centrally from the state capital but 
smaller projects (under $20 million) are often procured by regional offices of the delivery 
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agency.  On projects of value equal to or greater than $20 Million the proposed procurement 
solution is submitted to an internal committee for approval and advice on how to procure.  
So we lean on them to tailor a contract to suit unique circumstances.  – Interviewee A(C)4. 
Case A (C) has a pre-qualification system that requires building contractors seeking 
government work of $250,000 or above to be prequalified, whilst consultants must be 
prequalified if seeking work of greater value than $30,000 or under $30,000 if deemed to be 
of high risk (see Figure 4.3).  Prequalification has four levels relating to the value and 
complexity of the projects.  Prequalification requires parties wishing to bid on Government 
projects to submit a range of information about their business for assessment.  This comprises 
a mixture of information about financials, insurance, people and track record.  When 
successful in prequalification, this allows firms to bid for work within their prequalification 
level and below.  Tenders are either open bid for projects of low value and complexity (below 
$30K for consultants and $250K for contractors) or over those thresholds bids are received 
from suitably pre-qualified consultants and contractors.  Select tenders occur on projects of 
higher value and complexity where a number of pre-qualified consultants and contractors 
(approximately 4-6) are invited to tender on projects that are deemed to suit their skill set and 
experience. 
So, we would go out - - it could be open tender, anybody who is on our prequalification could 
tender for that, or select tender.  It depends on the circumstances.  It could be fully 
documented, it could be Design & Construct.  – Interviewee A(C)4. 
 
4.2.2.1 Procurement Approach 
 
The procurement approach is tailored on a case-by-case basis and influenced by perceived 
risk, complexity and location  
That's a factor (complexity), but I mean it's all about the risk, and the dollar value, I think by 
definition, a higher dollar value is defined as a higher risk, but it's more about the time.  I 
mean, you don't choose a non-traditional form with, you know fast tracking, with concurrent 
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design and construction, if time isn't a factor … But, I mean, that's changing a bit too now.  
There's horses for courses.  Partnerships are important for more complex projects and you 
share the risk.  - Interviewee A(C)2. 
Client department’s preferences can influence the approach adopted.  This can range from the 
client department’s attitude towards risk and innovation, to a desire to fast track, or a desire 
for cost certainty.   
These days (the client department) would have a very strong view about how it is to be 
procured … They have a very strong preference for Design & Construct. -  Interviewee A(C)2. 
Small contracts (under $20 million) tend to proceed down the traditional pathway, whilst  
shows that larger contracts tend to be procured using some variation on D&C or Managing 
Contractor.   
The way the process is depicted by Walker and Hampson is too simplistic and doesn’t match 
our contracts.  Almost all of the large ones I am involved with are Managing Contractor which 
is a mixture of Design & Construct Management, Novation of consultants and a Guaranteed 
Construction Sum.  – Interviewee A(C)2 
 
4.2.3 Summary 
 
The procurement approaches adopted by Case A(C) are selected to manage risk and the 
organisation is somewhat risk averse.  Figure 4.2 highlights the financial thresholds that 
trigger different procurement approaches when selecting building contractors, whilst Figure 
4.3 describes the selection process for building consultants.  Table 4.1 presents the contractual 
approaches used and their frequency of use by individual project managers.  The traditional 
approach to construction procurement is used when the projects are under $20 million.  A 
form of D&C called Managing Contractor is frequently used when projects are of a value 
over $20 million and considered more complex.  Regional offices handle projects up to $20 
million, and projects valued above that are procured centrally from the capital city.  
Transaction costs have been considered in the way thresholds are used for tendering, at times 
 104
mandating prequalification, and through the shortlisting of appropriate contractors or 
consultants. 
 
Figure 4.2: Case A(C) Procurement Decision Model – Building Contractor 
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Figure 4.3: Case A(C) Procurement Decision Model – Building Consultant 
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Table 4.1:  Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case A(C)  
 
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-
call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
A(C)1   100% 
Managing 
Contractor 
D&C 
     
A(C)2 80 % 20 %       
A(C)3 98 %  2%      
A(C)4 50 %  40%  10%    
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4.2.4 Defining value-for-money 
 
Whilst no official definition of VFM emerged from the interviews, all respondents indicated 
that procuring on the basis of VFM was an important objective of their work. 
It is a huge objective.  – Interviewee A(C)4 
Oh, ultimately to me, it’s the objective, I guess the whole process is geared around value for 
money.  – Interviewee A(C)3 
Because the public expect to get value-for-money, they not only expect to get it, they actually 
want to see we’re getting it too. – Interviewee A(C)1 
 
Value-for-money is a complex construct. 
It's a very tricky thing to compare, but I guess we probably can't until the very end of the day, 
because the arguers would say well it's all about innovation, it's all about whole of life costs, 
and, you know until 30 years time you will not be able to compare the value-for-money 
outcomes … So it's very difficult, you know, very tricky.  – Interviewee A(C)2. 
 
Because there is no universal definition given of VFM, and it is assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, it follows logically that the meaning of VFM will differ depending on the procurement 
approach being used.  For a traditional construction contract where there are separated phases 
of design development and construction, it is frequently the lowest price that is deemed to be 
VFM.  Risk is viewed as having been managed by having the design fully developed before 
starting the construction phase.  The non-traditional approaches to procurement integrate the 
design and construction phases into a more concurrent process.  From the client’s perspective 
there is a higher component of risk in these non-traditional approaches because the design 
documents that were tendered need further development before they can be used as the basis 
for an asset to be built physically.  These approaches rely less on price competition, because 
of this element of uncertainty around precisely what is to be built as the design still requires 
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further development.  These approaches present challenges for the delivery agency in 
justifying expenses and demonstrating VFM to their client departments. 
The big challenge for us at the moment is in these newer forms of procurement, which are 
threatening the way that - - that's not the right word … there's a major expense upfront to 
establish relationships with a contractor on an alliance project, which traditionally we have 
said aren't really required on building projects, because they're not as complex or high-risk as 
the infrastructure projects. Now, we might have to change that view … Now, in a value-for-
money sense, you have to really ask about that because we know the costs associated with that 
procurement are significantly greater.    – Interviewee A(C)2. 
In these non-traditional approaches to procurement, the importance of evaluating both price 
and non-price criteria through the tender process was viewed as a more important factor in 
achieving, and being able to demonstrate, VFM.   
A financial definition of VFM was the dominant perspective expressed by respondents.   
That you haven’t paid too much or too little for the product. You paid the right amount.  The 
price is right, yeah.  For the product, the product being the end product -Interviewee A(C)4.  
Yes, although there was a value-for-money assessment at the end. Having selected a preferred 
tenderer, there was a value for money assessment and a resource evaluation at the end, but it 
wasn't taken into account in the comparison … We put the QS (Quantity Surveyor) all over 
their proposals so that we made sure there weren't anomalies in the people they were 
proposing, with the rates.  And it was more about did the list of guys they were proposing 
really match our expectations of the role?   – Interviewee A(C)2.  
 
An important issue emerging from the financial perspective on VFM was that of justifying 
expenditure to client departments, and using competitive tendering and estimates to do so.   
Effective expenditure of money. I mean, we are always having to justify to our clients that the 
cost of projects you know, we bench mark it against existing projects, and in some cases will 
do a very detailed elemental estimate of the project to sort of satisfy the client this is what it's 
going to cost. – Interviewee A(C)4. 
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I mean, I don't know how you assess best value, other than call in competitive tenders … I 
don't know how else you would assess it – Interviewee A(C)2. 
Another theme relating to the financial perspective was the consideration of the life cycle 
costs of the built asset. 
It depends on the brief from the client, and based on that brief we’re going to balance capital 
against whole of life, and once we’ve got that to where that should be we should get the best 
possible balance of capital.  If we go too far this way with reducing capital costs, operational 
costs will increase, and that relates to value for money.  So it's that balance.  – Interviewee 
A(C)1 
I suppose we're responsible for making sure that the quality is achieved, that the construction 
is of a good quality, that there are no sort of lingering defects, that things are not going to 
break down 12 months after everybody has packed up and left. – Interviewee A(C)4. 
The delivery agency is influenced by what a client department values in terms of outcomes for 
their projects.  They therefore adopt a client perspective on what is valuable in terms of 
quality, time and procurement approach and this informs the selection criteria used. 
And from education's perspective, time is equally as important, as you know, the start of 
school, that classroom has got to be there, it's got to be able to be used.  – Interviewee A(C)4. 
 
Figure 4.4 maps respondents VFM knowledge with the manner in which they procure.  In 
Case A(C) the interviewees generally rated highly on both their VFM knowledge and 
moderate to high on their procurement approaches incorporating non-price criteria.  This is 
perhaps due to the high experience level of these project managers and the fact they are often 
procuring projects of higher complexity.   
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Figure 4.4: Case A(C) Interviewees' value-for-money matrix 
 
4.2.4.1 Summary 
 
Value-for-money is a complex construct requiring assessment on a case-by-case basis.  When 
procuring traditionally it is common for VFM to be considered lowest price with Government 
viewing the project as low in risk because the design documents have been fully developed.  
However on non-traditional projects where design documents are less developed a broader 
definition of VFM emerges.  A strong theme to emerge in case A(C) was that of taking a 
client perspective.  The outcomes sought by the client department influence the procurement 
approach used and what VFM means.  Client values might include a combination of timely 
completion, quality and cost, but may also include aspects of innovation and a consideration 
of an asset’s life cycle.   
 
4.2.5 Selection Criteria 
 
Project managers go through a risk assessment process and develop recommendations on the 
procurement approach, selection criteria and weightings.  This involves consultation with the 
client department and translating client values into non-price criteria.  The project manager 
discusses the approach chosen with colleagues in the delivery agency and the 
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recommendations are then submitted to a committee within the delivery agency for 
endorsement. 
I would discuss it with the client, what they thought about it. I'd discuss it with colleagues, 
what they thought about that as well … The final approval is the committee to say that's right, 
you've got the right selection criteria, you've got the right weightings, and it's okay to go.  So 
the process in place is to get it all lined up, so it's ready, get the contracts committee to say 
they endorse the process, and then go to the client and say can we go to tender and then we go 
to tender – Interviewee A(C)1. 
Generally it is a two staged selection process with the first stage requiring prequalification 
and the second stage the submission of a competitive tender for assessment.  Lead consultants 
and contractors are required to be pre-qualified and submit a tender for evaluation against key 
selection criteria which have a combination of price and non-price elements.  On traditional 
projects, building consultants tend to be awarded more on a 50/50 split of price and non-price 
criteria.  However, when selecting contractors on traditional projects the non-price criteria 
component is set between 5-10%.  It is typically set at 5% non-price criteria that relates to 
government imperative/priority criteria.  
 
Non price criteria are used more extensively on complex and or larger projects, when 
selecting both building consultants and contractors.  Smaller traditional projects are awarded 
predominantly on the basis of lowest price.  Commonly used non-price criteria are: the team 
being proposed, their level of experience and the construction methodology.   
The primary one is the quality of the team proposed and the track record in that sort of work, 
both the firm and the team.  I mean they’re the key things.  – Interviewee A(C)2 
Typically, we used price and non-price criteria.  Typically we've used criteria such as the 
recently (introduced) resource strategy and methodology. – Interviewee A(C)1. 
 
The non-price criteria used and level of weightings attached can vary significantly and are 
influenced by the client department.  For some client departments non-price criteria will be 
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between 70-80% on a non-traditional project.  However for other departments it is not as 
large.  
On the scoring sheet, there was one that sort of came out in front. I can't exactly remember 
what the percentage was, but usually we have 75 percent pricing or 70/30.  We never go more 
than 30 percent non-price criteria.  At the end of the day, the price actually probably came into 
it more.  – Interviewee A(C)4 
 
Part of the logic behind deeming the lowest price to be the best value in the case of traditional 
procurements is that consultants and contractors have generally submitted non-price criteria 
as part of the prequalification process.   
If they are invited to tender, you presumably think the three tenderers you have invited, are 
capable of doing the job.  – Interviewee A(C)3. 
Arguably, they all could have done it. They all could have completed it.  Well, they wouldn't 
have been on the list if they couldn't have done it. - Interviewee A(C)2  
 
There are a variety of methods for assessing non-price criteria that attempt to justify or 
demonstrate VFM.    
We keep the non price quite separate. We review that. We come up with a rated score and then 
the tender panel opens the prices and we have what we call a quality adjustment premium that 
we put on each tenderer to get some parity addressed, and the best one wins, not necessarily 
the lowest price.  It's a combination of pricing and non price. – Interviewee A(C)3. 
 
4.2.5.1 Summary  
 
Selection criteria vary considerably on traditional and non-traditional projects and between 
consultants and contractors.  On traditional projects non-price criteria are used for selecting 
consultants, but set at a minimal level for contractors.  Non-traditional projects tend to have a 
greater emphasis on non-price criteria in the selection process for both consultants and 
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contractors.  The selection criteria used are informed by risk.  In a traditional project, risk is 
seen to be managed by having completed design documentation and bids from prequalified 
tenderers.  There is recognition of the risk involved in the design process, hence the generally 
higher non price weightings used when selecting consultants (architects and engineers).  The 
non traditional procurement projects have a higher non-price element partly to reflect the 
inherent risk in design.  The fact that design and construction disciplines are being integrated 
to achieve some benefits means that the design is not fully completed before tendering and 
therefore there is more uncertainty as to exactly what is going to be built and how, and 
consequently more room for scope creep.  
 
4.2.6 Government Priorities 
 
All four respondents were aware of their Government’s Priorities but their working 
knowledge of how they applied to procurement seemed limited.   
A lot of the priorities are really, the priorities are set, but the choice of project is really set by 
agencies outside ours.  – Interviewee A(C)3  
But I mean, yes, they exist. Yes, they're recognized for what they are as political promises and 
political initiatives.  However, they're still recognized as valuable and desired aspirations, and 
generally the industry complies as far as it’s able. – Interviewee A(C)2 
To some degree I’m not sure whether the priorities are still in place – Interviewee A(C)1. 
 
The delivery agency considers that it is the client department’s responsibility to ensure that 
their project addresses an area of government priority. This requires a case being made by the 
client department to Treasury and Cabinet for funding and approval.   
The choice of project is really set by agencies outside ours. We're project managers. A client 
asks us to deliver something. We don't really question to a great extent.  Well, the Department 
probably does in its broader covenant perspective, but as a project manager, I don't question 
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whether this is a good project.  I mean, obviously, if it's an absolutely appalling project, you 
wouldn't work on it – Interviewee A(C)3. 
Clients view getting their project delivered as the priority. 
Well, the project itself was the priority. – Interviewee A(C)4 
Non-price criteria designed to achieve Government Priorities are meant to be included as 
standard selection criteria in all tender documents 
No. I mean, the priorities have to be incorporated into each contract.  I mean, they are a 
mandatory thing, and the contractors now have quite standard, sophisticated, ways of 
responding to it. Our clauses are very standard in terms of training, local procurement etc. 
Some contractors try harder than others to respond. Others will just pay lip service to things 
like local procurement.  – Interviewee A(C)2 
 
The two main Government Priorities to be advanced via the procurement process are local 
industry participation and training  
One is the local industry participation. The second one is the training … They're the two main 
ones that we get involved with.  – Interviewee A(C)1 
Look, all our policy says is that contractors will engage apprentices, and I don't know the full 
details of it. But it's a requirement put on the contractor to comply with the apprentice training 
policy which obviously requires a certain number of apprentices to be employed. – 
Interviewee A(C)3 
 
The physical location of a project influences the Government Priorities that are included as 
selection criteria.  For instance, if projects are located in indigenous or regional areas then 
project managers are likely to incorporate non-price criteria that seeks to advance local 
industry participation policy in the area.  Regionally located projects attract higher 
Government Priority weightings (10%), than non-regional projects (5%).   
The local industry participation plan is something that we think is important and usually still 
put that into selection criteria for a major project and we usually vary it in its percentage, 
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depending on where it is.  Five percent and ten percent in regional – Interviewee A(C)1 Local 
industry participation would generally be 5-10% of selection criteria – Interviewee A(C)2.  
Other priority areas mentioned were indigenous employment and public art.  There is less 
interest from clients in utilising the procurement process to deliver Government Priorities, 
particularly in policy domains of other government departments. 
They’re not interested in apprentice training.  I mean, corrective services are interested in 
getting prisons built - Interviewee A(C)1. 
The delivery agency expressed concern that Government Priorities were most likely not 
incorporated in to the procurement process when client departments engaged private sector 
delivery options.   
Unfortunately, our clients do sometimes go out and do their own things, and you wonder how 
they got away with it. – Interviewee A(C)4 
Projects are not audited against the government priorities. 
But we do report on how projects achieve the priorities of government, particularly the 
departmental projects of which the _____ is one. So I report how this is meeting the 
government priorities.  – Interviewee A(C)3 
 
4.2.6.1 Summary 
 
At some stage, the government has viewed the procurement process as a means to deliver 
joined-up government priorities. There is an existing framework for linking Government 
Priorities to procurement and it was suggested that Government Priority criteria are included 
as standard on all projects.  However, this criterion is not being pursued aggressively and 
appears far from standard, and seems somewhat at the discretion of the project managers.  
Projects are not audited as to how they performed against Government Priority criteria.  
Government Priorities do however get a sharper focus in regional locations as bidders are 
required to articulate their contribution to local industry.  Client departments are so focused 
on their goals, that it is a challenge for the delivery agency to push Government Priorities on 
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to their projects.  This is perhaps because the delivery agency is reliant on the client 
department for the ongoing funding of its activities.  When projects are not procured by the 
internal delivery agency, Project Managers felt that Government Priorities were not being 
pursued or advanced at all.  
 
4.2.7 Supply Chain Management 
 
Case A(C) adopts a very hands-off approach to supply chain management on its projects and 
instead engages lead contractors, via a tendering process to manage the supply chain.  They 
tend to stay out of the relationship between a lead contractor and its subcontractors. 
I have noticed the flavour coming through in a lot of tenders is that they are promoting their 
relationship with subcontractors and their long relationships with the same subcontractors … 
We try to keep out of that relationship. – Interviewee A(C)3 
 
In non traditional contracts they are attempting to overlay some processes that will create 
good working relationships between the key project members. 
In the contract, there are words like "cooperative contracting". … But there is nothing in the 
contract which sets anything up to make it happen … We have been putting in place 
partnering agreements, which involves the client, project services, the manager of the contract, 
the consultants and the subcontractors.  And we've tried to basically kick that off as soon as 
we appoint the managing contractor.  At that point, the subbies are not on board, but we try to 
have partnering workshops to start off with, set up charters for how we want to work together 
… It's not a contractual thing, it's just how our relation is going, where the issues are, where 
the big issues are … So the subcontractors have an opportunity to get involved in that. Some 
take it more seriously than others. Some not seriously at all. They think it's a waste of time, 
and that's fine. – Interviewee A(C)1 
 
Subcontractors are not required to be pre-qualified to work on Case A(C) projects and the 
selection of subcontractors is left to the head contractor on Government projects, particularly 
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in the case of traditional projects. Even when the Government client has had bad previous 
experiences with sub-contractors proposed by a major contractor they are reluctant to get 
involved in the selection decision. 
We don't select them. I mean, it's up to the contractor to select … The contract requires that 
we sort of have a look at who he's proposing to use and agree.  We don't usually knock 
anybody back, unless we're aware there is some issue.   – Interviewee A(C)4  
From the point of view of selecting subcontractors for traditional jobs, we have almost no 
input into it. – Interviewee A(C)1 
 
For non-traditional projects the delivery agency has more input because these contracts often 
require the lead contractors to prove that they selected subcontractors on the basis of VFM by 
competitively tendering on price.  If a lead contractor wants to select a subcontractor who did 
not submit the lowest price then the government client’s permission must be sought to do so 
The contract says they have to be tendered competitively, and we're looking for at least three 
subcontractors for each tender … to ensure we're getting the value for money … He's got to 
actually prove that and demonstrate. … He seeks our approval of the package, the documents. 
He'll tender that. If it comes in and he reviews the package and it's conforming with the 
documents and the lowest as the best, he'll accept that and move on and then he'll let us know 
that he's done that. If it's not okay, and it's not the lowest and he wants to accept it into dollars 
he has to ask our permission to accept it … In most of these subcontractors it usually is going 
to be the lowest cost.  – Interviewee A(C)1 
 
Lead contractors receive regular feedback formally from the Government client as part of 
regular reporting cycles on projects.   
Yeah, we do a - I think it's monthly - - they tried to introduce monthly.  I'm trying to think.  It 
may not be monthly, it might be quarterly.  I would have to check on the time… Usually when 
you are critical you'll get a reaction and they'll want to discuss it … as PM, you don't usually 
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get a look at a form.  Unless you sort of dig your heels in and say I want to have some input 
into this guy – Interviewee A(C)4 
 
Generally, subcontractors receive no formal feedback from the client, and there is reluctance 
on the client side to provide feedback to subcontractors because the contract they have is with 
the lead contractor and not the subcontractor.  
There's no formal process for that. There's no real process for reviewing their performance.  – 
Interviewee A(C)4 
They may offer some feedback informally and this is more likely to happen in cases where the 
Government client is unhappy with the standard of the subcontractor’s work. 
We don't usually interfere in that.  Yes. I mean, occasionally we might raise issues that at site 
meetings and stuff like that if unhappy with performance, but apart from that we don't buy into 
it because it’s, the contract is with the subbie.– Interviewee A(C)4 
 
The link between performance on projects and access to future opportunities for work is not 
strong. 
Occasionally you might get a bad mark, as you know. The builders clearly don't like that. 
Whether it influences things or not? I've never heard that.  – Interviewee A(C)4 
However, the Government client feels that its purchasing power has an influence on the 
behaviour of the supply chain. 
Feel as though if they don't do as well on this one, they won't get a chance for the next one, 
and so good relation with us … means they will continue to be on the tender lists … you still 
get the problem of a bad report that it might go through to someone else, but maybe you'll get 
away. But we've certainly seen I think ongoing now for some years with builders, probably not 
claiming and not putting in major claims against us because they don't want to not get a job in 
the future, and some have been quite blatant about it … Or not at all, because they know that 
there's a similar job coming up.  – Interviewee A(C)1 
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There is little done on the client side in terms of supplier development activities 
What do you mean "supplier development?"  Do you mean innovation? It's probably one for 
(Pilot Interviewee 1) to answer. I don't know.  – Interviewee A(C)3 
 
4.2.7.1 Summary 
 
The approach to supply chain management is to pay the lead contractor to manage the supply 
chain on government’s behalf.  There is no formal mechanism for the client to provide 
performance feedback to subcontractors.  However, feedback is given to lead contractors that 
may or may not relate to the performance of subcontractors.  Clients are loathe to get involved 
because the contractual relationship is between the subcontractor and the lead contractor.  
Almost nothing meaningful is undertaken in the area of supplier development for either the 
lead contractor or subcontract sector.   
 
For traditional procurements lead contractors are selected predominantly on the basis of price 
and a varying mixture of price and non-price on non-traditional approaches.  In both 
traditional and non-tradition procurements, subcontractors are selected almost solely on the 
basis of lowest price and it is very much the exception for a subcontractor to be selected by 
other criterion as government requires lead contractors to demonstrate that they have been 
selected on the basis of lowest tender. As a consequence, lead contractors are discouraged 
from using non–price criteria in the selection of subcontractors even on projects where they 
have been selected on that basis.   
 
Figure 4.5 aggregates the responses received from the project managers in case A(C) against 
the dimensions of the theoretical framework to present an overall case perspective.  A cross 
case analysis of the construction case responses is contained in section 4.7. 
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Figure 4.5 aggregates the individual responses received from the project managers in case 
A(C) to form an overall case perspective against the elements of the theoretical framework.  
As can be seen from Figure 4.5 case A(C) defines value-for-money more broadly than just 
price and attempts to pursue some policy by-products through the procurement process.  
Efforts are made to design tendering processes that minimise wasteful non-value adding 
tendering costs, but there is very little active management of the supply chain. 
  
Figure 4.5: Case A(C) 
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4.3 CASE B (C)  
 
4.3.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
Two of the respondents B(C)1 and B(C)4 hold Bachelor degrees; B(C)1 in Architecture and 
also holds a Graduate Certificate in Management, B(C)4 in Engineering. B(C)3 holds an 
Associateship in Architecture whilst B(C)2 was a draughtsman. Figure 4.6 presents the 
interviewees age, public sector and procurement experience.  From Figure 4.6 it can be seen 
that the project managers interviewed were all approximately 50 years old or over, and three 
have over 28 years experience in procurement, with B(C)4 having eight years experience 
procuring.  Aside from B(C)1 who has 14 years public sector experience, the other three 
respondents each have over 25 years experience in the public sector.   
 
Figure 4.6: Case B (C) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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4.3.2 Procurement Operations 
 
Legislation exists tying departments to procuring through the internal provider.  The 
overwhelming approach is that of lowest cost procurement of construction based on contracts 
with designers/architects/engineers and separate contracts with a construction contractor.  As 
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can be seen from Table 4.2, which presents the frequency with which contractual approaches 
are used by individual project managers, the traditional approach is predominantly employed 
[B(C)2 - 99%, B(C)3 and B(C)4 - 95%, B(C)1 - 90%].  The approach to prequalification 
incorporates both project value and complexity, and aims to reduce unnecessary tendering 
costs on both the industry and client side.  From Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 it can be seen that 
single select tenders are used for building contractors under $100,000, and are used for 
consultancies under $20,000 where the fees charged are predetermined by Government, or 
between $20,000-$100,000 where the fees are deemed within an acceptable range.  The 
approach to procurement is conservative, highly risk averse, and therefore unlikely to produce 
innovation.   
No, it tends to be all traditional because as I said 99.99% recurring. It's very rare in what you 
would call a normal construction, non construction project, we'll go to a Construction 
Management type contract, or even Design & Construct and things like that.  We tend to stay 
away from those in terms of government. – Interviewee B(C)2. 
 
Figure 4.7: Case B(C) Procurement Decision Model – Building Contractor 
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Figure 4.8: Case B(C) Procurement Decision Model – Building Consultant 
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case B(C)  
 
 
4.3.3 Defining value-for-money 
 
Whilst no formal definition of value-for-money was offered by respondents there was 
consensus that it is an important objective of procurement.   
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-
call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
B(C)1 90%  5% 2% 2%  1%  
B(C)2 99%  0.8%  0.2%    
B(C)3 95%  2%  2% 1%   
B(C)4 95%  2.5% 2.5%     
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Well it is part of government policy so it is part of everything we do.  – Interviewee B(C)3 
Value-for-money can not be prescribed, and instead needs to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis by an experienced project manager or director.  Given the propensity for traditional 
procurement it might be expected that VFM would be defined financially in terms of lowest 
cost.  However, this was not the case and respondents commented explicitly that VFM and 
lowest cost is not the same thing.   
Look, I think it's a term that is used loosely.  Value-for-money rolls off the tip of your tongue 
quite easily … Just because it's the lowest price it doesn't mean it's value-for-money.  When 
you get a contractor on board who might have been the lowest price but he delivers the project 
nine months late. Is that value-for-money?   – Interviewee B(C)2 
The overwhelming dominance of lowest cost tendering highlights that there is a dichotomy 
between the knowledge of the staff and the way in which it is applied through how they 
procure.   The respondents have a broader understanding of VFM but are locked into the 
organisation’s approach to procurement, perhaps because of the organisation’s risk aversion 
and the strong preference of Treasury for cost certainty. VFM is influenced by the 
procurement approach chosen and has a broader definition, not solely financial, on complex 
projects.  The project managers indicated that VFM in the consulting (design) and contracting 
(construction) disciplines were different.  It was felt that opting not to take the lowest tender 
in consulting, and instead spending more money, led to more tangible results.  Conversely, 
abandoning lowest cost tendering for building contracting produced a less tangible result.  
When all of the bids submitted by contractors on a traditional procured project are non-
conforming then the project managers have far more discretion and are allowed to select on 
the basis of best value rather than lowest price. 
 
From Figure 4.9 it can be seen that apart from B(C)3 the interviewees all had a high degree of 
knowledge about VFM but none of them regularly used non-price criteria in their 
procurement activities. 
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Figure 4.9: Case B(C) Interviewees’ Value-for-Money Matrix 
 
 
4.3.4 Selection Criteria 
 
For building contractors the primary selection criterion is price. 
So, to be quite honest with you, with those types of routine projects, by and large it comes 
down to conformity with the requirements of the tender document, and price, with a little bit 
of - I wouldn't say that it's a token consideration, but unless there is something in a buy local 
sense to do with the district factor or some sort of job in the regions, by and large the 
predominant driver in terms of the selection process is conformity with the tender 
requirements, and price, the tender price that is submitted. Regrettably, that's the case.  – 
Interviewee B(C)4 
For consultants 50% of selection decisions are not made on the basis of lowest price.  Non-
price criteria in the form of experience, people etc are used when selecting consultancies.  
Design consultants are selected more frequently on the basis of both non-price and price 
criteria.  There is recognition that it is worth paying for a good designer.  In both contractors 
and consultants the “buy local” policy gives a weighting preference to local firms.  The 
assumption is made for contractors that pre-qualification sorts out the contractors and those 
that are prequalified are of a suitable standard to work on Government projects.  Non-price 
criteria can be used as a pass/fail criterion to develop a shortlist of bidders (e.g experience 
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building hospitals) from which tenders will be submitted and awarded based on price.  On 
complex jobs the selection process may entail non-price criteria as part of the tender 
submission by building contractors.   
 
4.3.5 Government Priorities 
 
Case B(C) does not have articulated government priorities, or an overarching state planning 
document that addresses government priority areas.  Upon contacting the Premier’s 
department the researcher was advised to refer to the promises made before the last election 
as a reflection of the government’s priorities.  The construction procurement process has been 
viewed as a vehicle for achieving other government policies due to the presence of some 
overarching policies in the areas of training, public art and indigenous involvement.  
However, these joined-up policy initiatives do not appear to have been pursued in a highly 
coordinated manner.  One respondent expressed concern about the randomness with which 
requests are made of the internal delivery agency on projects.  Whilst projects are meant to be 
audited against policy initiatives, it is clear that the projects are not rigorously audited as to 
how well initiatives have been advanced.  Interviewee B(C)1 commented that you should be 
‘place driven’ when thinking about advancing Government Priorities or policy, and that the 
location of a project is central to shaping any additional value you are trying to create for 
communities.   
In location and it is place driven, right. Now, most agencies don't go and build two buildings 
in the same place pretty much at the same time to take advantage of it.  You know if we are 
building a school in ____, we won't be able to also build in, you know, something similar, 
another school in ____ because we're only building one. So the aggregation lies by coming 
across agencies, all right, a police station and a school and a medical centre, and some houses 
for that matter, that is an aggregation that you can only get in a non disaggregated model or 
some mechanism to get it, and government has just walked away from that.  – Interviewee 
B(C)1 
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4.3.6 Supply Chain Management 
 
Case B(C) adopts a “hands off” approach to supply chain management on its projects.  After 
selecting a lead contractor, primarily on the basis of price, the selection of subcontractors is 
left almost entirely to the discretion of the lead contractor.  There are some instances in which 
the client requires the lead contractors to nominate the subcontractors they are going to use 
for approval, but the subcontractors are not required to be formally pre-qualified.  
Subcontractors tend to be nominated in areas where specialised skills or experience is 
required, the number of suppliers in that field is small, or where the subcontract package is of 
a particularly high value.  There are instances in which a lead contractor might be asked to 
demonstrate that their chosen subcontractors have experience in the type of work they are 
bidding on.  Thus, on non-traditional procurements, the lead contractor’s ability to engage and 
manage suitable subcontractors might be incorporated in non-price criteria into the tender 
assessment. Feedback is given to the lead contractors formally via routine reporting cycles 
and informally when issues arise.  Feedback is not given either formally or informally by the 
client to subcontractors, although a subcontractor’s performance may be reported formally or 
informally to the lead contractor.  In theory there is a link between performance and future 
work opportunities, but the reality is that it has not been an area where the Government has 
been as vigilant as it might be.   
Yes, and it's not as strong as it could be but it does … My understanding is that it feeds into 
the system.  It's stated that it does but I just haven't actually seen a lot of evidence.  I know if 
there's an adverse report -- I understand that it's followed up. There is actually a letter that gets 
sent to the contractor, so to that extent it may impact on their categorisation but I just haven't 
been involved at that level to understand exactly how that feedback loop works.  – Interviewee 
B(C)4 
In terms of supplier development there is little evidence of any process.  The organisation 
attends industry association meetings and tries to communicate with the lead contractors 
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about what work is coming up, but apart from that, there is little formalised activity that 
would be recognised as supplier development with either lead contractors or subcontractors.   
 
Figure 4.10 illustrates the responses received from the project managers in case B(C) against 
the dimensions of the theoretical framework.  Case B(C) recognises both that lowest cost is 
not equivalent to VFM and the opportunity encapsulated in infrastructure procurement to 
pursue policy by-products. However, both of these intentions are hampered by the 
organisations strong preference for traditional tendering based on lowest cost.  Whilst 
tendering processes are designed to minimise wasted tendering costs on the supply side there 
is limited management of the supply chain. 
 
Figure 4.10: Case B(C) 
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4.4 CASE C (C)  
 
4.4.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
Three of the respondents hold Bachelor degrees, two in architecture C(C)3 and C(C)4, and 
one in Human Resources C(C)1.   Figure 4.11 illustrates the interviewees’ age, public sector 
and procurement experience.  From Figure 4.12 it can be seen that three of the interviewees 
were over 50 years old whilst C(C)4 was 42 years old.  Three of the participants had 
approximately 30 years experience in both procurement and the public sector whilst C(C)4 
had 18 years procurement experience and 15 years public sector experience.   
 
Figure 4.11: Case C (C) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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4.4.2 Procurement Operations 
 
In Case C(C) there is legislation tying departments to using the internal delivery agency to 
procure their construction projects.  From Figure 4.12 it can be seen that projects up to $4 
million are generally procured using a traditional approach whereas those over $4 million go 
to a specialised committee for further consideration.  From Table 4.3 it can be seen that even 
after consideration, approximately 80% are procured using a traditional approach. A 
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Managing Contractor approach tends to be used on fast track or high risk (brownfield site) 
projects.  Project managers within the delivery agency work on projects for a mixture of client 
departments matching the experience of project managers to the complexity of projects.  
Projects tend to range from $150,000 to $150 million and procurement is undertaken centrally 
from offices in the capital city.  For projects over $150 million, which are often Health 
projects, there appears to be a trend to have them undertaken as Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs), and these are procured by Treasury and not the delivery agency.  Whilst projects are 
internally tied, the delivery agency does have some discretion as to the projects they manage.  
On projects estimated to cost between $150,000 and $1 Million, where the internal delivery 
agency does not wish to manage the project, it can be procured by another internal agency 
devoted to facilities management activities.  Alternatively, it can be procured by the client 
department where it is deemed appropriate (e.g. boardwalks in national parks). 
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Figure 4.12: Case C(C) Procurement Decision Model – Building Contractor 
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Figure 4.13: Case C(C) Procurement Decision Model – Building Consultant 
 
Assess Service 
Being 
Proposed 
Assess Cost of 
that Service 
Building 
Consultant 
 
 131
Table 4.3: Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case C(C)  
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-
call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
C(C)1 75% *handled 
by 
different 
department  
3% 20%   2%  
C(C)2 80%  5%  15%    
C(C)3 70%  5%  18%  7%  
C(C)4 80% 1% 4%  15%    
 
4.4.3 Defining Value-for-Money 
 
Respondents agreed on the critical importance of VFM in construction project procurement.  
The respondents commented that VFM was the effective and efficient expenditure of taxpayer 
funds, and noted that lowest cost has rarely proven to be Value-for-Money.  A strong client 
focus was evident from Project Managers and the view that VFM on a particular project 
depends on what the client values.   
Well it depends on the client agency, at the end of the day what do the client agency want? Is 
their primary driver time? Is their primary driver cost? Is it just that they want a great asset at 
the end of the day? And depending on what their driver is, it would depend upon how we 
would structure the value-for-money component we were seeking. – Interviewee C(C)4 
VFM is therefore partly defined outside of the delivery agency by clients, which then 
influences the procurement approaches and selection criteria used.  A crucial component of 
VFM was ensuring that there was a match between the scope of a project and the budget.  
Project budgets are set external to the delivery agency by Treasury and the Client 
departments.  Project Managers are then charged with delivering a project within the 
predetermined budget and scope to satisfy the client department.   
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The perspective of VFM is broad and in some instances focused on adding value for client 
departments in terms of improving the service outcomes achieved from the physical facility 
being procured.  There was a focus on identifying opportunities to innovate and add real 
value, and linking this creation of value to the use of the facility by the client department.   
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.14 the respondents have a moderate to high level of knowledge 
about VFM and a varying degree of use of non-price criteria in their work depending on the 
types of projects they were procuring.  At best, there is only a moderate level of procurement 
on the basis of VFM, because approximately 80% is undertaken using a traditional approach 
selecting predominantly on price (see Figure 4.14).   
 
Figure 4.14: Case C(C) Interviewees’ Value-for-Money Matrix 
 
4.4.4 Selection Criteria 
 
Selection criteria are developed by Project Managers, but there may be some collaboration 
with members of the project team representing the disciplines of design, finance, client and 
delivery.  There are two pathways for selecting building contractors; the low bid approach and 
the value select approach.  The low bid approach does not mean that the lowest tenderer will 
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be awarded the project, but rather those tenderers whose bid is within the closest range to the 
estimate attracts the maximum score against the price criteria.  The low bid approach 
generally has a 90% weighting on price and a performance score based on previous work 
which is given a 5-10% weighting.  The value select approach is used if there are other 
criteria that the Government wants the building contractor to demonstrate in terms of 
capability.  The value select approach has a component of non-price criteria (50-70%), price 
criteria (30-45%) and a performance score (5-10%) (for example construction of a TAFE 
college).   
 
The traditional approach to construction procurement is undertaken 80% of the time and  
utilises a low bid approach.  On non-traditional projects they are far more likely to go down a 
value select pathway, particularly when using Managing Contractor approaches.  Choosing 
building consultants is done differently and tends not to involve formalised selection criteria 
the way that building contractor selection does.  It tends to be a process of assessing the 
service being offered (non-price) and then looking at the price, and determining if that price is 
within what is deemed to be an appropriate range. So the choice is based on non-price 
(service) then check to make sure fees are within an acceptable range.   
 
The use of non-price selection criteria seemed focused on getting the best team for the project 
and creating good working relationships.  The thinking being that to create value and deliver 
outcomes for clients, they need a team approach and the crucial thing is the relationships 
between the parties. 
 
4.4.5 Government Priorities 
 
The internal delivery agency views it as a client’s responsibility to ensure their projects are 
aligned with the state plan. The link between construction project procurement and the 
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strategic plan is made by the client department and is a crucial step in ensuring a project is 
funded by Cabinet.  It is up to the client department to demonstrate that a building will enable 
services to be delivered creating an appropriate level of public value that warrants investment 
by Cabinet.   
 
Projects are not strictly audited against Government Priorities identified in the state plan but it 
was suggested they do monitor their performance against this criterion.  The internal delivery 
agency believes that client departments would report on how their yearly activities 
contributed towards the delivery of the state plan, but not on a building project basis.  There 
was some recognition that the procurement process can deliver additional benefits but it did 
not appear to be a high priority.  Location determines how much indigenous and regional 
policies are sought to be advanced. GPs seemed to get more attention on regional projects and 
it was then that there was some opportunity for Project Managers to incorporate GPs as non-
price criteria. Training is something that has standard clauses on all Government projects but 
again was not being rigorously pursued or audited.  Ecologically Sustainable Development 
(ESD) issues seemed to be an area that the state wanted to be a major focus of the cross 
government initiatives in works.   
Well the non price stuff is about their experience, their practice’s experience, who they are 
putting on the project, their methodology for delivery, their ESD management that’s becoming 
more of an issue now, what else is there? – Interviewee C(C)1 
 
4.4.6 Supply Chain Management 
 
Subcontractors are selected by lead contractors.  However, for packages of work valued at 
over $150K subcontractors have to be prequalified.  This may be relaxed on regional projects 
to enable the engagement of local subcontractors where there are none that are already 
suitably prequalified.  There is a move towards approaches based on partnering principles and 
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some of the project managers were insistent that is how project team members have to behave 
on their projects.  Case C(C)’s approach to supply chain management is an arms length 
approach where they allow lead contractors to manage subcontractors but overlay some 
partnering principles and seek to engage subcontractors in value adding processes.  The 
project team often contains subcommittees of which one would be the subcontractor 
relationship working group that focuses on trying to get subcontractors involved in the 
relationship and the collaborative approach.   
 
Regular meetings are conducted to provide feedback on how project teams are performing 
whilst the project is running but this is largely focused on lead contractors.  The performance 
of lead contractors is reviewed on projects and a performance score is entered into the 
prequalification system which then becomes part of the selection weighting on the next 
project a contractor bids on.  When trades or subcontractors need to be prequalified, they 
would get feedback directly, but there is no prequalification performance score used as part of 
the selection process for subcontractors.  There is little formal feedback given directly to 
subcontractors and this tends to be done via the lead contractor.  The interviewees note that 
there is room for improvement in their feedback to subcontractors.   
We are not as good at that as what we should be (giving feedback to subcontractors) - I think 
we need to build on that particularly in our relationship contracts.  – Interviewee C(C)2 
 
Whilst there are no activities undertaken that the delivery agency recognises as being focused 
on supplier development there did appear to be one interesting initiative utilising Government 
staff.  The Government has employed a group of experienced ex-tradesmen who visit sites 
and spend time with contractors, subcontractors and consultants liaising with them about the 
approaches they are taking, and providing advice on the constructability of designs. 
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Figure 4.15 highlights the responses received from the project managers in case C(C) against 
the dimensions of the theoretical framework.  Case C(C) views VFM as entailing elements of 
value adding for clients but predominantly procures traditionally on the basis of lowest cost.  
There was mild recognition of policy by-product opportunities represented by infrastructure 
procurement.   Awareness was shown of the tendering costs imposed on the supply side and 
approaches to tendering reflected this.  Active management of the supply chain was 
recognised as important element in creating value.  
 
Figure 4.15: Case C(C) 
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4.5 CASE D (C)  
 
4.5.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
All five respondents hold Bachelor degrees; two in architecture D(C)1 and D(C)5, two in 
building D(C)2 and D(C)3 who held a trade qualifications, and also one in engineering D(C)4.  
From Figure 4.16 it can be seen that all five interviewees were over 40 years of age, with 3 of 
them approximately 50 or over.  Four interviewees have over 20 years experience in the 
public sector with D(C)3 having 8 years experience.  All interviewees have over 10 years 
experience in procuring construction projects with D(C)4 and D(C)5 having over 25 years 
experience. 
 
Figure 4.16: Case D (C) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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4.5.2 Procurement Operations 
 
Case D(C) administers an accreditation system that enables accredited departments to procure 
their own construction (see Figure 4.17).  If a department is not accredited they have to use a 
service provider that is accredited, this can be either the internal delivery agency or a private 
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sector firm.  The accreditation system aims to ensure that the groups purchasing construction 
have the necessary expertise to do so.   
 
Case D(C) has a prequalification system that incorporates both building consultants and 
contractors and classifies projects based on value.  Prequalification is used to limit the number 
of suitable contractors bidding and minimise waste in the industry.  From Figure 4.17 it can 
be seen that the size of projects being worked on in the internal delivery agency is on average 
about $10-12 million, but can range from $50,000 to $150 million. There is an initial funding 
approval process by Cabinet and Treasury, and then a later gateway process where projects 
have to go to Treasury, if they are over $10 million, for approval of the procurement approach 
proposed.  
 
Case D(C) procures using a mixture of contractual approaches including approximately 60% 
traditional, D&C, novation and construction management (see  
Table 4.4).  D(C)2 and D(C)3 procure, act as project managers for client departments and 
subcontract packages totally on the basis of lowest price.  
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Figure 4.17: Case D(C) Procurement Decision Model – Building Contractor 
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Figure 4.18: Case D(C) Procurement Decision Model – Building Consultant  
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Table 4.4: Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case D(C) 
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-
call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
D(C)1 40%  59% 1%     
D(C)2&3 100%        
D(C)4 *  * * * * * * * no-response 
D(C)5 10%  30% 40% 20%    
 
 
4.5.3 Defining Value-for-Money  
 
All respondents commented that value-for-money is an important aspect of their procurement 
activities.  When trying to define VFM the project managers were client focused and 
attempted to make sure they kept in mind what the facility will be used for by clients. 
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However being able to demonstrate or justify costs to other government stakeholders over the 
life cycle of the built asset was also seen as vitally important.  The impact of Treasury on 
defining VFM was evident at the concept stage and through the gateway process scrutinising 
the approach selected.  
And, we would in many ways have to respond to what our clients have rather than push our 
clients.  The pushing policeman role is no longer if it ever was with … It's with Treasury. 
Treasury is the one that would drive the sort of initiative.  – Interviewee D(C)1 
 
It was felt that the opportunity to really shape value-for-money is tied to the scope of a project 
and its design.  Hence, it was felt that there was more opportunity to influence it during the 
planning phase rather than once it gets to the tendering stage.  Design was seen as being very 
important in considering both the asset’s life cycle and the service outcomes delivered for 
clients.  An overwhelming theme defining VFM was that of paying the lowest price for a 
specified asset.  The idea is that an exact specification is built within the boundaries of 
estimates and a budget.  VFM in practice is still largely defined as the lowest price.   
If you are down a fully documented job and you have made so many decisions about what 
you're going to do, the opportunities for the best value-for-money almost boil down to who put 
the best tender in, in terms of dollars.  The only other value-for-money criteria, if there are 
design aspects in the tender.  – Interviewee D(C)1 
 
From Figure 4.19 it can be seen that respondents generally have a low to medium level of 
understanding of VFM and a low to medium approach to incorporating non-price criteria in 
their procurement activities.  D(C)2 and D(C)3 both procure solely on the basis of lowest 
price tender and have a limited perspective of VFM.  D(C)1, D(C)5 and D(C)4 all have a 
moderate understanding of VFM and a moderate approach to incorporating non-price criteria 
on their projects.   
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Figure 4.19: Case D(C) Interviewees’ Value-for-Money Matrix 
 
4.5.4 Selection Criteria 
 
The selection of building contractors is predominantly undertaken on the basis of price.  The 
project managers feel that because contractors have already submitted some non-price 
information, as part of both the prequalification process, and the shortlisting process, then 
there was no need to ask for it again.  There is reluctance by project managers to include non 
price criteria.  However, in instances where they are not using prequalified contractors, there 
might be a higher weighting given to non-price criteria.  Building consultants tend to be 
selected on the basis of a two envelope system, non-price and then price.  Non-price criteria 
are used as gateway criteria (pass/fail) and then selection is made predominantly on the basis 
of price.    The split between price and non-price criteria can get up to as high as 60% price 
and 40% non-price, but this is reported to be rare.  Design is seen as the area where it is worth 
introducing some non-price criteria post prequalification where it can add value to a project’s 
delivery.  The underlying assumption is that prequalification has addressed the non-price 
issues and unless there is a design element involved in the project e.g. the design needs further 
development, or elements of constructing that design, then there is no need to look at non-
price criteria again.   
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4.5.5 Government Priorities 
 
All of the respondents were aware of the existence of the state’s strategic plan and broadly of 
its content.  The alignment between the activities of a department and the strategic plan is 
articulated in a business unit (government department’s) plan that describes how they will 
contribute to the achievement of the state plan.  At the level of a project manager it is not 
explicit  as to exactly how that link works.   
So in a way, there is a roundabout link to the State plan and the senior executive service level 
of the department, those higher level executives, need to be able to demonstrate how their 
work fits into the State plan.  Not so much at our level.  – Interviewee D(C)2 
As part of getting a project funded, a case needs to be made about how a particular project 
aligns with the state plan.  The project managers commented that the focus of procurement 
activities is no longer on delivering social objectives.  Some Government Priorities are, on 
occasions, included as extra conditions on a contract, for example: regional involvement, 
aboriginal participation and apprentice training.  Government Priorities become more of a 
focus on non-traditional procurements.   
We do, you know, try and encourage and keep some records of apprentices and that sort of 
thing and we are - and the push is coming through now for aboriginal participation.  A number 
of projects within the department are being nominated within the contracts to be aboriginal 
participation projects, not just every project across the board.  …  All those things that you 
referred to are in your general conditions of contract.  We have environmental and safety 
requirements and that sort of thing they need to achieve that we keep statistics on and waste 
management reports and all that sort of thing that we do at our own level.  – Interviewee 
D(C)2 
Projects are not audited against the state plan government priorities, although it was suggested 
there are key performance indicators (KPIs) developed for projects, and project managers felt 
they probably align with state plan goals.   
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4.5.6 Supply Chain Management 
 
The approach to supply chain management is a mixed approach containing elements of hands 
off and arms length.  Subcontractors are selected by the lead contractors and are not required 
to be prequalified.  There are some special circumstances where a subcontractor may be the 
preferred subcontractor in particular areas, but this is reported to be rare.  The government 
does not like to get too involved with the contractor’s business of running its supply chain.  
However, lead contractors are encouraged to focus on the outcomes delivered by 
subcontractors for the Government client.  There is an attempt to align the expectations of all 
parties on the outcomes to be delivered.  Performance feedback is given as part of the 
processes laid out in the contract.  The project and contract method dictate the sort of 
feedback mechanism.  For traditional contracts, feedback is generally provided to lead 
contractors but not to subcontractors, unless there is an issue, and the lead contractor might be 
asked to bring a subcontractor along to a site meeting.  Under the relationship/cooperation 
contracts the project team is given a rating and consensus is sought from the group.  Under 
this form of contract, the head contractor is supposed to go through a similar performance 
feedback regime with its subcontractors.  The cooperative approach to contracting contains 
subcontracting conditions that try to ensure that lead contractors include subcontractors as 
part of the relationships in terms of payment, dispute resolution, variations and claims.   
 
In terms of access to future work, the suggestion is that there is a strong link between 
performance and future work, particularly when performance is considered poor.   
There is a strong link between the contractor performance report and prequalification.  And 
that totally governs their performance here, governs the number of opportunities that a 
contractor will be given to tender on projects.  It will also, if they were to get unsatisfactory 
ratings here, they would be interviewed as to why their performance is unsatisfactory and with 
a view to removing it from the prequalification list.  – Interviewee D(C)5 
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Figure 4.20 summarises the responses received from the project managers in case D(C) 
against the dimensions of the theoretical framework.  In case D(C) the perspective taken to 
VFM was largely about defining it in financial terms and procurement was in the main based 
on lowest cost.  There was very little recognition of the policy by-product opportunities 
procurement presented and little active involvement in managing the supply chain.  Efforts 
were made to minimise tendering costs on the supply side. 
 
Figure 4.20: Case D(C) 
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4.6 CASE E (C)  
 
4.6.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
Both respondents hold Bachelor degrees, one in architecture E(C)2 who also holds a Masters 
degree in Business whilst E(C)1 has qualifications in engineering and a Graduate Diploma in 
management.  As can be seen from Figure 4.21 E(C)1 is 38 years old, has 12 years experience 
procuring construction projects and 10 years experience in the public sector.  E(C)2 is 57 
years old with 35 years procurement experience and 4 years public sector experience. 
 
Figure 4.21: Case E (C) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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4.6.2 Procurement Operations 
 
The approach utilised in Case E(C) is distributed and decentralised; government departments 
are empowered to procure their own construction projects.  Since April 1996 the Departments 
have employed officers with specialist knowledge to facilitate this function.  The agency 
formerly responsible for delivery, whilst no longer procuring, maintains a centralised building 
policy role and administers the prequalification system.   
 
 147
As a result, the practices between departments vary and there is little commonality in their 
procurement activities. Figure 4.24 shows that one department has outsourced the bulk of 
these procurement activities to a private sector provider who employs a predominantly 
traditional approach to procure construction with separate contracts for designers and 
builders.    
Once we’ve got the tender documents finished, and we have the program manager for all of 
this is (private sector firm) … And they manage the whole thing in a sort of, they have very 
good overview system; they’re involved all the way along … They will then get a list of 
builders who are interested in tendering on say a job like this. And they may get twelve or 
fifteen; they can get quite a lot. – Interviewee E(C)2 
 
A small section (6) within the department is responsible for rolling out $1.7 billion in facility 
upgrades across the state, in conjunction with regionally based offices and project managers.  
They are examining the potential of PPPs as a method of delivering facilities where a 
maintenance period is built into the construction contract.   
 
For Department 1, consultants are obtained from the prequalification register administered by 
the centralised building policy department. 
 
For Department 2, consultants are required to write to the department they seek work with, 
and then are interviewed by the department.  They are then required to become prequalified 
with the central building policy department of government.  
And we have interviews every six months or so and we discuss the projects that we do, the 
typical projects, and see whether they’re interested, what service we expect from them, and an 
indication of the fees that we pay and that sort of thing, and ask if they would like to go on the 
list. They have to then go through a process of being approved by the (centralised building 
policy) department as having the adequate insurances and all that sort of thing. So then they 
get onto our list and they sit on the list.  – Interviewee E(C)2 
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In Department 1 the smallest project would start at $4million and the upper limit is not set, for 
example a PPP just undertaken was worth $400 million.  For Department 2 the projects tend 
to be in the $2-10 Million range, and there are about 7 projects underway using a PPP 
approach. 
The Department is now doing some PPP projects. And one of the benefits of course is that’s a 
lease arrangement. So you don’t actually pay for the building.  – Interviewee E(C)2 
 
Figure 4.22: Case E(C) Procurement Decision Making Model – Building Contractor (1) 
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Figure 4.23: Case E(C) Procurement Decision Making Model – Building Consultant (1) 
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Figure 4.24: Case E(C) Procurement Decision Making Model – Building Contractor (2) 
 
> $??? 
Y N 
Facilities  
Group  
 
Finalised Tender 
documents go to 
Private Sector 
firm who largely 
manage the 
tender process 
on the Govs 
behalf 
recommending 
5-6 to tender and 
then preferred 
tenderer   
Building 
Contractor 
$2 – 10 
Million
Y N 
Traditional 
99% 
PPP – 7 projects 
on the go – 1% of 
projects, 5% of 
value 
 
 150
Figure 4.25: Case E(C) Procurement Decision Making Model – Building Consultant (2) 
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Table 4.5: Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case E(C) 
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-
call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
E(C)1 70% 10% 20%      
E(C)2 99% 1%       
 
4.6.3 Defining Value-for-Money 
 
Both respondents indicated the importance of procuring VFM.  Their aim as procurement 
professionals is to define clearly and up front what they are looking for because VFM is not a 
fixed concept and needs to be specified on a project-by-project basis.  Generally this means 
financially constraining construction within the boundaries of a cost plan and making sure the 
internal quantity surveyor concurs with the rates proposed. Price is an important factor 
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shaping VFM but not the only aspect.  VFM must also consider any innovation that has been 
proposed either by architects or by builders.   
The cost is one aspect of it, but definitely not the only aspect. As I said, innovation, value 
adding, whoever tenders, do they come up with an innovative way of delivering the same 
thing at a lesser cost? It can be previous experience, it can be a particular technology that they 
propose to apply. It’s quite a number of things that are considered. Our objective is to actually 
be up front and specify, help them to work out what we’re looking for, and that’s an ongoing 
sort of task. I don’t think anyone nailed it one hundred per cent as yet. – Interviewee E(C)1 
VFM may also incorporate companies that work locally and source materials locally, but it is 
also an ability to deliver those components within the constraints of a cost plan.   Whilst VFM 
is viewed as being about value adding and innovation it is clearly intended from the 
Government’s perspective, that the innovation helps save money or means they get more for 
the same money.  Another theme to emerge was that VFM is about building facilities that 
create outcomes for client department within their policy domains.  
It’s simply getting the best educational outcome possible for the funds allocated; it’s as easy as 
that. Yes, it’s very simple. – Interviewee E(C)2 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.26 the VFM knowledge of the interviewees in Case E(C) was 
relatively low and the procurement approaches were largely using the traditional method and 
little or no non-price criteria.  It can also be seen that E(C)2 had a low level of understanding 
of VFM and no procurement activities using non-price criteria.  On the other hand E(C)1 had 
a slightly broader understanding of VFM and a moderate use of non-price criteria.  
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Figure 4.26: Case A(C) Interviewees’ Value-for-Money Matrix 
 
 
4.6.4 Selection Criteria 
 
In Department 1 non-price criteria such as value adding, innovation, experience, financial 
capacity and OH&S practices are included when selecting building contractors and it was 
noted by the interviewee that these are difficult selection criteria.  Non-price criteria are 
weighted at approximately 40% and price at approximately 60%.  Price criterion is awarded 
on how a bid compares to a pre-tender estimate.  If it’s lower than the benchmark then that 
bid gets the full score, if it’s within a range of 10% above it gets 80% of the score, if it’s more 
than 20% above it gets a score of zero.  
 
Generally an expression of interest would be circulated to what were deemed to be an 
appropriate pool of contractors and then a shortlist of contractors would be drawn up with a 
minimum of three tenderers.   
 
In the case of Department 2 a committee of local stakeholders who represent those inhabiting 
and using the facility are involved in interviewing consultants from a list of architects 
provided by the Department.  They then advise the Department which one they wish to work 
with. 
Now what we do is we then give the (client) say, three architects names from the list, and we 
say to the (client) go and interview these three architects and see which one you would like to 
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work with. So that’s how they get appointed, and then they enter into an agreement – the 
(client) and the architect into a client-architect agreement.  – Interviewee E(C)2 
The criteria did not appear to be formalised, and seems informally to be focused on their 
proposed approach to a project and their rapport with clients. 
 
For Department 2 that outsources procurement to a private sector firm selecting building 
contractors is conducted differently.  The private sector firm receives a list of approved 
building contractors from the centralised building policy department, along with the 
architect(s) it assesses the list and recommends a shortlist of 5-6 contractors to prepare 
tenders.   The private sector provider suggests the selection criteria and then an agreement is 
negotiated between the department and the firm about the weightings to be allocated to each 
criterion.  It was suggested that criteria could include whether building contractors were 
registered with government, the volume of work they do, the traditional size of projects, their 
insurance and the past experience with the builders.  The private sector firm evaluates the 
tenders and makes a recommendation to the department as to the preferred building 
contractor.   
So then with the architects they assess all of these, and again they have criteria on which to 
assess them – whether they’re registered with the Department, the volume of work they do, the 
traditional size of projects, their insurance, and all that sort of thing. And also our past 
experience with those particular builders too is important. (The private firm) will then write to 
us and recommend five or six tenderers. And then when tenders close again there is an 
assessment done by (the private firm), they get a report from the consultant then go through it. 
And they’re extremely good they do a magnificent job in really sort of checking that 
everything lines up and conforming tenders and all that sort of thing. And then out of all that, 
sometimes there are negotiations, out of all that they write to us and make a recommendation 
and they say we recommend you accept this tenderer.  – Interviewee E(C)2 
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4.6.5 Government Priorities 
 
Department 1 did its own procurement.  They acknowledged the opportunities that 
procurement contributed to the delivery of government priorities but asserted that earlier in 
the process, in the planning phase was where the most significant impact could and should be 
made.   
It goes actually a step back, procurement it’s possibly even too late or you’ve got a much 
better opportunity to implement those policies during the planning stage … I mean we went 
locally to build the (facility). And in fact we opted to go for a public tender to give opportunity 
to local builders as well because they’re not actually registered … so we’re trying to take that 
into account. The point I’m trying to make is I think you’ve got more opportunity to make an 
impact earlier in the process.  – Interviewee E(C)1 
 
An important aspect when applying for funding is demonstrating how well a project’s 
procurement fits into the overall objectives of Government. In Department 1 of case E(C) the 
planning phase was viewed as being the appropriate time for considering the overall policy 
objectives of Government.  Consideration at this stage allows these policy objectives to be 
addressed and costed.  Their subsequent inclusion during the procurement phase can lead to 
budget creep and sometimes creates the perception for Treasury that a project is not delivering 
VFM.   
 
Where a project is located in a regional area, and costs over $1 million it must comply with a 
regional/local content policy, in the capital city the threshold is $3 million.  Firms are required 
to articulate how they will contribute to the state’s development by using local materials, 
labour etc.  Apart from this regional/local content policy there are no other standard clauses in 
contracts relating to GPs. An overriding imperative is the need to be financially responsible; 
in government this creates a price pressure and a department is much more likely to consider 
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an initiative that has a direct benefit to its portfolio as opposed to trying to include objectives 
of other jurisdictions.  
 
Officers in Department 2 did not appear to be overly aware of the Government Priorities as 
identified in the state plan.  It was assumed there was an alignment between their procurement 
activities and the plan, but that it was the responsibility of a higher manager to ensure 
compliance.   
Look I’m not really familiar with the goals to be perfectly honest. (Document containing 
priorities shown to interviewee). Well I think all of those points are in fact definitely shared 
goals that are within what we do. They all really occur in our work in everyday occurrence … 
So I think they really are all being achieved very well.  – Interviewee E(C)2 
Projects are not audited against the GPs, however they feel they are being achieved well. 
Yes, they’re embodied in our thinking … I don’t suppose they really are - I suppose the 
definition of audit I suppose. I’m not quite sure how to reply to that one. – Interviewee E(C)2 
 
4.6.6 Supply Chain Management 
 
In both departments they adopt a “hands off” approach to supply chain management.  They 
want projects done well and for people to work together but don’t get involved in the 
relationships between lead contractors and subcontractors.  Subcontractors are largely 
selected by lead contractors and are not required to be prequalified.  In some instances 
contracts state that lead contractors will obtain prices from particular subcontractors or shall 
use one of a group of firms in a particular classification of work.  There are also times where 
they feel there is a package of work that needs to be controlled and then they might step in 
and carry out certain classifications of works directly or under direct control.   
 
Supplier development was not seen as an issue for the department outsourcing procurement.  
They did not view subcontractors as wanting to be engaged.  They viewed a good building 
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contractor as managing subcontractors whose work is largely a compartmentalised section to 
be completed before moving to another project.   
Because when you get a good builder the good builder manages all that so well. I can’t think 
of any problem ever on any of my jobs, hundreds of them, where there’s been a poor working 
relationship between subcontractors that have affected one another that it’s been to the 
detriment of the job. I just don’t think it ever happens. With a lot of the subcontractors they all 
have little sort of walls around what they do; they just do one thing and buzz off. They don’t 
actually rely on a lot of cooperation from other subcontractors, if you see what I mean.  – 
Interviewee E(C)2 
The other department felt they did undertake supplier development activities but could not 
think of an example of it.   
I’m sure we do, I can’t think of a particular example.  – Interviewee E(C)1 
Where there are issues between the lead contractors and subcontractors it is up to the parties 
to sort them out. 
 
The approach to performance feedback seems informal and focused on getting the project 
completed on time, and having regular dialogue about progress towards timely completion.  
Regular feedback occurs through site meetings so there is a regular dialogue between the 
client and the contractor, but the feedback is focused on budget, time and quality.   
Well yes obviously they do get regular feedback through you’ve got contractors; you’ve got 
site meetings and stuff. So there is a dialog between the client and the contractor on a regular 
basis. We tend to do lessons learned, but that would be more for consultancies or for the 
planning, yes … For the construction not really, I mean once you move into a construction it’s 
the budget, time, and the quality that’s gets recorded and monitored. And if they all are up to 
scratch, if not then we deal with it through standard project management tools that are set in 
contracts.  – Interviewee E(C)1 
However, subcontractors do not get direct feedback and rely on the lead contractor for 
feedback.  It is suggested that firms will get reduced access to future work if an organisation 
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performs poorly but it does not seem a strong link.  There is some conjecture about whether 
having a strong link between performance and future work opportunities is in fact the right 
thing for government to do in terms of having a transparent selection process.  They also 
comment that the description of what is a good performance and bad performance is 
somewhat vague.   
I’m not sure how you define strong, there is a link …  I mean also whether it should be or 
shouldn’t it is another issue. Again we’re dealing with a subjective matter and we’re trying to 
have a transparent selection process, you know there would have to be a mechanism to 
establish the sort of criteria for what is a good performance, what isn’t.  – Interviewee E(C)1 
 
Figure 4.27 demonstrates the responses received from the project managers in case E(C) 
against the dimensions of the theoretical framework.  The perspective taken to VFM in case 
E(C) was narrow and largely based on price.  The procurement approach was heavily focused 
on lowest cost and there seemed to be little thought given to minimising tendering costs on 
the supply side.  Policy by-products were not a regular part of the equation and the supply 
chain was not viewed as a supply chain nor needing to be actively managed.  
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Figure 4.27: Case E(C) 
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4.7 CONCLUSIONS – CROSS CASE ANALYSIS CONSTRUCTION 
 
The cross case analysis of the construction cases is structured around the theoretical model 
and addresses the five areas identified in the literature review: Infrastructure Procurement, 
Value-for-Money, Policy Objectives, Supply Chain Management and Tendering Costs. 
 
4.7.1 Infrastructure Procurement 
 
There are many similarities in the way the States procure building construction projects (as 
illustrated by Table 4.6).   
 
Table 4.6: Cross Case Comparison Construction 
Case Centralised 
Works Dept 
Tied Prequalification 
for consultants 
Prequalification for 
contractors 
Gateway 
processes 
A (C)  *    
B (C)      
C (C)      
D (C)  *    
E (C)      
* - can use either internal government delivery agency or a private firm  
 
As can be seen from Table 4.6 in four of the five States [A(C), B(C), C(C) & D(C)] 
construction projects are procured for client departments by a delivery agency.  In cases B(C) 
and C(C) client departments are tied by legislation to procuring through an internal project 
delivery agency, whilst in cases A(C) and D(C) client departments are able to choose between 
the internal delivery agency and private sector firms.   In case D(C) client departments must 
use an accredited provider; this can be a private firm or public sector agency.  In case A(C) 
there is no accreditation requirement and it was suggested that client departments use the 
centralised government agency due to established working relationships. Case E(C) has a 
centralised building policy agency, but no centralised delivery capacity, so government 
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departments have been empowered to procure their own construction projects using their own 
staff for the last 14 years.   
 
In nearly all cases they rely on a two-stage procurement process where both consultants and 
lead contractors are required to be prequalified before they are eligible to tender for projects.  
Case C(C) also requires subcontractors working on their projects to be prequalified for 
packages of work valued at over $150,000.  
 
Gateway processes are used in every case.  In cases A(C), B(C) and C(C) they are undertaken 
within the delivery agency that focus on scrutinising the contractual approaches, selection 
criteria, weightings and evaluation approaches proposed by project managers.  In cases A(C), 
D(C) and E(C) there are also treasury gateway processes that scrutinise a range of details 
including project justification, budget and contractual approaches. 
 
Table 4.7: Frequency of Traditional Procurement Approach 
Case Traditional 
A (C) 55-60% 
B (C) 90-99% 
C (C) 70-80% 
D (C) 60-65% 
E (C) EC1.70% 
EC2.98% 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.7 Cases B(C) and E(C)2 undertake procurement via an almost 
entirely traditional approach.  The rest of the cases undertake more than half of procurement 
in a traditional manner but engage in more non-traditional procurement systems.  Case A(C) 
uses some D&C and managing contractors.  C(C) also uses managing contractors on complex 
projects and brown-field sites. D(C) undertakes D&C, Novation and direct management of 
some of their own works on brownfield sites, whilst E(C)1 does some D&C and BOOT on 
large projects.  Managing contractor approaches are popular in the sector when trying to gain 
 161
benefits from integrating the design and construct disciplines on projects with a degree of 
complexity. 
 
Table 4.8: Project Managers Public Sector Experience, Procurement Experience, and 
Mean Age 
Case Mean Public 
Sector 
Experience 
Mean 
Procurement 
Experience 
Mean Age 
A(C) 35 22.75 53.5 
B(C) 25.66 22.33 52.33 
C(C) 27.75 27.75 49.75 
D(C) 23.4 19 48.4 
E(C) 7 23.5 47.5 
Overall 25.63 23.68 50.52 
 
Figure 4.28: Public Sector Experience by Project Managers 
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Figure 4.29: Age of Project Managers procuring Buildings 
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Table 4.8, Figure 4.28 and Figure 4.29 show that the staff project managers procuring projects 
on behalf of Government are mature and experienced, approximately 50 years old, with 20+ 
years work experience in both procurement and the public sector.  The exception to this was 
case E(C) where the two project managers interviewed had significantly less experienced in 
the public sector environment and in case A(C) where the cohort of project managers were 
extremely experienced with an average 35 years experience in the public sector. 
 
4.7.2 Value-for-Money 
 
None of the project managers from the five construction cases offered a formal definition and 
there was no discernible difference between the cases as to how much of an objective value-
for-money was.  Instead a consensus of its highly important nature and universal agreement 
about the importance of value-for-money to their work emerged. Project managers described 
it variously as a huge objective, an important aspect of procurement, a responsibility they had 
to the public, of critical importance, and part of everything they do.  
 
The definitions of Value-for-money that emerged were focused variously on financial aspects 
of projects.  The definition of Value-for-money adopted on a project is influenced by a range 
of factors including the procurement approach being selected, client department preferences 
and the level of project complexity.  
 
Figure 4.30 illustrates that a large amount of procurement is undertaken on the basis of lowest 
cost and in all five cases the use of non-price criteria is at most only moderate. In two cases 
E(C) and B(C) the procurement approaches appeared to be strongly influenced by the 
preferences of the Government overall.  In cases where non-traditional procurement 
approaches are used, the perspective of Value-for-money is increasingly not linked solely to a 
financial conceptualisation.  
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Figure 4.30: Cross Case Analysis Construction VFM Matrice 
 
4.7.3 Policy Objectives 
 
The selection criteria employed when procuring projects provide insight into the policy 
objectives that Government is seeking to address. 
 
4.7.3.1 Selection Criteria 
 
Given the frequency of traditional procurement in cases B(C) and E(C), the procurement of 
building contractors is predominantly made on the basis of price criteria. In many of the 
cases, when procuring traditionally, project managers believe that prequalification 
requirements have addressed non-price criteria [B(C), D(C)] and therefore project managers 
are reluctant to include additional non-price criteria.    
 
In E(C) where procurement is decentralised and undertaken in departments the criteria vary 
between departments.  E(C)1 uses a mixture of price and non-price criteria, whereas in E(C)2 
the development of selection criteria is outsourced to a private firm that, in consultation with 
the department, develops criteria and provides a recommendation of which building 
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contractor to use.  The preference in E(C)2 is for traditional procurement based on the 
primary selection criterion of price. 
 
 B(C) and D(C) claim that they use non-price criteria less formally at an early stage, as pass or 
fail criteria when determining the shortlist of whom they want to tender on a project. A(C) has 
standard non-price criteria related to Government Priorities on its traditionally procured 
projects set at 5-10%, and C(C) has 5-10% non-price criteria related to performance on 
previous projects. 
 
Selection criteria are influenced by client departments, but can also be influenced by internal 
experts within the delivery department or treasury officials who administer gateway 
processes.   
 
Where procurement is not tied to the central delivery agencies as in cases A(C) and D(C) 
client departments potentially have more influence over the selection criteria employed, as the 
delivery agency relies upon continued business for its existence.  Alternatively in case E(C) 
because the agencies procure for themselves they are free to use whatever criteria they deem 
to be appropriate to successfully deliver the project. 
 
In all cases non-price criteria are a stronger feature of non-traditional procurement and can 
vary significantly e.g C(C) described it as potentially entailing 50-70% non-price; 30-45% 
price; 5-10% performance score.   
 
Overall, the use of non-price criteria is less prominent in the selection of building contractors, 
whereas in a higher percentage of cases they are used as part of the overall criteria when 
selecting building consultants.  However the non-price criteria are not always used as 
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formalised selection criteria, and can be informal qualitative assessments of a building 
contractor’s expertise, experience and price proposed as was the case in C(C), D(C) and E(C).   
A(C) commented that a 50/50 split between price and non-price criteria was used for selecting 
consultants, whereas B(C) believes 50% of the time decisions are not made on the basis of 
price.  This view of non-price criteria being more frequently part of the building consultant 
selection reflects the view that design plays a predominant part in shaping the global/overall 
value achieved from a project.   
 
4.7.3.2 Government Priorities 
 
Table 4.9: Cross Case Analysis of Government Priorities/Strategic Plan Existence and 
Awareness 
Case Government 
Priorities 
Strategic 
Plan 
All Project Manager aware 
of Government priorities 
and/or Strategic Plan 
A(C)    
B(C) *   
C(C)    
D(C)    
E(C)    
* - researcher encouraged to refer to election promises as Government Priorities 
 
As Table 4.9 shows, all States had identified Government Priorities. However, in the case of 
B(C) the researcher was directed to the election promises as the best representation of 
Government Priorities.  In case A(C) Government Priorities existed but there was no 
overarching state strategic plan, whilst case B(C) also has no overarching state strategic plan.   
 
Standardised Government Priority related non-price criteria in the area of training and local 
industry participation were set at 5-10% in case A(C); regional projects attract 10% weighting 
rather than 5%. Other Government Priorities mentioned were indigenous employment and 
public art.  In case C(C) project managers seemed to think that training was a standardised 
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requirement on projects although were unsure as to how that happened.   Whilst not 
incorporated as standard non-price criteria on projects, the project managers felt that 
Government was broadly trying to achieve Environmental goals via projects, but they 
provided little evidence or examples to support this view.  In cases B(C) and D(C) 
respondents commented that there were some policies in the areas of training, public art and 
indigenous involvement, whilst E(C) commented that if a project is valued at over $1 million 
in a regional area, or $3 million in the capital city, they have to comply with local content 
policy.   
 
Location again determines GPs, and regional projects seemed to provide project managers 
with more scope to influence GPs criteria. D(C) commented that the emphasis of procurement 
has moved away from delivering social objectives.  
 
A consistent assumption made by the project managers across the cases was that in order that 
a project gain funding approval, it needed to be able to demonstrate that it aligned with 
Government priorities.  This demonstration of the link between a project and Government 
Priorities often happened within a client department before a project with a budget attached 
was forwarded to the delivery agency for procurement.  The project managers also explained 
that this alignment generally took place at a level higher within the organisation than those 
responsible for procuring projects.  
 
For the cases where projects are not tied to the internal delivery agency, it seemed somewhat 
unlikely that a private sector firm will recommend the department procures in a manner that 
advances Government Priorities.  However, when procurement is tied to the internal delivery 
agency the project managers feel that the focus of the departments they are procuring for is 
not in creating policy by-products in these Government Priority areas. 
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In none of the five cases were projects audited against Government Priority criteria and when 
policies were pursued it was in a somewhat ad-hoc manner and seemed to be influenced by 
the project manager skill set and experience.     
 
4.7.4 Supply Chain Management 
 
Table 4.10: Comparative Supply Chain Approaches 
Case Lead Contractors 
Select 
Subcontractors 
Prequalified 
Subcontractors 
Feedback given 
to Lead 
Contractors 
Feedback to 
subcontractors 
Supplier 
Development 
A(C)      
B(C)      
C(C)      
D(C)      
E(C)      
 
Overwhelmingly, the approach to SCM is consistent across the cases (see Table 4.10).  Lead 
contractors select subcontractors, who they propose for approval by government, and who are 
rarely not approved.  There is some talk of partnering on non-traditional projects, but this is 
largely between government and lead contractors.  In A(C) government mandates that 
subcontractor selection by lead contractors is made on the basis of value for money, which 
they define in this situation as lowest price.  Lead contractors are required to show cause if 
they did not select the cheapest conforming bid.  B(C) comments that on non-traditional 
projects, a lead contractors ability to engage suitable subcontractors might be incorporated as 
non-price as part of the selection process.  However, B(C) rarely undertook anything other 
than traditional projects.  
 
C(C) requires subcontractors to be prequalified for packages of work worth over $150,000K.  
However, this can be relaxed on regional projects to engage local subcontractors.  In case 
C(C) there was a strong desire from project managers to pursue partnering principles on their 
projects.    
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Feedback is provided both formally and informally to lead contractors but government is 
reluctant to provide feedback to subcontractors because that is not a contractual relationship 
and they do not want to insert themselves into their lead contractor’s role.     When 
subcontractors are prequalified, as in C(C), or written into a non-traditional contract, they will 
receive formal feedback.  In other cases they may receive informal feedback, but this would 
generally occur when they were not performing at a satisfactory level. 
 
In almost all cases the relationship between performance and future work is not strong.  D(C) 
claims that there is a strong link between performance and opportunities for future work and 
that a contractor’s or consultant’s performance governs their future opportunities. In all cases 
unsatisfactory ratings can see suppliers removed from prequalification lists, but this rarely 
happens.  In case C(C) performance on previous projects is used as a non-price selection 
criterion, but they do not use prequalification scores for the subcontractor selection process.   
 
There is limited supplier development activity by government as a client apart from attending 
association meetings and communicating with contractors about future projects.  However, 
C(C) had an interesting supplier development approach in which experienced tradesman 
employed in surveillance roles by government spend time with consultants on projects and 
pass on their knowledge on constructability etc.  One of the respondents in E(C) did not view 
the supply chain as wanting to be engaged which in some respects explains the somewhat 
relaxed approach to managing the supply chain.   
 
4.7.5 Tendering Costs 
 
In most cases there was an awareness of the impact that their tendering processes had on the 
tendering costs imposed on the supply side.  In cases A(C), B(C) and E(C)1 there were 
contract value thresholds in place for both building consultants and contractors that  mandated 
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the procurement process to be used.   In cases C(C) and D(C) thresholds existed for the 
selection of building contractors.  In E(C)2 there were no thresholds used and the approach of 
the private firm undertaking the department’s procurement was to encourage price based 
competition from a large pool of contractors.  It is likely that this type of approach imposes 
unnecessary tendering costs on the supply side.  The existence of thresholds acts to reduce the 
tendering costs imposed on the supply side.  As projects get more complex, and larger in 
dollar value, the thresholds restrict the numbers submitting full bids.  Threshold based 
approaches recognise that bidding on larger and more complex projects involves higher 
tendering costs for contractors and consultants. 
 
Generally where thresholds existed, efforts were made to shortlist in order to limit the number 
of bidders on projects.  Shortlisting on the basis of non-price criteria was a significant part of 
the selection process on non-traditional projects, so as not to waste supply side resources 
tendering on projects where the tendering costs are likely to be high.  There was little 
awareness demonstrated, in any of the cases, of the tendering costs involved with the different 
procurement approaches used by Government and the cost of maintaining prequalification 
registers. 
 
4.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Tables 4.6-4.10 and Figures 4.28-4.30 demonstrate the many similarities within the cases.  
Case E(C) varies the most in that it procures infrastructure in a decentralised manner, whilst 
Case C(C) seems more engaged with attempting to manage its supply chain.   
 
The propensity for traditional procurement approaches in all cases is high, and, as a result, 
value-for-money is largely defined financially and operationalised as selecting the lowest 
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cost. The risk aversion of Governments perhaps mandates that prequalification be used to 
provide confidence when government procures on the lowest cost basis. 
 
The impact of procurement in terms of the tendering costs inflicted on the supply side is 
generally considered.  However, there was little evidence to suggest that Government is 
conscious of the tendering costs involved with its tendering approaches and prequalification 
registers. 
 
Only case A(C) contained an active approach to procuring Government Priority policy 
objectives via the procurement process.  Other cases suggested that this was the way things 
were done, but did not appear to have consistent methods of achieving it.   
 
Chapter 5 presents the results from the roads cases and concludes with cross-case analysis of 
the themes emerging from the roads cases. 
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CHAPTER 5 : WITHIN CASE RESULTS - ROADS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 5 presents the within case results for the five cases drawn from five Australian State 
Government Roads Agencies.  The results are presented in themes related to the five primary 
research questions.  Similar to Chapter 4, detailed case analysis containing excerpts from the 
interviews is presented for the first case C(R).  For cases A(R), B(R), D(R) and E(R) similarly 
in-depth and detailed analysis was undertaken from which the summary results are presented 
here.  Sections 5.2-5.6 highlight the results and analysis of the individual construction cases, 
whilst section 5.7 focuses on the conclusions drawn from the cross case analysis of the 
construction cases. 
 
5.2 CASE C (R)  
 
5.2.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
From Figure 5.1 it can be seen that three of the project managers [C(R)1, C(R)3 & C(R)4] 
have over 25 years public sector experience, whilst C(R)2 has 12 years experience.  Apart 
from C(R)3, who spent 3 years in the private sector, the other respondents are career civil 
servants.  Three of the project managers were moderately experienced at procuring roads 
projects with 10 years or less experience [C(R)1, C(R)2 & C(R)4], whilst C(R)3 has 20 years 
experience procuring projects.  All four respondents hold Bachelor Degrees in Civil 
Engineering, with C(R)1 also holding a Masters Degree in Business.   
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Figure 5.1: Case C (R) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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5.2.2 Procurement Operations 
 
Case C(R) has a regional office structure whose responsibilities are largely to oversee and 
operate the road network in their region, and administer maintenance contractors.  Regional 
offices do not procure significant works, and instead become clients of the centralised major 
projects office.  Projects tend to range between $2 million and $50 million, although 
occasionally there are larger projects.  A recommendation is made by the Department as to 
how a project should be procured, and then this is passed to the Minster who has a cabinet 
delegation to award projects up to about $11 million. 
 
A prequalification system exists that requires contractors to submit a range of information for 
assessment about company resources; financial, human resources, track record, and 
certifications in the areas of quality, safety and environment.  The prequalification system 
contains various classifications of works including road building, bridge building, signage, 
asphalt, pavement marking and quarry materials.  The system also contains levels that range 
from works of low value and low complexity up to works of high value and high complexity.  
To become pre-qualified for road building a contractor needs to have undertaken small 
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projects, perhaps substantial council subdivisions or the equivalent.  Prequalification enables 
the Government to target and invite bids from the appropriate band (classification of works 
and value) of tenderers within the prequalification system.  However, the Government’s 
preference is to publicly advertise, particularly major projects, to show the market the 
opportunities available.  
 
As detailed in Figure 5.2 a range of dollar value thresholds impact on the tendering process.  
Historically all procurement has been undertaken using a traditional approach, which is often 
referred to as ‘construct-only’ in the roads sector and only in the last 5-6 years has non-
traditional procurement been undertaken.   
 
Projects below $10 million tend to be procured using a traditional approach.  The organisation 
is aware of, and attempts to minimise, the tendering costs on Government projects and uses a 
prequalification system to target appropriate contractors. 
D&C is very expensive for tenderers … so you don’t do a D&C lightly, and it’s only when 
there is a significant opportunity for innovation from the contractor’s side of things that 
outweighs the cost of having three tenderers.  – Interviewee C(R)1 
It is a challenge to get Treasury to buy-in on non-traditional, relationship based procurement 
approaches.  
It is meeting a lot of treasury resistance at the moment, because they can’t work out how they 
can demonstrate Value-for-money.  From treasury’s point of view they think construct only or 
maybe D&C gives us, or government the best bang for the buck.   – Interviewee C(R)2. 
 
A prequalification panel exists for consultants; it assesses a range of criteria including: 
management, track record, human resources, and quality systems.  The approval process for 
consultant expenditure is slightly more relaxed because the contracts awarded are generally 
not as high in value.  As can be seen from Figure 5.4 contracts up to $10-20,000 in value can 
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be quickly awarded to consultants, without an open competitive tendering process, to expedite 
projects. 
 
5.2.2.1 Summary 
 
Case C(R) uses a highly centralised approach to procuring construction projects.  As can be 
seen from Figure 5.2 projects valued at under $2 million are procured by a regional office.  If 
a project’s value is estimated to be worth $2 million or more, it will be procured centrally by 
the major projects area.  Projects under $10 million are generally procured on a construct-only 
basis.  From Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1 it can be seen that over 80% of roads projects procured 
by the interviewees were procured traditionally (construct-only).  The authorising 
environment (Treasury) has a preference for traditional procurement as they view it as the 
best way of guaranteeing VFM.  The Government is aware of the expenses incurred by 
contractors in submitting tenders, particularly on the larger non-traditional jobs, and tries to 
match projects to appropriately prequalified contractors and limit the numbers bidding by 
shortlisting before inviting full tenders.  Further, they do not enter into non-traditional 
projects without considering whether a project has a scope that fits with a more innovation 
seeking approach.   
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Figure 5.2: Case C(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Contractor 
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Figure 5.3: Case C(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Consultant 
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Table 5.1: Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case C(R)  
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-
call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
C(R)1 
92%  5%  3%    
C(R)2 
80%  15%  5%    
C(R)3 
85%  13%  2%    
C(R)4 
*  *      
*indicated these were the approaches used but did not provide estimates of the percentage of use 
 
5.2.3 Defining Value-for-Money 
 
All respondents viewed value-for-money as a major objective of their procurement activities. 
I think value-for-money envelops or encompasses the whole thing … it underpins the whole 
process what we are achieving is value-for-money.  – Interview C(R)3 
Historically, the approach to VFM has been that of lowest price, but the culture is gradually 
shifting to embrace a broader definition of value.    
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We've definitely moved away from lowest price … and I guess it’s been the Government’s 
thinking, or the Government’s acceptance of looking at non-price criteria, where now we 
spend a lot of time looking at non-price criteria really to get value-for-money. – Interview 
C(R)2 
Overarching Government procurement rules mandate that project managers must consider 
whole-of-life costs when purchasing.  One respondent cited an official definition of value-for-
money that focused on achieving objectives. 
I can give you the official definition … the fulfilment of objectives for the lowest whole-of-
life cost, maximisation of the objectives – Interview C(R)1 
A strong theme to emerge from the data was that of VFM being the best outcome for the 
lowest cost. 
We try and ensure that we do not overpay for something but we try to get the best possible 
outcome for the lowest possible cost, that’s the simplistic definition of value-for-money.  – 
Interview C(R)3 
The scope of a project, and hence the design discipline was viewed as a major opportunity for 
value creation because it shapes VFM on any particular project. 
When somebody says we need a road to go from point A to point B then they will make a 
decision about probably design standards and the scope of the project, and that’s where cost 
cutting tends to happen.  And that is fair enough, but once you say it will be two lanes with a 
sealed shoulder kind of thing then that’s what gets built.  But you might, should have actually 
had four lanes might have been the answer because in 20 years you will have to come back 
and widen it so that’s where those things tend to get considered a bit or you continue 
maintaining a road that has passed its use by date instead of building a new one.  – Interview 
C(R)1 
As can be seen from Figure 5.4 the project managers interviewed in case C(R) had a moderate 
to high level understanding of VFM.  Approximately 80% of procurement undertaken by 
C(R) is done in a traditional manner focusing predominantly on price which explains their 
low to medium use of non-price criteria (see Figure 5.4 and Table 5.1).  
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Figure 5.4: Case C(R) Interviewees’ Value-for-Money Matrix 
 
 
5.2.3.1 Summary 
 
Project managers view VFM as an all encompassing objective of their procurement activities.  
When procuring they are aware that taking a life-cycle perspective is mandated and that 
ultimately VFM is about how well an asset helps Government achieve its’ objectives.  The 
official definition focused on exactly that; achieving objectives.  It was recognised that the 
scope of a project has an enormous impact on how well a Government meets its’ objectives.  
It is at the planning stage when the scope is being developed through the design process that 
VFM is largely shaped on a project.   Once a decision is made on scope the objectives that can 
be achieved from any asset have been somewhat predetermined and constrained.  
Increasingly, non-price criteria are being used in procurement and there is widespread 
recognition that late completion, variations and claims do not represent VFM.  Respondents 
believed that politicians have an important role in defining VFM so that they, as project 
managers, are empowered to procure on a basis that is acceptable to their political authorisers.   
 
5.2.4 Selection Criteria 
 
Building contractors are selected on a combination of price and non-price criteria.   
Generally speaking, the more difficult it is to define something in your contract, the more 
likely you are to look at the non-price assessment.  – Interviewee C(R)1 
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Using non-price criteria is often related to the complexity of a project, and used less on 
projects of low value and low complexity.  On traditional projects non-price criteria can be set 
at low levels (5-10%).  For example, if a project involves adding another lane along side an 
existing piece of road then the weighting is probably 90% price and 10% non-price criteria.   
When you are on a construct-only (project) then the non-price you don’t value very high 
because that doesn't matter.  – Interviewee C(R)4 
On a construct-only project of moderate complexity and moderate value, the breakdown 
would be 75% price and 25% non-price criteria.  The types of non-price criteria considered 
include; track record, methodology, the proposed team, appreciation of the principal’s and 
client’s requirements, and how they will introduce and optimise innovation. 
 
If a contractor, who has been difficult to work with previously, submits a bid then that bid can 
be risk adjusted based on the extra resourced needed to manage them or their claims history.  
On non-traditional projects, where non-price criteria might be weighted more heavily than 
price, there is still a process of comparing financials to independent and historical estimates.  
So that probably ensured … that we had made the best efforts to achieve a non-competitive 
price that was acceptable.  – Interviewee C(R)3 
 
A two-stage process is used on high value projects where at the first stage non-price criteria 
are assessed separately and then at the second stage price criteria are assessed to select a 
single contractor or to shortlist preferred contractor(s) . 
We will go through and get them to submit non-price in one envelope and then price in 
another envelope and then we have the prices locked away, still sealed until we finish the non-
price evaluation.  So we go through everyone’s non-price criteria and score all of them and 
then we go to the stage two which is a price assessment … we end up with a preferred 
contractor.  – Interviewee C(R)2 
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When selecting consultants non-price criteria attract a higher weighting and can be set around 
75% or higher.  The main three non-price criteria used are past experience, approach to the 
task, and the staff nominated. 
I am doing a couple for consultant designers and that is basically 100% non-price, or the other; 
best team, track record, availability, history, and price is a minimal amount.  – Interviewee 
C(R)2 
 
The organisation predominantly uses three evaluation approaches when procuring building 
contractors and consultants. When the purchase is a straight forward element, for example, 
quarry materials, a comparative price approach is used, which is essentially the tendered price 
plus any adjustments.  When selecting consultants, a matrix method is used which converts 
price to points and then compares the various bidders on points.  For construction works, an 
adjusted comparative price approach is used where price is adjusted based on performance 
against non-price criteria.   
We basically pick the best one for the job after a bit of careful thought. Having said that, each 
of the methods lends itself to different types of jobs. So a lot of the time you will get a choice 
between one and two methods and then it’s a bit judgment and experience with what the best 
one is.  Then we also go through and work out what the non-price criteria are and, how we are 
going to weight them and how we are going to score them.  – Interviewee C(R)2 
 
5.2.4.1 Summary 
 
On traditional projects, non-price criteria are weighted at about 5-10% for contractors unless 
there is something complex about the nature of the work that warrants a higher level of non-
price criteria.  When selecting contractors on non-traditional projects non-price criteria will 
have a higher weighting.  A two-envelope system is frequently used for selecting contractors 
on non-traditional projects, where non-price is assessed first independently, and then price is 
assessed.  Consultants are selected on a mixture of both price and non-price criteria and it is 
common for non-price to be a larger component in their selection.  Differing evaluation 
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methods are used to evaluate bids depending on the nature of the purchase.  The experience 
and judgement of a project manager is important when selecting which evaluation approach to 
use on a particular project.  After having determined selection criteria, weightings and an 
evaluation approach, a project manager is forced to accept the outcome of the process and 
cannot use judgement at the final stage.   
 
5.2.5 Government Priorities 
 
All interviewees were aware of the State’s strategic plan, although their knowledge of its 
content was somewhat limited. 
Mmmm, broadly, not my area of strength I must admit.  – Interviewee C(R)3 
Project managers commented that the budgetary cycle funding projects was linked to the 
strategic plan, and that for a project to be funded it needed to be outlined within the strategic 
plan.  However, project managers also commented that the linkage between an individual 
project and the strategic plan was not something they were exposed to. 
Ah, there is a link … and I think in the background all of the investing and all of the money 
that’s been delivered to the budget cycles has been linked to the strategic plan. So unless there 
is clear links and this is something that I don’t really see in my role, but unless there is clear 
links for each project to the strategic plan then its not going to get up and get funded and 
budget.  – Interviewee C(R)3 
When requesting funding, appropriate linkages must be demonstrated and established 
between a project and the strategic plan. 
Unless there are clear links with the strategic plan you are not going to get money … I think 
the strategic plan is helping in that it is a bit of a strategic focus which wasn't there previously.  
– Interviewee C(R)2 
When it comes to selecting projects to be undertaken the strategic plan influences the projects 
that are procured, but does not influence how projects are procured. 
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No.  That (strategic plan) might talk about which projects are preferred … but when it comes 
to procuring the projects no, it doesn't have any influence at all or it shouldn't.  – Interviewee 
C(R)1 
 
The link between procurement and government priorities is tenuous and appeared both to be 
inconsistently applied and dependent on the project managers’ skills and experience. 
There is a link undoubtedly … and also I suppose and I am guessing here a bit to recognise 
and utilise the local resources as much as possible.  … If you do engage interstate parties then 
there is some knowledge transfer that they still utilise local, I mean that’s something we are 
very strong on and I think that is part of the strategic plan in a sense that we need to build up 
our knowledge base in local companies.  – Interviewee C(R)3 
Training is one Government Priority that is incorporated on all Government projects as a 
standard clause in contracts. 
Um, not a lot, some of it, certainly training from a roads bridgeworks background, certainly 
there is a requirement for training of both graduate engineers, or graduate people from TAFEs, 
there is a requirement for training whether its labourers, operators whatever it is … and that’s 
basically something on each contract we let, – Interviewee C(R)2 
However, project manager knowledge of how Government Priorities for training applies to 
their project procurement was so limited that it did not seem as if training was indeed 
incorporated as a standard element.   
 
Another Government Priority discussed was the Environment.  Whilst not incorporated as a 
standard non-price criterion on projects, it was felt the Government was broadly trying to 
achieve Environmental goals via projects.  
We are very strong on environmental issues, but some of it is a bit superficial. What I mean by 
that is ultimately if push comes to shove the environment gets second fiddle.  – Interviewee 
C(R)1 
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A project’s location has an influence on the types of Government Priorities that are 
incorporated into contracts, but this also seemed to be inconsistently applied.  If a project is 
particularly large or in a remote area then it might have indigenous involvement policies 
included as non-price criteria 
Occasionally we've had some special requirements for youth training and indigenous 
employment, but only on major projects or remote programs.  – Interviewee C(R)1 
 
The inclusion of Government priority criteria is driven by project managers and does not 
appear to be consistently applied on all projects.   
Well, just getting some training packages, it’s really driven by the project manager but the 
Government would say that they want to get some of those outcomes, but I’m not clear in my 
mind just exactly who on the ____ (project) is driving it, but it is not being driven in a very 
strong way across all our projects.  – Interviewee C(R)4 
 
Projects are not formally audited against the government priorities articulated in the strategic 
plan.   
 
5.2.5.1 Summary 
 
Incorporating Government Priorities into the procurement process appears to be inconsistently 
applied in Case C(R).  Whilst recognising Governments interest in the Government Priority 
areas of training and environment, the project managers did not have consistent viewpoints on 
what was happening and how it operated.  It was suggested that there is a separate section of 
government whose responsibility is to oversee training approaches on projects, and another 
section that oversees the local industry involvement scheme.  There was some reticence 
expressed by project managers about whether achieving these types of Government Priorities 
was indeed an appropriate role for procurement.   
 
There was also concern expressed about whether using procurement approaches that 
preference local suppliers contradicted Competition Policy and Free Trade Agreements.   
 184
Project managers did not appear to be engaged in trying to deliver Government Priorities on 
their projects.  The link between the Government Priorities articulated in the strategic plan 
and the procurement of a project is made at a budget approval phase.  Project managers 
appeared to have a limited insight into this process and hence appeared somewhat 
disconnected from the delivery of Government Priorities.  Projects are not audited against the 
strategic plan but Government departments are periodically required to outline how their 
activities contribute to the achievement of the strategic plan. 
 
5.2.6 Supply Chain Management  
 
Subcontractors are selected by lead contractors but Government are required to approve the 
subcontractors proposed.  Should a lead contractor wish to change subcontractors post tender 
submission, then Government approval is required.  Generally, the process involves lead 
contractors advising Government of the subcontractors they are planning to use.  For a 
number of classifications of work, where a prequalification scheme exists, lead contractors are 
required to select prequalified subcontractors.  The prequalification scheme has expanded into 
classifications of works which are most frequently undertaken by subcontractors.     
We have got a prequalification scheme for say road works and bridge works which gets a head 
contractor on board. Below that there is a number of prequalification schemes that 
subcontractors have to be approved under, so things like asphalt, spray seals, raw materials, 
signs they all have to be pre-qualified subcontractors. – Interviewee C(R)2 
Whilst subcontractors are informed of their rights with respect to surety of payment by the 
Government, there is little active Supply Chain Management (SCM) practiced by the 
Government. 
We need to know who they are to inform them of their rights in terms of payments and 
everything as we have had incidents where they haven't received their dues, so we write to 
them making sure they understand what their rights are.  – Interviewee C(R)3 
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Lead contractors and major subcontractors get direct feedback from Government on their 
performance. 
It tends to be, it’s really only the major subcontractors. So if you had a major asphalt, or a job 
involving major asphalt works or major bridge works they'd be in on it too.  We'd be giving 
them the feedback … We would be letting the head contractor know, I guess with the 
subcontractors the small ones as long as they are delivering what we want, and doing it safely, 
it doesn't really bother us too much, they're there, they are engaged by the head contractor, so 
the head contractor would manage them.  – Interviewee C(R)2 
 
A major theme to emerge was that of partnering approaches.  On projects where partnering 
principles are being used, meetings and exchanges of information become less formal and 
monitoring performance is done less formally, but more regularly. 
We do have a partnering process we have included in almost all our contracts …  it’s not 
contractual but it does measure performance in a sense in the way that the contractor 
undertakes certain aspects, and in a way we measure subjective aspects of how he is attending 
to such as safety, site, the way he runs his site, how people perceive that issues are being 
resolved, in communications happening, in job satisfaction, all those sort of things are in a 
sense a measure of how the contractor is performing albeit not a hard nosed sort of way.  – 
Interviewee C(R)3 
 
There was conjecture as to whether project managers felt that performance should influence 
future work opportunities.  Because the Government does not consistently conduct post 
project reviews it would be seen as unfair in some instances.  It was noted that reporting 
attracts more attention on major projects.   
And the link of that to performance isn't as effective or well instituted as it should be, but we 
have on occasion de-listed where it’s been necessary, but its probably not.  It could be 
improved I guess, I'd like to see it improved.  – Interviewee C(R)3 
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There is very little activity by the Government that would be recognised as supplier 
development aside from briefing subcontractors on new prequalification schemes and seeking 
to engage contractors on contracts with partnering principles.   
We might have a prequalification scheme come out for something and we might go out and 
tell sub contractors or potential subcontractors what it’s all about, but it’s not to a large extent.  
– Interviewee C(R)2 
We try to invite them into partnering on construct-only things.  – Interviewee C(R)4  
 
5.2.6.1 Summary 
 
The supply chain is largely left to the lead contractor to manage.  However, Government is 
increasingly prequalifying classes of work undertaken by subcontractors and pursuing 
partnering principles with lead contractors.  Performance feedback on projects is provided 
directly to lead contractors, and subcontractors delivering important packages of work on a 
particular project.  The link between performance and future work opportunities is tenuous.  If 
lead contractors perform poorly then they are likely to be excluded from the prequalification 
register and denied access to future Government projects.  However, there is little reward for 
good performance, and project managers felt that performance feedback was inconsistently 
provided to contractors by Government.  They also felt that the feedback provided was 
sometimes of poor quality, and hence did not enable contractors to focus their improvement 
efforts.   There is very little activity undertaken in the area of supplier development apart from 
some communication with potential contractors and the broad pursuit of partnering principles 
on projects.   
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Figure 5.5 shows the responses received from the project managers in case C(R) against the 
dimensions of the theoretical framework.  In case C(R) value-for-money was clearly defined 
in terms of the fulfilment of objectives and whilst there was some interest in procuring policy 
by-products this was inconsistently undertaken.   Case C(R)’s approach to managing the 
supply chain is attempting to create good working relationships based on partnering 
principles.  Tendering activities are undertaken in a manner to minimise the tendering costs 
borne by the supply side.  A cross case analysis of the roads case responses is contained in 
section 5.7 
 
Figure 5.5: Case C(R) 
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5.3 CASE A (R)  
 
5.3.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
Three of the respondents have Bachelor Degrees in Civil Engineering; A(R)1, A(R)2 and 
A(R)4 who also holds a Masters Degree in Business, with A(R)3 holding a certificate in Civil 
Engineering.  As can be seen from Figure 5.6 three interviewees [A(R)2, A(R)3 & A(R)4] 
have over 15 years experience procuring projects in the public sector environment whilst 
A(R)1 has over 10 years.  The respondents are procurement professionals who have worked 
predominantly in public service roles. 
 
Figure 5.6: Case A (R) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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5.3.2 Procurement Operations 
 
The road network is divided into regions with regional offices undertaking procurement 
activities within those areas. Regional offices can be involved in either minor works, for 
example, a purchase order for $20,000 of materials or major works up to $300-$400 million.  
A centralised major projects unit focuses on projects of over $50 million and either procures 
projects outright or in partnership with a regional office.  Figure 5.7 shows the tendering 
thresholds and the approval processes for projects. There were no set guidelines detailing 
when a project was procured regionally or centrally.  However, the more remote a region, the 
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increased likelihood that the centralised major projects unit will be involved with procuring a 
large project in its region, and the regional office then becomes the client.  The major projects 
section is responsible for over $1 Billion of infrastructure projects a year and most are 
procured using non-traditional approaches.   
 
Table 5.2 highlights the different contractual approaches used and shows that regional 
procurements tend to be more traditional [A(R)1 & A(R)2] whereas the major projects area 
tends to procure non-traditionally [A(R)3 & A(R)4].  The Government organisation A(R) has 
an aversion to D&C procurement and also believes contractors prefer not to undertake 
D&C’s.  The Government views D&C contracts as producing outcomes of low quality and 
believes contractors view them as having a large upfront tender cost.  Instead A(R) prefers to 
try to do some design in-house and then do construct-only projects.  For larger projects the 
Government favours ECI or Alliance approaches in which contractors do not incur prohibitive 
upfront tendering cost to develop bids.  These larger projects have an Expression of Interest 
(EOI) process and then contractors are shortlisted on the basis of non-price criteria and then 
asked to develop a design, for which they are paid.  They are then invited to tender a price.  A 
lot of the work in remote regional areas is contracted solely by invitation because it is 
government policy to provide work to local governments, local contractors, and the 
organisation’s internal maintenance unit. 
 
A prequalification system exists to assess contractor’s technical capacity for constructing 
roads and bridges, and the financial health of the company.  There are seven classifications of 
work that cover bridge design, highway engineering and transport planning etc for which 
there are three levels of complexity ranging from low to high complexity.  A prequalification 
process also exists for consultants requiring them to submit information about their technical 
skills, resources and management capability.   
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Figure 5.7: Case A(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Contractor 
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Figure 5.8: Case A(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Consultant 
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Table 5.2: Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case A(R)  
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
A(R)1 90%     5% 
Alliances 
5% 
(ECIs)  
 
A(R)2 90%     5% 
Alliances 
5% 
(ECIs) 
 
A(R)3 42%  5%   37% 
Alliances 
16% 
(ECIs) 
 
A(R)4 42%  5%   37% 
Alliances 
16% 
(ECIs) 
 
 
5.3.3 Defining Value-for-Money 
 
All respondents indicated that VFM is an important objective of their procurement activities 
given their role overseeing taxpayer’s funds.   
We take our responsibility for the taxpayers' funds very seriously. – Interviewee A (R)1 
The respondents noted that VFM is a subjective concept and that the traditional way of 
assessing VFM has been seen as the lowest price. 
I think the easy way of assessing value-for-money is cheapest price, but everybody realises 
that is not really value-for-money, that there are a lot of other objectives that need to be 
obtained and you know, performance criteria that needs to be assessed.  – Interviewee A (R)3 
An important theme influencing the project managers’ thinking about VFM was the financial 
life cycle implications of the asset.  Investing upfront by paying for good design was viewed 
as very important in reducing future maintenance costs.  Project managers do not want to 
deal, over an asset’s life cycle, with the financial and other implications of poor design. 
Design is considered crucial in traditional contracts because contractors are building what is 
in the documentation.  Project managers are looking for the best design as far as life-cycle and 
quality are concerned, and that means the right price for the right quality of work. 
 
For traditional/construct-only contracts, the assumption is that the Government’s knowledge 
of local conditions, through its’ network of regional offices, helps it to specify the design and 
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then bids from appropriately prequalified contractors represent VFM.  In theory, if the design 
is good, traditional contracts represent VFM because all the contractor has to do is construct 
what is in the documents.  VFM becomes more difficult on large projects where the scope is 
not as clear and it is in these instances where alliance approaches are often used.  The funding 
environment (Treasury) views alliance projects less favourably because VFM is not assessed 
in terms of lowest cost.  Treasury view VFM as delivering a project under budget.  As a 
result, the delivery agency is almost encouraged to inflate budgets so that they deliver under 
budget.   
Unfortunately, our Treasury officials, to them demonstrating value-for-money is that you 
brought it in under budget, and I said to one of them well that's easy, I'll just bump the budget 
up and they said that's fine, as long as you bring it under budget, we don't care, we're all anal, 
we're accountants for Christ's sake. – Interviewee A (R)3 
The authorising environment (politicians) view VFM in terms of what was delivered to the 
State for the funds allocated.  One project manager commented that a politically imposed fast 
tracked timeline does not enable them to procure value-for-money.  
 
From Figure 5.9 it can be seen that all participants had a moderate to high level understanding 
of VFM.  A(R)3 and A(R)4 regularly incorporated more non-price criteria in to their 
procurement activities and are procuring major non-traditional projects.  A(R)1 and A(R)2 
incorporate less non-price criteria in their procurement activities and are more frequently 
procuring traditionally.  
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Figure 5.9: Case A(R) Interviewees’ Value-for-Money Matrix 
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On traditional projects the predominant selection criterion used is the tendered price from 
prequalified bidders. However, the risk assessments that are undertaken focus largely on 
financial details, although may involve some analysis of non-price elements like traffic 
management.   
 
The attitude entrenched within the department has been that non-price criteria are not needed 
because contractors are prequalified.  This has been the view of senior management and so it 
has been a challenge to introduce non-price criteria as part of the tender process.  The greater 
the perceived risk factors of a project the increased likelihood of the use of non-price criteria.  
Generally, if non-price criteria are included they are project specific as project managers do 
not want non-price criteria to duplicate prequalification, but they believe that including non-
price criteria is beneficial to the selection process.       
We see non-price criteria in two ways: one is that it actually tells us who's serious about 
actually bidding on the work, and it also tells the contractors what we view as the high risk 
items …  We've had a lot of problems with contractors in the past that just drop in low bids.  – 
Interviewee A(R)2 
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Non-traditional projects have a higher non-price component and are procured far more often 
on the basis of non-price criteria, although price is still an important criterion.  The weighting 
of price and non-price criteria is generally at the judgement of the project managers and might 
be developed in consultation with the regional client.   
 
One non-traditional project was awarded on the basis of 60% price criteria and 40% non-price 
criteria.  On larger projects procured by the major projects area there is often an expression of 
interest, which involves submitting only non-price criteria.  After the EOI, contractors are 
shortlisted and asked to submit a price, and then selected on a combination of both price and 
non-price. 
 
On some non-traditional projects non-price criteria are used to shortlist prequalified 
contractors but the selection decision is made largely on price.  So price is the primary 
criterion but it is moderated by the non-price criteria used to shortlist.  However, there are 
some non-traditional projects where non-price criteria are the main decision making criteria 
and the process is focused largely around getting the right team for the project.  Alliance 
projects shortlist on the basis of non-price criteria, then both contractors teams develop a 
design and a price estimate, for which they are paid.  The selection decision is then made by 
assessing the design (non-price) and the estimate (price), and might be something like a 60% 
price – 40% non-price split.  
 
The types of non-price criteria used on many of the larger projects are focused on the 
contractors understanding of the project, and propensity for teamwork.  They tend not to be 
focused on technical capacity as the Government has confidence in the prequalification 
system to address technical issues.  Instead, non-price criteria focus on whether contractors 
are going to be able to handle the traffic management and public interface issues.  There 
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might be non-price criteria focused on past performance (claims history, latent condition 
claims or time extension claims), subcontractor relationships or human resources.  When 
assessing tenders, non-price criteria are often quantified into dollars to determine how much 
better performance in terms of outcomes is going to cost the Government.   
 
5.3.5 Government Priorities 
 
All the interviewees were aware of the Government Priority areas and commented that they 
influenced their selection policies, and that their procurement activities fed into the state 
infrastructure plan.  When the funding case for a project is developed a justification is made 
of the strategies (Government Priorities) it is fulfilling.  However, the link between 
procurement and Government Priorities was considerably less explicit.  From the 
Department’s perspective, the overarching policy or Government Priority that roads projects 
address is ‘connecting the state’.   
 
The interviewees believe the focus of the political authorising environment is demonstrating 
that the community benefits from government expenditure on projects.   
A cynical person might also say that the government priority is to be re-elected, but we're not 
cynical. – Interviewee A(R)1 
The procurement process, or how you deliver a road, was viewed by Government as a means 
to drive indirect benefits to communities in the forms of training, local content etc.   
There's a direct benefit by building the project, and an indirect benefit sometimes by the way 
you do it. – Interviewee A(R)4 
 
Standard non-price criteria designed to advance Government Priorities should be incorporated 
for all projects.  However, Government Priorities were more of a focus when procuring 
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projects in regional areas, and it was clear that the location of a road was an important factor 
influencing the types of priorities that the agency incorporates into projects.   
 
Training is a Government Priority that was consistently addressed via procurement, with 
projects having standard requirements. 
Within our contracts too, we have requirements, for training levels, numbers of apprentices 
and training hours and so on.  – Interviewee A(R)3 
Training and employing local communities is viewed as relating to the Government Priority 
of ‘widening the skills base’.  This, at times, focuses on local indigenous populations, but the 
project managers comment that this was difficult to achieve with conventional contractors.  
However, it was suggested that non-price criteria in the form of a local supply strategy 
addressing both people and resources might be used depending on the project and the 
location.  Projects are not strictly audited against the Government Priorities, although they are 
required to report on their contribution to policy areas like the training initiatives.   
 
Overall, whilst Government Priorities are, in theory, considered upfront when initiating a 
project, how much they actually influence projects seems somewhat variable, non-
standardised and influenced by the road’s location, and the skills, vision and drive of the 
project manager. 
 
5.3.6 Supply Chain Management 
 
Lead contractors are responsible for selecting subcontractors.  However, approval is required 
and Government can refuse or withhold permission to use a particular subcontractor on the 
basis of previous poor performance.   
 
Many of the materials used in road construction are sourced from certified suppliers in the 
areas of; quarry material, gravel mixes and pre-stressed steel and Government requires 
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subcontractors and suppliers contributing packages of work worth over $50,000 to be 
prequalified or certified.  Where there is no existing prequalification scheme for a 
classification of work, a project manager will make a judgment on previous experience with a 
subcontractor.  The Government recognises that this has an effect on the market by limiting 
the suppliers.   
 
On non-traditional projects, supply chain management, including supplier and subcontractor 
selection, might be non-price criteria included as part of selection processes.  
Are they going to use three prices, are they going to have preferred suppliers? So they 
document all that and we assess that as part of the selection process.  – Interviewee A(R)3 
Government acknowledges that on non-traditional projects there is a risk transfer from the 
lead contractor to the subcontractors that current contracts allow them little opportunity to 
influence.  
 
Previously the emphasis on performance feedback had been on reporting at the end of projects 
which would be submitted to the contracts section which administers a database detailing how 
contractors have performed on various projects.  The emphasis on performance reporting has 
shifted to more regular reporting during the project.  Contractor reports are used to provide 
regular feedback, and end of project reporting is used to assess contractors’ performance and 
reward good performance by giving them first opportunity to tender for projects with short 
selection processes.  Subcontractors will get feedback and loss of access to future work if they 
are on the prequalification supplier register and do not perform well.   Their prequalification 
status may be affected and they might be downgraded to provisional status.   
Definitely.  The thing is more slanted towards what one might call the negative feedback or a 
recognition of problems.  So the standard is, you know, meeting the specification which is the 
minimum standard, so if you fall below that, you will certainly get a lot of feedback.  – 
Interviewee A(C)3 
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There is little supplier development activity undertaken by the Government.  However, they 
have identified capacity in the second tier of contractors and are currently trying to engage 
them on non-traditional (relationship-based ECI) projects.   
 
Figure 5.10 exemplifies the responses received from the project managers in case A(R) 
against the dimensions of the theoretical framework.  Case A(R) defines value-for-money 
broadly and this is enabled by their preparedness to procure non-traditionally.  The 
organisation seeks policy by-products when procuring roads projects, and training is 
incorporated as a standard.  
 
Figure 5.10: Case A(R) 
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5.4 CASE B (R)  
 
5.4.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
All three respondents hold Bachelor degrees in Civil Engineering, with B(R)2 also holding a 
Masters in Business Administration and B(R)1 holding a Graduate Diploma in Business.  
From Figure 5.11 it can be seen that all interviewees were over 50 years of age, and all had 
over 25 years experience in the public sector.  The procurement experience varies somewhat 
with 12 years experience for B(R)2, 26 years for B(R)1 and 35 years for B(R)3.  All of the 
project managers are career public servants having spent their entire careers in the roads 
organisation. 
 
Figure 5.11: Case B (R) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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5.4.2 Procurement Operations 
 
Until the mid 1990s all road construction was done in-house or via construct-only contracts.  
The state road network is divided into districts that regional offices are responsible for 
managing.  For regional projects, project managers are required to develop a scope, and an 
initial cost estimate before an assessment is made on whether the project will be solely 
delivered by the region or in conjunction with the central office.  As projects increase in 
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value, regional project managers communicate with the centralised major projects branch and 
the project is either procured completely by the centralised branch or in partnership with the 
region.  As indicated by Figure 5.12 the regions are responsible for projects up to about $10 
million, which are almost all construct-only contracts.  Procurement tends to be awarded to 
prequalified contractors submitting lowest price tenders.  If a regional office is delivering a 
project, they undertake all the assessments of tenders, and they would get some support from 
central office when preparing contracts.  However, if it is a large project, the assessment 
might be done from the capital city or could be done in partnership with staff from both the 
central office and the region.  
 
Prequalification exists; it covers five classifications of work and incorporates various levels of 
project value and complexity.  Prequalification assesses a contractor’s technical capability and 
capacity, their track record, financial capacity, and approach to quality and occupational 
health and safety (OH&S).  There is no prequalification requirement for consultants (see 
Figure 5.13) and the department aims to do 25% of design in-house.    However, the 
Department has three long term contracts with consultants in the roads engineering area.  
Project managers engage these consultants, but are required to demonstrate the value of the 
various consultant proposals, by addressing issues of the details of the brief, price and staff 
being proposed.   
 
Currently, they project manage a mixture of contracts; construct-only, D&C, alliances and 
some directly managed works, which are not quite fully in-house delivered. On non-
traditional projects there is an EOI stage and then shortlisting to approximately three 
contractors who then compete on price.  For alliance projects, there is shortlisting and there 
are workshops and interview processes that address non-price criteria.   
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Figure 5.12: Case B(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Contractor 
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Figure 5.13: Case B(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Consultant 
 
Traditional 
Project 
Project Managers 
engage one of three 
consultants who are 
on the Departments 
existing panel and 
are required to 
demonstrate that it 
represents VFM  
Building 
Consultant 
Contractors are 
required to submit 
consultants as part 
of their bid who 
are then assessed 
on both price and 
non-price criteria 
N Y 
 
 202
Table 5.3: Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case B(R)  
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-
call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
B(R)1 80%  15%  5%    
B(R)2 100% 
Alliance 
       
B(R)3 *- - - - - - - - 
*no response 
 
5.4.3 Defining Value-for-Money  
 
The project managers believe that VFM is a major objective of their procurement activities.  
Being able to demonstrate VFM and the impact of Government expenditure is an important 
component of the objective and this is easier if the design scope of a project is well 
developed.  VFM is a complex construct and is not a concept that is ever fixed as it varies 
according to what Government is trying to achieve.    
We haven't yet got it cast in concrete as an organisation … I think it is very much a case-by-
case basis. – Interviewee B(R)3 
However, from the Department’s perspective it is impossible to arrive at a universal definition 
of VFM, because VFM will vary on the sections of road, the environment, the funds 
available, and the future planning strategy. 
I think Value-for-Money can change on a network depending on the section of the road you're 
talking about, the environment you're in, how much money is available, what your forward 
plans might be and so on, which makes it very difficult to come down and argue or 
demonstrate Value-for-Money.  – Interviewee B(R)3 
 
A strong theme prevalent in Case B(R) was that VFM is an assessment of the level of service 
being received against the funds spent on that service.   
Proposal A might give you a level of service which you think is probably at the top or upper 
end of what you'd like it to be, but the cost that goes with it is just too high … At the other 
end, you might have a very low level of service, again for a very low price, and there will be 
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circumstances where for a number of reasons, that lowest price and lowest level of service, is 
the right Value-for-Money because it might mean, you've got plans in four or five years time 
to retire that bit of infrastructure, and therefore there is no value in spending a lot more money 
and having a high level of service.  – Interviewee B(R)3 
 
Project managers recognise Government’s desire to make a contribution to society in addition 
to building infrastructure.  The project managers note that the easiest definition of VFM is 
solely in financial terms and this is also the simplest political view of VFM.  Because of this 
they realise the importance of being able to communicate why a project is VFM to a 
community and politicians and believe that the Department must sell its vision of VFM to the 
authorisers.  However, communicating VFM information on infrastructure projects is difficult 
and challenging.   
Value-for-Money is just seen as simply the dollars, the bottom line … So I suppose you need 
to be able to sell what’s value. And to be fair, that's it’s not just the politicians, I suppose it's 
the whole community because that's what they need to respond to. So, how do we package that 
information I always find it challenging.  So there's one about procuring and the second one is 
actually selling it, that it does represent value for money.  – Interviewee B(R)2 
 
In traditional procurements, VFM is pursued through a competitive tender process from 
prequalified contractors.  In non-traditional projects, VFM takes on a broader meaning and 
non-price criteria are far more likely to be considered during the tender process.  In both 
instances VFM is about sourcing the market for the supplier they think can deliver the best 
outcome. 
From Figure 5.14 it can be seen that the VFM knowledge in Case B(R) ranged from moderate 
to extremely high.  The use of non-price criteria in procurement was used at a moderate level 
by B(R)1 and B(R)2 and at a high level by B(R)3.   
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Figure 5.14: Case B(R) Interviewees’ Value-for-Money Matrix 
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On traditional projects, building contractors are selected on the basis of price, in addition to 
being prequalified.  However, for non-traditional projects the selection process is more likely 
to consider non-price criteria such as the project team, experience, competencies, skills and 
the proposed approach.  Further examples of the types of non-price criteria used on projects 
might include: commitment to innovation, social and environmental factors, and 
demonstration of working relationships.  Tenderers are often shortlisted solely on the basis of 
non-price criteria, before inviting bids and then selecting on the basis of price.   
 
The use of non-price criteria can vary from being given a 70% weighting on a non-traditional 
project to not being considered, where price is the only selection criterion.  Where non-price 
criteria are not used, the project managers feel that prequalification addresses non-price 
issues, and believe the shortlisting process also address non-price criteria.  There is debate 
internally over the weightings attributed to non-price and price criteria, and how to justify and 
rationalise whether those weightings have been set at an appropriate level.   
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So there's a large spectrum and it all depends upon the appetite of the organisation about 
whether they want to give weighting to non-price criteria as opposed to the price criteria.  – 
Interviewee B(R)3 
 
On alliance projects there tends to be a two envelope system where proposals are firstly 
assessed against non-price criteria.  The non-price criteria are quantified into dollars to enable 
the bids to be ranked and compared.  The price criterion is then considered and added to the 
scores on the non-price criteria to enable a final ranking of the proposals.   
 
Whilst consultants are not prequalified there is an existing panel which contains three 
consultants in the roads engineering areas who have already been through a rigorous selection 
process assessing both price and non-price criteria examining their people, experience, skills, 
cost and availability.  Project managers call consultants from the panel to do work for the 
Department and are required to demonstrate against price and non-price criteria that the 
proposals received represent value.  Project managers procuring construct-only projects 
generally use consultants from the panel.  On non-traditional projects the parties tendering are 
required to propose their own consultants whom are assessed against a mixture of price and 
non-price criteria (people, track record etc).  For a complex and or large specialist consultant 
contract the Department would have a stand alone contract where they again assess price, 
people and experience of various bidding consultants. 
  
5.4.5 Government Priorities 
 
Government Priorities in the areas of skills training and regional development are included as 
standard clauses in contracts.  Local content clauses are weighted as non-price criteria as part 
of the selection process. Tenderers are required to nominate where they are sourcing their 
materials from, which might attract a regional preference. 
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Yeah, well, I guess our state like most states, have got policies of regional development and 
skills training and those sorts of things, so they are all included as a blank issue.  – Interviewee 
B(R)3 
 
On some projects, project managers add additional criteria based upon Government Priorities.   
These additional criteria can involve thinking about a project’s physical location and the 
benefits created for a local community through, for example, trainees and apprentices, public 
art, environment, indigenous training or involvement etc.   
 
So the Government Priorities pursued on projects can be tailored depending on a project’s 
location and size but are not as consistently pursued as they might be. 
Trying to find ways to sort of build those into our procurement strategies and procurement 
processes.  So things like the public art, I suppose we’ve learnt that we put a budget in there, 
rather than you know, got a budget of half a million dollars, and give us proposals which are 
likely to get say in submissions, get an indication of what you're likely to get for that sort of 
money.  – Interviewee B(R)2 
 
Engaging contractors and creating teams that can deliver these types of benefits to 
communities is a challenge.  These benefits are considered more achievable on non-traditional 
contracts, and in particular, alliance projects where Government staff are part of the team and 
it is easier to develop shared values and goals to which there is real commitment amongst 
team members.   
I am very much of the view we need to spend a lot more time identifying what is the list of 
things that we want out of these contracts … Obviously, you want to spend as little money as 
you possibly can. I'm not sure whether that's a good driver or not.  You want to get a level of 
service that you’ve described. You want to be able to respond to a number of social drivers in 
particular areas, and then you want to sort of cascade down a bit lower if you like and start 
saying well how would the arrangement or the way you do that business address these issues.  
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And, that is really where we need to I suppose get a bit more clear on identifying what are the 
things you actually measure when you assess a proposal to be able to answer those high level 
drivers. – Interviewee B(R)3 
 
Government Priorities are audited on projects as they are running, and payment is withheld if 
a contractor is not delivering.   
Oh, we would do that during the project.  We wouldn't be paying a contractor if he's claiming -  
and there's actually clauses in the contract which makes that clear if he is not meeting those 
requirements, he's going, he’s gonna get pulled up, we won't be paying him.  – Interviewee 
B(R)1 
It was also suggested that it is perhaps not as useful to do audit post project as there is little 
recourse available to the Government at that stage. 
 
5.4.6 Supply Chain Management  
 
Subcontractor’s are selected by lead contractors but are required to be approved by 
Government.  Government takes note of the subcontractors proposed but prefers not to get 
involved in the lead contractor’s management of its’ supply chain.  Government does not 
want to be seen as interfering and hence subjected to claims of lost earnings by the lead 
contractor.  However, if there is a critical subcontractor who has been nominated by the lead 
contractor as part of their bid then the Government will write that subcontractor into the 
contract to ensure substitution does not occur.  A prequalification system used to exist for 
both consultants and some subcontract elements but the Government found it was labour 
intensive and the focus now is solely on lead contractor prequalification.   
It was just a very complex, labour intensive process to manage the thing and it was rarely up-
to-date so we only prequalify principal contractors now.  – Interviewee B(R)1 
 
Feedback is provided to lead contractors during, but primarily at the end of projects and this 
feedback flows back in to the prequalification system.   Lead contractors might be surveyed 
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over the course of a project and there will be regular exchanges of feedback at formal 
meetings.  However, subcontractors do not necessarily get direct feedback from the client 
organisation but they may receive a copy of the client’s feedback form and they do have the 
opportunity to express their opinion.  On some projects it was suggested that they do try to 
engage the subcontractors in partnering relationships.  In theory, performance has an effect on 
a contractor’s prequalification level and hence their opportunities for future work.   Evidence 
suggested it was infrequently applied and that performance did not have a strong impact on 
opportunities for future work, other than perhaps disastrously poor performance. 
 
Supplier development is not a term the organisation was familiar with and the respondents 
were not sure whether they were addressing it as an issue.   
Supplier development activities?  Nothing comes readily to mind, not in my area, anyway.  
No, we don't do that. There might be areas that do it.  – Interviewee B(R)2 
The organisation was aware of their role in training the smaller players to raise their skills and 
competencies and acknowledge they cannot just rely on lead contractors to raise the standards 
in the industry.     
We accept this is an industry issue, that we've got to start training the smaller players to raise 
their skills and competencies … All that sort of stuff has to be driven by the client.  And it will 
only happen if there is a real will by the client to do it, demonstrate that the real will is there 
and follow it through. – Interviewee B(R)3 
The return to some direct management of works has provided an increased opportunity to 
influence skill development.   
We now have an internal policy that we're going to deliver up to 10% of our budget by direct 
management, so that hopefully will also give us an opportunity of influencing the skill 
development.  – Interviewee B(R)3 
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Figure 5.15 displays the responses received from the project managers in case B(R) against 
the dimensions of the theoretical framework.  As can be seen from Figure 5.15 case B(R) 
defines value-for-money broadly and pursues policy by-products through its procurement 
approaches.  However, they acknowledge there is still more thinking to be done about the 
value they are hoping to derive from projects.  On some projects case B(R) actively get 
involved in supply chain management by espousing partnering principles with suppliers.  
Tendering processes are undertaken in a manner designed to limit the waste by the supply 
side. 
 
Figure 5.15: Case B(R) 
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5.5 CASE D (R)  
 
5.5.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
All four respondents hold Bachelor degrees in Civil Engineering, with D(R)2 also holding a 
Graduate Diploma in Management.  From Figure 5.16 it can be seen that three of the four 
participants [D(R)2, D(R)3 & D(R)4] have over 20 years in the public sector environment 
procuring projects and are career public servants, whilst D(R)1 has 10 years experience in 
public sector procurement.   
 
Figure 5.16: Case D (R) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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5.5.2 Procurement Operations 
 
As illustrated by Figure 5.17, Case D(R) has a regional office structure that administers 
maintenance contracts as well as procuring construct-only projects of a small to medium 
scale.  The Department also has a centralised procurement area that deals with larger projects, 
and a dedicated group who are largely responsible for procuring PPP/BOOT projects.  The 
Department has some internal capacity for road construction works and single invitation 
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maintenance work is undertaken either with internal capacity or by partnering with local 
councils.   
We've got an in-house construction capacity because there are some jobs that don’t suit going 
out to private tender, cant scope them and they've got to be done quickly, all those sorts of 
reasons.  – Interviewee D(R)2 
 
A prequalification system exists for building contractors that has various classifications of 
work and levels within it relating to project value and complexity.  Prequalification assesses a 
contractor’s financial capacity, technical capability and experience, track record, experience 
of staff and management.  Some classifications of works, for example concrete paving, have 
specialised requirements as well, so a contractor has to be prequalified at the overarching 
class of the work (e.g. Roads Construction Level 3) and also are required to be prequalified 
for the packages of work within the contract.  If the lead contractor is not prequalified for the 
package underneath then they have to engage a subcontractor who is.  Consultants are not 
required to be prequalified and are instead selected on the basis of their capability, track 
record and human resources (see Figure 5.18).   
 
As reflected in Table 5.4, there is a strong organisational preference for the traditional 
approach to procurement.  Alliance approaches tend to be used when the project is in the 
$100-150 million range.  The major projects group procures large scale highway 
redevelopments using a PPP/BOOT approach and has approximately 6-10 projects running at 
any one time.  To encourage contractors to pursue higher standards of design there is some 
use of the D&C+M approach. This additional component adds specified periods to D&C 
contracts during which building contractors are responsible for maintaining the road they have 
built. 
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We do some D&C stuff, plus Maintain.  We believe that by adding the Maintenance 
component you drive better performance in the Design & Construction part of it – Interviewee 
D(R)3 
Project managers acknowledge that Alliance projects have a lower upfront tendering cost than 
do D&C+M and BOOT projects, and hence are well received by building contractors.   
 
Figure 5.17: Case D(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Contractor 
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Figure 5.18: Case D(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Consultant 
 
Complex 
Project 
20-30% Price 
criteria 
70-80% non-price 
criteria 
Building 
Consultant 
N Y 
70% Price criteria 
30% non-price 
criteria 
 
 
 
Table 5.4: Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case D(R)  
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-
call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
D(R)1 90% 4% 4%    2%%  
D(R)2 95% 2% 2%    1%  
D(R)3 90% 4% 4%    2%  
D(R)4  100%       
 
 
5.5.3 Defining Value-for-Money  
 
All respondents indicated that purchasing VFM was an important objective of their work and 
recognise the important role VFM has in shaping their procurement activities. 
 I think its a very, very, very strong objective, its probably the biggest factor in anything that 
we do.  – Interviewee D(R)2 
The dominant theme expressed by project managers was a financial perspective to defining 
VFM.  VFM was considered to be best demonstrated via open tender competition from 
prequalified tenderers.  On projects, financial data in the form of tender quantities, proposed 
rates, and unit rates on plant and labour are examined to analyse bids submitted by contractors 
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in light of both independent and historical estimates.  Non-price criteria are considered when 
selecting contractors, but it is rare that the lowest prequalified tender would not be selected.   
We close the tenders and then it’s pretty much on price although we go through quite an 
extensive analysis of it, and we do look at non-price issues when we are evaluating the 
construction tenders, but its very, very, very unusual not to take the lowest prequalified tender 
for a particular job.  – Interviewee D(R)3 
 
On traditional projects, VFM is viewed as documenting the standard of work desired (design 
documentation) and then delivering the contract at the specified quality standard at an 
acceptable price determined by competition, without excessive variations.   
 
Another prominent theme emerging was life-cycle costing and ensuring that Government was 
not procuring low quality assets that required excessive maintenance over the duration of their 
life cycle.  There was an awareness of the interdependent relationship between design and 
maintenance acknowledging the importance of design in creating outcomes that will result in 
life-cycle costs appropriate to the period an asset is expected to be used.  Design is viewed as 
a value creating process, as design determines the scope of a project.  Once design is set then 
decisions are made by the Department as to what components go into delivering the design at 
an appropriate level of maintenance costs, for example the types of pavement that are 
appropriate in a particular geographic area.  The specifications outlined in Government tender 
documents have incorporated life-cycle considerations for the asset being procured.  
Maintenance diaries and knowledge of local conditions from the regional offices inform these 
specifications.   
So we have a number of ways of trying to assess VFM apart from straight up initial cost, and 
we certainly look at you know, we do maintenance diaries so we are looking at the 
maintenance cost of various solutions.  – Interviewee D(R)3 
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There is also some impetus to incorporate maintenance periods into their D&C contracts 
(D&C+M) to motivate contractors to build quality into their design, rather than undertake 
maintenance afterwards.  
When you get into the BOOT and DCM type projects, we do look at whole of life concepts, 
because they are proposing designs rather than us. – Interviewee D(R)1 
 
5.5.4 Selection Criteria  
 
The assumption made on construct-only (traditional) jobs is that prequalification has taken 
care of all the non-price criteria so selection decisions can be made solely on the basis of 
price.  Non-price elements are considered as ‘pass’ or ‘fail’ criteria at the shortlisting stage.  
Whilst they are used on the selection process they are not formalised as weighted selection 
criterion.  The main selection criteria are focused on price, which investigates the rates 
proposed, including a comparison with estimates and risk within the tender in terms of 
quantities.  Prequalification is viewed as a scrutiny process and on that basis the lowest priced 
tender should be accepted unless there are good reasons otherwise, which might be the 
proposed methodology, or the assumptions being made on rates for risky or unknown 
elements.  Generally the lowest tender wins unless it is deemed not to be the best VFM 
because the risk is considered too great.   
But its very, very, very unusual not to take the lowest prequalified tender for a particular job, 
but we prepare quite an extensive report and it does consider the make up of their rates to see 
if there are any risks with their tender quantities – Interviewee D(R)3 
 
On construct-only projects non-price criteria are considered covered by the prequalification 
hurdle and it is a very rare case in which additional non-price criteria are used as part of the 
formal tender submission process.  For construct-only projects the selection criterion is 
predominantly price, however, performance reports are looked at to see if there are issues of 
concern.  On non-traditional projects the selection criteria are far more likely to incorporate 
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non-price elements like the proposed methodology or solution, traffic management, project 
team, construction program, construction strategy, human resources, track record etc.  The 
selection process often evolves as the scope of the project evolves.   
On that contract it wasn't a formula based assessment, more a qualitative sort of approach to 
looking at it. I mean some companies offered things that we were totally uninterested in, and 
also on further discussion with them on some of the methodologies we weren't happy to accept 
like the way they would deal with like the keeping traffic flowing during the course of the 
work.  – Interviewee D(R)2 
 
Non-price criteria are used on projects where maintenance periods are incorporated into 
contracts, and a risk adjustment is made on proposals.  D&C and D&C+M contracts often 
have a whole suite of non-price criteria that are given weightings.  Proposals are ranked 
against the non-price criteria and the price criterion is adjusted according to the performance 
on the non-price criteria, enabling a comparison to be made between proposals.   
 
On BOOT and D&C+M projects, non-price criterion assessing the capability of the proposed 
team is often used at an EOI stage as ‘pass’ or ‘fail’ criterion.  Non-price criteria are often 
focused at the shortlisting stage on whether it is thought that the bidding company can 
actually do the work. 
The whole process of selecting or going through the EOI process for starters, that’s really 
about capability and whether these particular consortia have got the right team that could 
deliver the project, so that’s the first stage and there is separate assessment criteria for that, um 
yeah, in the EOI stage. – Interviewee D(R)4 
After shortlisting, formalised non-price criteria in the form of capabilities and previous 
performance are often used, and typically the weighting attached is something like 85% price 
criteria and 15% non-price criteria.  On non-traditional projects the building contractor, in 
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conjunction with their consultants, are proposing the design so the Government makes 
assessments on the approaches and materials proposed with respect to whole-of-life issues. 
 
Consultants are not required to be prequalified and contracts are awarded using a combination 
of both price and non-price criteria.  The type of non-price criteria frequently employed for 
consultant contracts are their capability, track record and human resources.  Price can be as 
little as 30% of the consideration and it really depends on the scope of the work being 
undertaken on a project.  Projects like option selection, route selection or concept design 
development might entail 20-30% price criteria and 70-80% non-price criteria.  Whereas 
preparing contract documents might feature 70% price criteria and 30% non-price criteria.  
Typically price might be a component of say 30-50%.   
 
As can be seen from Figure 5.19 the VFM knowledge of the interviewees ranged from 
moderate to high.  The use of non-price criteria in procurement was used at a moderate level 
by D(R)4, D(R)3 and D(R)2, and at a high level by D(R)1.  
 
Figure 5.19: Case D(R) Interviewees’ Value-for-Money Matrix 
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5.5.5 Government Priorities 
 
All of the project managers were aware of the strategic plan outlining the Governments 
Priorities.  However, the alignment between procurement activities and the strategic plan was 
not explicit to them.  Project managers assume there is an alignment between projects and 
Government priorities and that this strategic alignment needs to be demonstrated to Treasury 
otherwise funding would not be approved.   
So obviously because the government is trying to deliver things in the state plan then that has 
an influence on our business planning process and the sorts of directions that the organization 
as a whole might take, but I can’t say it has really done a lot in terms of our procurement 
strategy at this stage – Interviewee D(R)1 
 
There were not many Government Priorities for which roads were the lead agency, apart from 
reducing the road toll.  Where a project directly impacts on aboriginal communities or 
indigenous populations they attempt to incorporate aboriginal participation policies.  Other 
Government Priorities that are incorporated on all projects are environmental assessment and 
urban design.  In some cases public art is explored.  The training and use of apprentices on 
projects is something that is no longer monitored as it was previously. 
 
Project managers felt that the incorporation of Government Priorities as non-price criteria had 
previously been a more formalised process.  The guidelines provided to contractors are less 
prescriptive than they used to be and focus is on getting tenderers to submit plans on how they 
will address Government Priority criteria, for example training or aboriginal participation.  
We used to have a much more formalised system, we’ve relaxed back that, we require them to 
produce training plans, aboriginal participation plans, but the guidelines are more outcome 
focused and less prescriptive than they used to be.  They (contractors) have to obviously meet 
the approval conditions that we have for the project, things like safety, our requirements in 
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terms of quality but there probably wouldn’t be unique government requirements that we 
would be putting on this type of contract.  – Interviewee D(R)1 
 
Projects are not audited against Government Priority criteria.  The results are monitored but 
tend not to have formalised performance measures attached to them and did not seem to be 
rigorously assessed.   
 
5.5.6 Supply Chain Management  
 
The selection of subcontractors is predominantly left to the lead contractors who seek the 
approval of Government for their subcontractor selection.  It is rare that they are not approved 
but if Government has concerns they are raised with the lead contractor.  There are 
prequalification requirements for certain classifications of work that subcontractors are 
required to meet.  For example, to build a bridge, a subcontractor needs to be prequalified for 
bridge construction.  For projects in high risk areas the requirements might relate to engaging 
appropriately qualified traffic control firms. 
 
Regular performance feedback is provided to lead contractors at monthly meetings and three 
times a year a more comprehensive performance reporting regime is undertaken.  If a 
subcontractor was not performing it would be brought to the attention of the lead contractor.  
On construct-only projects the Government feels let down by the work performed by many 
subcontractors.  
We discuss performance at each monthly meeting with the contractors and if there was a 
subby not performing we would certainly bring that to the contractor’s attention.  The 
contractor’s system should identify non conforming work and if he doesn't, we do, and we 
give him the opportunity to raise it in his system otherwise we will serve him with a notice 
and get it raised as an NCR (non conformance report) … our contract is with the head 
contractor so we take our issues to him and expect him to take it up with the subby.  – 
Interviewee D(R)3 
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Contractually the relationship Government has is with the head contractor so that is who they 
communicate with, and expect lead contractors to address their concerns with the 
subcontractors.  Feedback is not normally provided directly by Government to subcontractors, 
although in some instances they may receive feedback informally. Previous performance of 
lead contractors is taken into account when awarding contracts and this can affect their pre-
qualification level.  If a contractor was to get a stream of unsatisfactory performance reports 
they could be removed from the prequalification system entirely, or they could have their 
level of work eligibility downgraded.    
 
Whilst supplier development was not a term familiar to the project managers interviewed, 
there did appear to be some activities undertaken in this area.  The Government conducts 
training courses, particularly in the area of quality, to ensure that contractors and consultants 
understand Government requirements.  There is also a registration scheme for traffic control, 
and Government provides train-the-trainer training in this area, to help stimulate expertise in 
the industry. Other issues they have sought to address periodically, through training and 
information sessions such as environmental erosion control and traffic control of worksites.  
Further, the Department liaises with a number of industry working groups (asphalt, concrete, 
concrete paving etc), participates in forums and contributes to technical discussions, which 
are often then reflected in the Government’s technical specifications.  Briefing seminars are 
also held informing lead contractors of future Government projects.   
 
Figure 5.20 exhibits the responses received from the project managers in case D(R) against 
the dimensions of the theoretical framework.  In case D(R) value-for-money is largely defined 
in terms of lowest cost, however this is moderated by having contractors satisfy the 
prequalification hurdle.  The predominant approach to procurement is traditional based on 
lowest cost and there appears to have been a move away from viewing procurement as an 
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appropriate mechanism to achieve policy by-products.  There is little active management of 
the supply chain although tendering approaches use prequalification to target appropriate 
bidders and minimise wasted tendering costs on the supply side.  
 
Figure 5.20: Case D(R) 
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5.6 CASE E (R) 
 
5.6.1 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
E(R)1 holds a trade qualification in quantity surveying, whilst E(R)2 holds Bachelor degrees 
in Civil Engineering and Business.  From Figure 5.21 it can be seen that both interviewees 
have spent the majority of their careers in the public sector.  The interviewees vary 
considerably in age and experience with E(R)1 having 20 years public sector procurement 
experience and E(R)2 having 5 years experience.   
  
Figure 5.21: Case E (R) Interviewee Age and Experience Distribution 
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5.6.2 Procurement Operations 
 
As illustrated by Figure 5.22 Case E(R) has a regional office structure that manages general 
maintenance contracts on the road network, and procures construction projects valued up to 
$3-4 million.  There is also a major projects area that procures larger scale projects like 
Freeway developments.  The capability also exists to create hybrid project teams, made up of 
combined regional and major projects staff, to deliver large projects in regions.  A small 
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internal labour force is available within each region although it has been considerably reduced 
and is made to compete with private sector contractors for projects.  Whilst not as 
comprehensive as previously, the Department still has some internal design capability, and the 
design unit select the projects that they want to design in order to maintain the expertise of 
Department staff.   
And I think a third of all works are supposed to still be done by them. … and they pick and 
choose some of the jobs that they do in order to maintain the expertise of their own staff. – 
Interviewee E(R)1 
 
Projects require an approval for the estimated cost from both the State budget team and 
Treasury, however the Department determines the procurement approaches used.  The main 
approach used is traditional procurement and at times they divide what might be one large 
project into smaller contracts to enable competitive traditional procurement. 
If it’s a $300 million scope of works they may divide it into three jobs of $100 million 
depending on the staging that they consider is going to be appropriate, the types of works that 
are in there and the complexity of them. – Interviewee E(R)1 
 
Most work is undertaken as mandated, by prequalified contractors, except in cases involving 
classification of works for which no prequalification scheme exists.  Even for smaller 
packages of work, the majority (approximately 60%) is undertaken by prequalified 
contractors.  A prequalification scheme similar to that for contractors exists for the 
consultants’ panel.  Consultants are required to submit for assessment a similar suite of 
information about their track record and proposed personnel.  Most of the consultant contracts 
have a value of less than $100,000 and if registered consultants are available in the category 
of work then project managers must engage a consultant from the panel (see Figure 5.23).  
The panel was created to streamline the process for engaging a single supplier consultant for 
work up to $100,000. 
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Figure 5.22: Case E(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Contractor 
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Figure 5.23: Case E(R) Procurement Decision Model – Building Consultant 
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Table 5.5: Distribution of Construction Contract Type for Case E(R)  
 Traditional BOOT D&C Novation CM/PM On-
call 
multi 
task 
GMP Full cost 
reimbursable 
E(R)1 >80% * * * * * * * 
E(R)2 >80% * * * * * * * 
* Respondents both indicated that traditional procurement took place more than 80% of the time but provided no other data 
 
5.6.3 Defining Value-for-Money  
 
Project managers viewed VFM as an important objective of their procurement activities.  The 
Department has a strong preference for construct-only projects, and a very strong preference 
for awarding these to the lowest priced prequalified tenderer.   
Well I guess you could say all our contracts are really based on Value-for-Money. Indirectly 
we identify that by getting a lowest bidder. – Interviewee E(R)1 
The logic is that for a construct-only project all the requirements of the work are specified in 
the contract documents, and hence the lowest price provides the best Value-for-Money. VFM 
means getting the level of quality specified in the design documentation at the lowest possible 
price.  
We’re defining the value or the quality of the product. It’s not necessarily the best product but 
a quality product … Hence a person who can come back with the lowest price really is 
providing us our best Value-for-Money. – Interviewee E(R)1 
The dominant theme to emerge was the financial perspective of VFM as the lowest cost being 
the best Value-for-Money.  VFM in the tendering process means using local knowledge and 
accepting the lowest priced bidder.  Project managers spoke of analysing bids to compare 
them with industry estimates and historical data.  Whilst money is the primary driver of VFM, 
if a contractor proposes elements on a project that the Department views as adding value then 
it will be considered provided it still allows the works to be done within the funding 
allowance. 
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On non-traditional projects, the scope of work is considered carefully so that projects are not 
tendered with large uncertain elements of design still requiring resolution by contractors.  
This is done purposely by Government to enable them to call for tenders in a way that enables 
them to select between bidders on the basis of lowest price.   
So we decided to simplify the works a bit and alter the delivery strategy and hope to bring in 
some of our second tier contractors … by doing that we opened the competitive pool up to 
around about twenty tenderers, which just makes a more competitive environment. And in the 
end we actually were justified in doing that because the prices that we got were a lot closer to 
what we expected and were actually lower than our engineers estimate for a number of the 
tenders. – Interviewee E(R)2 
 
If a contractor submits a tender price that is greater than 10% higher or 20% lower than the 
expected cost they are required to explain the difference.  Once contractors submit their price 
the only way that the price can be removed is if the Department agrees to its removal.  
 
5.6.4 Selection Criteria  
 
Whilst stating that it is not necessarily the lowest bidder that is awarded the contract, projects 
are overwhelmingly selected on the basis of price.   
The lowest price will normally be the one that is chosen unless there are very special reasons 
not to. – Interviewee E(R)1 
 
There is however, a risk mitigation process under which project managers risk adjust the price 
assumptions of projects.  Where contractors have submitted bids and the Department believes 
they have made a mistake it then becomes a negotiation process between the Department and 
the contractor.  A contractor can either withdraw their bid on the basis of being alerted to a 
mistake or elect to keep the bid in.  So it can be on the basis of this perceived risk that the 
lowest bid may not be accepted.  The Department might also abandon the lowest cost route 
where a contractor has elected to maintain their bid, after having being alerted by the 
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Department that it may contain a mistake.  The Department might view a low bid as being too 
risky, and feel that a contractor has submitted a low bid to win the contract and will then seek 
to claim money back later via contract variation claims.  
It’s no advantage to us at all if the contractors go broke, or even if they put in prices that are 
too low to get the work, because it only means that we’re in an adversarial situation straight 
away because they’ve virtually got to create variations to the contract to ensure they make a 
profit.  – Interviewee E(R)1 
Non-price criteria are not incorporated as formalised selection criteria, but project managers 
feel they do form part of the tender analysis. For example, at an early stage in the pre-
tendering process a decision is made with regards to a contractor’s history and their capability 
to handle a project.   
 
Selection criteria for consultants are based predominantly on price.  However, non-price 
criteria including track record and previous experience are also considered but not as 
formalised selection criteria.  It is also uncommon for non-price criteria to be used when 
procuring non-traditional projects.  Prequalification is considered by the Department to have 
addressed non-price issues for contractors.   
 
If a project manager makes a recommendation to award a project to anyone other than the 
lowest priced bidder then the chief executive officer’s approval is required.  Anything outside 
of the standard approach prior to selecting the supplier has to the go to the chief executive for 
approval.  At times the Department tries to convince either, or both of, the CEO and Ministers 
that to award projects to contractors who have submitted very low bids will cost more in 
terms of surveillance and require more resources to be allocated on a project by the 
Department. Judgements are also made about whether technical aspects of contractor’s bids 
meet those required of particular projects, but once that is determined the lowest price 
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prequalified bidder will win. As can be seen from Figure 5.24 the interviewees VFM 
knowledge and use of non-price criteria in their procurement activities was low. 
 
Figure 5.24: Case E(R) Interviewees’ Value-for-Money Matrix 
 
 
5.6.5 Government Priorities 
 
Both project managers were aware of the strategic plan and the Government Priorities 
articulated within it.  It was felt that procurement activities were undertaken in keeping with 
the strategic plan’s vision, but not necessarily driven by, nor explicitly linked to the plan.  The 
Department has a strong preference for lowest cost procurement, and as a result achieving 
Government Priorities via the procurement process is not incorporated in the current approach 
unless the CEO’s approval is sought.  
I would have to say indirectly to the best of my knowledge, no. Because certainly our 
procurement processes don’t change … If anything outside the standard variation we’re very 
rigid on has to go to the chief executive for approval. And he has five or six reasons which he 
can approve things on – being any other exceptional circumstances. And that would be the 
scenario there that it would be something that a Minister has directed that these works be done 
in a certain format with a certain relationship, and those would be then approved accordingly. 
– Interviewee E(R)1 
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The major contribution the Department sees itself making to the strategic plan is managing 
the infrastructure that provides transport efficiencies to regions and markets allowing the state 
to grow.  
Yes, certainly I suppose in what we do, in what we’re trying to provide we’re trying to satisfy 
a lot of the (strategic plan) strategies with regards to growing a link in (the State). That the 
project itself is designed to provide that benefit to the region and the state by providing greater 
transport efficiencies to key freight areas and markets. – Interviewee E(R)2 
There is a standard participation policy condition of tendering for contracts over $3 million in 
regional locations and over $5 million in urban areas, where contractors are required to 
provide information on how the community will benefit from their approach to constructing.  
Standard environmental management clauses are also included as conditions of tendering, but 
these are not explicitly aligned to the state plan.  There are criteria addressing Government 
Priorities written into contracts as standard ways of operating in the areas of participation 
policy and environmental policy.  However, whilst training is a focus for the organisation it is 
not pursued via projects.  The link between the strategic plan and procurement is not explicit 
although respondents felt that their procurement activities were broadly aligned with the state 
plan.  Projects are not audited to assess how they contribute to delivering the State’s strategic 
plan. 
 
5.6.6 Supply Chain Management  
 
The selection of subcontractors is left to lead contractors who advise the Department of their 
subcontractors and the Department generally approves them unless a subcontractor has been 
previously removed from the prequalification list.  Some subcontract packages, particularly in 
the areas of traffic signals, street lighting or designers, may have prequalification 
requirements.  They are in the process of introducing prequalification requirements in the area 
of traffic management.  Additionally, a contract might have requirements, for instance if there 
is a major bridge on a contract they will have to get a prequalified bridge contractor.  
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However, the Department has moved towards including less requirements on subcontractor 
prequalification and putting more onus on the lead contractor.  
 
The regional offices may have knowledge of good and bad subcontractors in their area but it 
is left to the lead contractor to select, manage and deal with subcontractors.  Feedback on 
performance is provided formally to lead contractors as specified in the contract, but not to 
subcontractors.  The approach to managing the supply chain is hands-off, but in reality the 
lead contractor’s are not taking ownership of managing the supply chain. The Department is 
taking on some responsibility for assuring the quality of their subcontractor’s work to ensure 
they get a built asset of a quality they are satisfied with.   
However the principal contractors are getting less and less experienced and so they’re happy 
to engage subbies, but they don’t manage them. So it’s a constant battle to get the principal 
contractors to take over the ownership of their subcontractor’s work.  – Interviewee E(R)2 
Subcontractors may receive informal feedback directly from the Department perhaps via 
technical experts whose responsibility is surveillance and auditing for the Department.  It was 
thought that future contractual approaches would seek to involve principal subcontractors in 
partnering type processes.   
There’s a school of thought out there that the subbies should be brought along, or the main 
subcontractor should be brought more into the process of the client and the principal 
relationship, because they’re often the main person that adds value or that ultimately has the 
responsibility for how things turn up out there is the subbies … I think as we go along in our 
next contracts is to have some of the principal subcontractors involved in a partnering type 
process and to get the principal to understand that that doesn’t mean that we’re going away 
from them or anything but it’s just that that subcontractor should be part of all of our decisions 
that we make and he’s the one that can affect the profit margins of the principal contractor 
anyway.  – Interviewee E(R)2 
Performance on projects has only a limited effect on success on future bids for work.  Poor 
performance stops contractors from progressing to higher levels of prequalification where 
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they would be eligible to bid on jobs of higher value.  There is little activity in the area of 
supplier development.  However, the organisation attends meetings with relevant professional 
associations to ensure they stay abreast of current issues and developments but little hands on 
supplier development activity is undertaken.  Figure 5.25 presents the responses received 
from the project managers in case E(R) against the dimensions of the theoretical framework.  
From Figure 5.25 it can be seen that case E(R) defines value-for-money narrowly.  
Predominantly projects are procured traditionally on the basis of lowest cost.  There is limited 
pursuit of policy by-products when procuring projects and apart from some prequalification 
requirements for subcontract packages there is little management of the supply chain.  Whilst 
showing some awareness of the tendering costs imposed on the supply side in preparing 
unsuccessful bids the tendering processes used seemed to encourage competition somewhat to 
the detriment of costs borne on the supply side. 
 
Figure 5.25: Case E(R) 
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5.7 CONCLUSIONS – CROSS CASE ANALYSIS ROADS 
 
The cross case analysis of the roads cases is structured around the theoretical model and 
addresses the five areas identified in the literature review: Infrastructure Procurement, Value-
for-Money, Policy Objectives, Supply Chain Management and Tendering Costs. 
 
5.7.1 Infrastructure Procurement  
 
There are many similarities in the way the State roads agencies procure construction projects 
(as illustrated by Table 5.6).   
 
Table 5.6: Cross Case Comparison of the Roads Cases – Infrastructure Procurement 
Case Regional 
Office 
structure 
Major 
projects 
area 
Prequalification 
for contractors 
and no. of 
categories 
Prequalification 
for consultants 
Internal 
Design 
capacity 
Internal 
Construction 
capacity 
A(R)     7    
B(R)     5    
C(R)     6    
D(R)  *   8    
E(R)     6    
* - has three distinct areas that deal with regional, major and PPP projects. 
As can be seen from Table 5.6 all five cases have a regional office structure where small 
projects are procured within regions and larger projects are procured centrally but might have 
involvement of regional office staff.  The size of projects handled by the regions varies 
somewhat with differing financial thresholds triggering whether a project should be procured 
by the major projects area. In addition to a major projects office Case D(R) also has a 
dedicated PPP project office.  As can be seen from Table 5.6 in all cases prequalification 
systems are used for contractors under a variety of classifications of work, and levels 
representing value and complexity.   
 
Three of the states have prequalification requirements for consultants [A(R), C(R) & E(R)] 
whilst both B(R) and D(R) have no prequalification requirements for consultants.  B(R) has 
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long term consultant contracts which enable them to do draw upon consultants to do work 
quickly at pre-negotiated rates, whilst D(R) assesses consultants on a project-by-project basis.  
 
All of the cases have both some internal capacity for design, and some have internal capacity 
for construction.  Some states create internal capacity through partnering with local councils 
[C(R), D(R)].  Case B(R) reported having 25% of design work undertaken in house whilst 
case E(R) reported that 33% of design work was undertaken in house.  Both of these cases 
talked about having this approach in order to develop the skills of the staff within their 
agency. Case B(R) commented that they were doing 10% of their budget as direct managed 
works, whilst case D(R) some capacity for works and single invite maintenance.  Case C(R) 
has a much reduced design capacity than previously but still had construction capability that 
was useful for rural projects, emergency situations and training graduates.  Case A(R) also has 
a more extensive in house capability where it can still undertake quite large sized projects 
with its own internal labour force. 
 
In case C(R) projects valued over $2 million were handled by the centralised major projects 
section, whilst for B(R) it was for projects valued at over $10 million.  Similarly, D(R) 
commented that regional offices only procure traditional projects of a small scale.  Cases 
A(R) and E(R) are somewhat more decentralised with substantial procurements in the regions 
(e.g. A(R) up to $50 million) and they also procure major projects either in partnership with 
the central major projects office or outright in the region.  
 
Table 5.7: Frequency of Traditional Procurement Approach 
Case Traditional 
A (R) 60-65% 
B (R) 80% 
C (R) 80% 
D (R) 90% 
E (R) >80% 
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As can be seen from Table 5.7 in four of the cases traditional procurement is undertaken more 
than 80% of the time.  As a general rule, smaller projects in regions are undertaken using the 
traditional approach.  For case A(R) projects are procured traditionally between 60-65% of 
the time but for larger projects they are using Early Contractor Involvement and Alliance 
approaches.  D(R) is using PPP methods for large projects.  C(R) tends to favour D&C and 
Construction Management procurement for larger projects. For smaller projects in all cases 
they will look to do some design in house and then a construct only project.  B(R) undertake a 
mixture of construct only, D&C, alliances, and some direct managed works that is not quite 
full in-house construction.  For many of the cases projects in remote locations may be 
procured via sole invitation inviting local government or local contractors to participate. 
 
Table 5.8: Public Sector Experience, Procurement Experience and Mean Age of Project 
Managers Procuring Roads 
Case Mean Public 
Sector 
Experience 
Mean 
Procurement 
Experience 
Mean Age 
A(R) 19.5 22.75 46.75 
B(R) 30.33 22.33 53.66 
C(R) 24.25 11.75 46.75 
D(R) 23.75 22.5 48.25 
E(R) 21 12.5 48.5 
Overall 23.71 18.47 48.65 
 
Figure 5.26: Procurement Experience of Project Managers Procuring Roads 
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Figure 5.27: Age of Project Managers Procuring Roads 
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As can be see from Table 5.8, Figure 5.26 and Figure 5.27 the project managers procuring 
roads projects on behalf of the state governments are on average in their late 40’s and have 
approximately 20+ years experience in the public sector.  In cases A(R), B(R) and D(R) 
project managers have on average 22 years experience procuring projects whilst project 
managers in cases C(R) and E(R) have on average 12 years experience procuring projects. 
 
5.7.2 Defining Value-for-Money 
 
Universally, project managers agreed that VFM was an important objective.  Project 
managers described VFM variously as having the maximum impact with taxpayer funds, a 
major objective, underpinning the whole thing, and important in everything that they do.  
There were only, at best, subtle and minor differences between the cases.  A number of 
themes emerged from the interviews.  A project manager from case C(R) was the lone voice 
in offering a formal definition of VFM.  The definition mandated the consideration of life 
cycle.   
The fulfilment of objectives for the lowest whole of life cost, maximisation of objectives – 
Interview C(R)1 
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Using the regional offices’ knowledge of local conditions to influence specifications was 
considered important, as well project managers were conscious of life cycle as the 
Department inherits the ongoing maintenance ramifications of the asset.  Project managers 
also acknowledged that VFM was limited by the scope of a project, hence the importance of 
design. A strong theme present in cases D(R) and E(R) was that VFM specified the level of 
quality through design documentation and then procuring at the lowest cost delivered VFM. 
 
Overall project managers felt that the concept was complex and subjective, but clearly did not 
mean lowest cost and instead was related to procuring an asset at a specified quality level 
incorporating a life cycle perspective.  One project manager commented that VFM was a 
complex concept with no universal definition, and instead when procuring a section of road 
the context and the strategy for the section of the road being procured needed to be considered 
along with price.  Another theme to emerge was the perspectives of the authorising 
environment.  Project managers felt that Treasury viewed VFM as delivering a project under 
budget, whilst politicians view of VFM focused upon what was delivered for the money.  
Figure 5.29 contrasts the differing perspectives on Value-for-Money with the extent and use 
of non-price criteria for the roads cases. 
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Figure 5.28: VFM Matrix Cross Case Comparison Roads Agencies 
 
5.7.3 Policy Objectives 
 
5.7.3.1 Selection Criteria 
 
In case E(R) projects are awarded on the basis of price with very few exceptions.  There is 
however some risk mitigation process where project managers risk adjust based on the price 
assumptions of projects, when they might view a low bid as too risky. Case D(R) also has a 
very strong preference for awarding on the basis of price.  Both cases D(R) and E(R) consider 
that prequalification has covered non-price criteria, whilst cases A(R) and B(R) have the same 
view on traditional projects.  For cases A(R) and B(R) if non-price criteria are included on a 
traditional project they are project specific. 
 
When procuring non-traditional projects, cases D(R) and E(R) consider non-price criteria less 
formally during the shortlisting process prior to inviting contractors to submit full bids.  The 
rationale is that anyone who does not satisfy the non-price criteria cannot deliver VFM and 
therefore will not be invited to submit a full tender.  For B(R) on non-traditional projects non-
price criteria varies from 0-70% of the selection criteria. 
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In the case of C(R) all construction contracts have non-price criteria.  The more difficult 
something is to define in a contract, the higher the weighting attached to non-price criteria.  
The weighting attached varies from between 5-10% for construct-only projects through to 
25% on moderate complexity construct-only projects.  
 
For case A(R) non-traditional projects have a higher non-price component – one example 
given of a non traditional was 60% price and 40% non-price.  On large projects non-price is 
used to shortlist prequalified contractors but the selection decision is made on price.   
 
When selecting consultants cases A(R), C(R) and E(R) prefer prequalified consultants, whilst 
B(R) appoints consultants to its panel on a non-formalised mixture of price and non-price 
criteria.  Cases D(R) and E(R) have a preference for procuring on price.  However for E(R) 
non-price criteria, like experience, are considered informally, whilst D(R) notes that price can 
vary from as little as 30% of the consideration up to as much as 80% of the selection criteria.  
Case C(R) selects consultants on the basis of 75% non-price criteria but in some cases it can 
be as high as100%.  On traditional projects A(R) select prequalified consultants on a mixture 
of price and non-price criteria.  Case A(R) frequently used non-traditional alliance and ECI 
procurement approaches where consultants are proposed by the parties bidding.  The parties 
bidding generally comprise a lead contractor and a lead consultant working in partnership.  
On these projects A(R) further shortlists to two partnerships, who are invited to prepare 
designs for a period of time, during which they are paid for their design work.  At the 
prescribed deadline the design proposals developed and constructability are assessed against a 
mixture of price and non-price criteria and the project is awarded to one of the two parties. 
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5.7.3.2 Government Priorities 
 
Table 5.9: Cross Case Analysis of Government Priorities/Strategic Plan Existence and 
Awareness 
Case Government 
Priorities 
Strategic 
Plan 
All Project Manager aware of 
Government priorities and/or 
Strategic Plan 
A(R)    
B(R) *   
C(R)    
D(R)    
E(R)    
* - researcher encouraged to refer to election promises as Government Priorities 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.9, in all cases the project managers were aware of the 
Government Priorities and/or the Strategic Plan.  In the case of A(R) standard non-price 
criteria designed to advance Government Priorities are incorporated on every project in the 
area of training.  In the case of B(R) Government priorities in the areas of skills training and 
regional development are included on all projects.  Project Managers can add other criteria 
depending on a project’s location for instance public art, indigenous training or involvement.  
For C(R) some of the project managers believed that training as a Government Priority was a 
standard requirement on all projects.  However, the responses from project managers about 
the implementation of this varied and they had very limited knowledge of the workings of the 
scheme, which seemed to focus more on training staff in government than within the industry.  
The inclusion of GP criteria is not consistently applied on all projects and appeared to be 
driven by project managers.  In case D(R) incorporating Government Priorities on projects 
had previously been more formalised, and the focus has shifted to getting contractors to 
articulate how they will address training, aboriginal participation etc.  Similarly, in case E(R) 
Government Priorities are not incorporated into projects as anything other than lowest cost 
requires CEO approval.  However, contractors are required to describe how the community 
will benefit from their approach to construction. 
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In all the jurisdictions Government Priorities appeared a higher priority on regional projects. 
In many cases e.g. A(R), B(R), C(R) location had an influence on the types of Government 
Priorities incorporated, such as; local supply, addressing both people and resources used, or 
indigenous policies.   
 
In cases A(R), C(R) and D(R) the requesting funding stage required a justification to Treasury 
of the Government Priorities a project is fulfilling, or a link with the strategic plan. D(R) 
commented that the link between procurement and achieving Government Priorities was not 
explicit.  C(R) further noted that the alignment or link between the Government 
Priorities/Strategic Plan and procurement is not seen by project managers. Project managers 
in cases B(R) commented that it is easier to pursue Government Priorities on alliance projects 
where Government staff are part of the team and there is a higher sense of developed team 
values.  E(R) reported that their procurement is in keeping with the strategic plan, but it is not 
driven by, nor explicitly linked to the plan. 
 
Only one of the five cases [B(R)] felt that Government Priorities were audited on their 
projects, but in reality this was not an audit but rather a monitoring process whilst a project is 
underway.  For the other four cases [A(R), C(R), D(R), E(R)] the achievement of Government 
Priorities was not audited.  
 
5.7.4 Supply Chain Management 
 
Table 5.10: Comparative Supply Chain Approaches 
Case Lead Contractors 
Select 
Subcontractors 
Prequalified 
Subcontractors 
Feedback 
given to Lead 
Contractors 
Feedback to 
subcontracto
rs 
Supplier 
Development 
A(R)      
B(R)      
C(R)      
D(R)      
E(R)      
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As can be seen from Table 5.10 there are similarities between the approaches taken to the 
supply chain amongst the roads agencies.  The management of the supply chain is very much 
left to the lead contractor including the selection of subcontractors.  Whilst lead contractors 
are required to seek agency approval of the proposed subcontractors, very rarely does the 
agency not approve.  In reality the agency is being advised as to who the subcontractors are 
and largely leaves the management of those subcontractors to the lead contractor.   
 
In all cases except B(R) prequalification categories cover subcontract work in the most 
commonly used areas which means that for work in those areas lead contractors are required 
to select subcontractors who are prequalified for the package of work they are going to 
undertake on the project.  B(R) found prequalifying subcontractors a labour intensive 
exercise, however, where a subcontractor has been nominated by the lead contractor and is 
considered critical to the project then the Government will insist on writing that subcontractor 
into the contract. 
 
In case A(R) a financial threshold mandates that subcontractors undertaking packages of work 
valued at over $50K have to be prequalified. However, where a prequalification category does 
not exist for subcontractors, the project manager makes a decision based on previous 
experience of that subcontractor. C(R) comments that the number of classifications of works 
under which lead contractors have to select prequalified subcontractors is growing. 
 
In terms of feedback, the contractual relationship appears to play an important role.  All lead 
contractors are given feedback by the Government on projects because they are the other 
party to the contract.  Feedback is given to subcontractors in two cases – A(R) prequalified 
subcontractors receive feedback, and in C(R) major subcontractors receive direct feedback 
and due to the partnering principles incorporated into all their projects other subcontractors 
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receive less formal feedback.  B(R) comments that a subcontractor may receive a copy of the 
lead contractor’s feedback form and D(R) notes subcontractors may receive informal 
feedback where performance is poor.  In case E(R) subcontractors may receive feedback 
directly from technical experts who do surveillance and auditing for the roads agency.   
 
The link between performance and future work opportunities was not strong.  In cases A(R) 
good performance gives contractors and subcontractors favourable work opportunities in the 
future.  B(R) comments that performance has little effect on future work opportunities.  Case 
C(R) questioned whether performance should have an effect on future work opportunities as 
Government acknowledges it does not conduct post project review sufficiently thoroughly, 
and felt it would therefore be potentially unfair.  Case D(R) notes that performance affects 
prequalification level and status and is taken into account when awarding contracts.  E(R) 
comments that performance on projects has only a limited effect on the success of future bids 
for work.   
 
Supplier development was not a term familiar to the project managers.  All of the cases 
undertook little in the way of supplier development.  A(R) commented that they were trying 
to engage second tier contractors in ECI projects to build capacity, whilst B(R) were 
conscious that they have to train the smaller players to raise their skills and competencies, but 
were still grappling with how to get larger contractors to do that.  Likewise in case C(R) there 
was little they recognised as being supplier development except perhaps inviting contractors 
into partnering arrangements.  D(R) commented that they do undertake some training in 
quality and traffic control and try to provide an understanding to interested parties of 
Government requirements and future projects, whilst also liaising with industry groups.  E(R) 
did not recognise any of their activities as being in the area of supplier development.   
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5.7.5 Tendering Costs 
 
In most cases there was an awareness of the impact that their tendering processes had on the 
tendering costs imposed on the supply side.  In two of the cases [A(R) & C(R)] there was a 
fixed project value threshold that dictated a project should be procured by the specialist major 
project area.  The other three cases [B(R), D(R) & E(R)] also had specialised major project 
areas but did not have definitive rules about when they would be called upon.  These projects 
are then procured centrally by project managers experienced in non-traditional projects who 
are generally fully aware of the cost imposts placed on the industry in bidding for these 
projects. 
 
In all cases the Government attempts to minimise the tendering costs imposed on the industry.  
However in case D(R) and E(R), perhaps because of their strong desire for traditional 
contracts to support the dominant organisational view of value as the lowest cost, they may 
have lost sight of the implications of its approaches for the industry.  This is particularly so in 
the case of E(R) where major projects procured in regions are packaged in a way that enables 
them to be procured traditionally with the CEO’s approval required for any variation from 
lowest price.  Rather than employing a shortlisting process they structure projects to enable 
more bidders to participate believing that greater competition has led to lower prices. 
In cases A(R) and B(R) Government was aware that the costs imposed on the supply side by 
non-traditional procurement projects are likely to be high. A(R) could be seen as a leader in 
non-traditional projects; so as not to waste supply side resources in tendering on projects a 
significant part of the selection process was shortlisting on the basis of non-price criteria.  
Conversely both A(R) for alliance projects and D(R) for PPP projects, viewed the 
considerable client side costs involved with assessing bids as being a process that did add 
value and was therefore worthwhile.  
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Evidence from two cases [B(R) & D(R)] showed an awareness of the prohibitive costs 
prequalification imposed on the Government as a client.  Both had found that administering 
prequalification for consultants an expensive and time consuming process.  B(R) developed a 
consultant panel as an alternative and potentially more cost effective solution to achieving 
some of the benefits of prequalification for consultants.  B(R) had also abandoned the 
prequalification of subcontractors. In other cases Government was identifying subcontractor 
prequalification as an increasingly important factor and prequalification approaches were 
expanding into new classifications of work.  To avoid a lead contractor substituting 
subcontractors after winning a government contract B(R) locked in the proposed 
subcontractors, where the Government was keen for them to work on the project. 
 
5.7.6 Conclusions 
 
Tables 5.6-5.10 and Figures 5.26 – 5.28 show many similarities between the cases.  The 
perspectives of VFM in cases A(R), B(R) and C(R) is slightly broader than those in the D(R) 
and E(R) cases.  With respect to policy objectives A(R) and B(R) seem genuinely keen to 
pursue some policy by-products via the procurement process, as does C(R), but the 
operational aspects of how that could be achieved in C(R) was somewhat unclear in the minds 
of those responsible for delivering projects.  In case D(R) it was noted they have moved away 
from viewing the procurement process as a vehicle for driving other policy objectives, whilst 
in E(R) it was not viewed as a priority apart from asking contractors for a statement as to how 
the local community would benefit from their approach to construction.  Overall, the Supply 
Chain Management is largely outsourced and seen as the domain of the lead contractor.  
Cases A(R) and C(R) are the most active in attempting to manage the supply chain, with A(R) 
the most innovative with respect to relationship based procurement and C(R) keen to employ 
partnering principles.  B(R) also attempts some relationship based procurement and D(R) and 
E(R) are quite passive in their approaches.  The tendering costs imposed on the supply side 
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are generally considered but E(R) in its desire for traditional procurement seems less aware of 
the consequences of their procurement approaches. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on drawing together the themes identified in the cross-case analysis of both 
the construction and the roads cases.  
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CHAPTER 6  – CROSS CASE ANALYSIS CONSTRUCTON 
AND ROADS  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 4 presented the within and cross case analyses for the construction cases, whilst 
Chapter 5 presented the within and cross case analyses for the roads cases.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to present the cross case comparisons between the construction cases and the 
roads cases, highlighting the major trends and discernible differences.  The themes identified 
in the theoretical framework are used as the basis to present the cross case analysis in this 
Chapter.  Section 6.2 focuses on infrastructure procurement, section 6.3 value-for-money and 
section 6.4 policy objectives.  Section 6.5 presents the cross case analysis for supply chain 
management, whilst 6.6 addresses tendering costs.  Section 6.7 highlights the conclusions of 
the cross case analysis of both the construction and roads cases within the same state 
jurisdiction, and the cross case analysis of construction and roads cases overall.  
 
6.2 INFRASTRUCTURE PROCUREMENT 
 
Procurement of construction projects is undertaken predominantly by a centralised delivery 
agency on behalf of client departments, except in case E(C) where procurement is 
decentralised to departments and the policy function is contained within a separate central 
department.  In cases A(C) and D(C) departments can opt for external delivery, although in 
the case of D(C) the provider needs to be Government accredited.   
 
When roads departments procure they do so for regional offices within their department and 
hence do not have a client relationship external to their department.  Procurement in all of the 
roads cases is tied to the roads agency whilst for construction there are three cases in which 
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procurement is not tied.  When compared with the construction cases, the roads organisations 
have a more decentralised procurement approach, with regions overseeing projects, except for 
C(R) which is basically a centralised operation.  However, whilst decentralised, all of the 
roads agencies have specialised areas that are responsible for procuring major projects: this 
was not as strong a feature of the construction cases.   
 
A two-staged procurement process requiring the prequalification of building contractors 
before bidding is used in every case.  In the roads cases the prequalification systems used are 
more nuanced and cover a larger number of work categories.  Prequalification is a 
requirement for building consultants in every construction case, but two of the roads cases do 
not prequalify designers [B(R) & D(R)].  The roads agencies have maintained a larger internal 
design expertise and construction capacity [e.g A(R) & B(R)].  Further, their ability to partner 
with local governments to construct roads gives them another option for drawing quickly on 
an almost completely “internal” construction capacity.  In construction case A(C) there was a 
substantial internal construction capacity available to government whilst D(C) maintained 
some construction capacity in the area of heritage buildings but otherwise there was 
considerably less capacity.  Gateway processes administered by treasury departments were 
mentioned as playing a larger part when procuring construction projects. 
 
In all cases traditional procurement remains a strong feature.  The roads agencies more 
frequently procure traditionally, with B(C) and E(C) having the highest frequency of 
traditionally procured projects and cases A(C) and A(R) the most likely to procure using non-
traditional approaches.  A(R) and B(R) used alliances to integrate design and construct 
disciplines whereas managing contractor approaches to integrating design and construction 
were a favoured approach in a number of construction cases [e.g. C(C), D(C)] 
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The average age of those procuring is approximately 49 years old for the roads cases and 51 
for the construction cases.  For the construction cases project managers had an average of 
approximately 26 years experience in the public sector and 24 years procurement experience, 
whilst for the roads case project managers had an average of approximately 24 years public 
sector experience and 19 years procurement experience.  There is a high degree of similarity 
between the characteristics of those procuring.  Project managers in the roads cases tended to 
hold Bachelor degrees in civil engineering whereas in the construction cases the project 
managers generally held Bachelor degrees in either architecture, building or engineering.  The 
project managers are highly experienced in procuring projects.  In eight of the ten cases 
project managers had approximately 20 years or more experience procuring projects, with 
only project managers in cases C(R) and E(R) having on average 12 years procurement 
experience.  In nine of the ten cases project managers had over 20 years public sector 
experience, with only the project managers in E(C) having on average 7 years public sector 
experience.  Project managers in A(C) were the most experienced having on average 35 years 
experience in the public sector.  The average age of those procuring ranged between 46 years 
and 53 years, with four project managers aged in their 30’s [from cases E(C), A(R), C(R) & 
E(R)] and only one female project manager was identified for interview, she came from case 
C(C).   
 
6.3 DEFINING VALUE-FOR-MONEY 
 
Value-for-Money was considered a crucial objective of procurement by all of the project 
managers interviewed.  Only one project manager out of the 37 interviewed offered an official 
definition of Value-for-Money which was from case C(R).  There was not an enormous 
difference between construction and roads as to how VFM was articulated.  In articulating 
VFM, both construction and roads cases showed a strong inclination to preference financial 
considerations.   
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The definitions offered in the construction cases had a stronger element of client preferences 
and client determined values that was not a feature of the roads cases.  Conversely the roads 
cases focus at a much higher level on life cycle considerations than do the construction cases.  
A lot of the time VFM means lowest price, or where defined more broadly is in virtually all 
cases, pursued operationally via lowest cost procurement.  This can be demonstrated by 
contrasting how project managers define VFM with how they procure.  Figure 6.1 contrasts 
the VFM knowledge of interviewees with the extent and use of non-price criteria by 
aggregating the project managers in each case.   It demonstrates that for most of the cases the 
knowledge of VFM is moderate as is the use of non-price criteria.  For cases E(R) and E(C) 
the knowledge of VFM and use of non-price criteria is low, whilst in case B(C) the 
knowledge is moderate but the use of non-price criteria is low.  For cases A(R) and A(C) the 
knowledge is in the high range but the use of non-price criteria is moderate.   
 
Figure 6.1: VFM Matrix Comparing Construction and Roads Cases 
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6.4 POLICY OBJECTIVES 
 
6.4.1 Selection Criteria 
 
When selecting building consultants it is common for non-price criteria to be a larger 
component of the selection decision than when selecting building contractors.  However, the 
non-price criteria used for selecting building consultants are subjective qualitative 
assessments made by the project managers about the skills and experience of the consultants 
being proposed.  For building contractors, non-price criteria are used but price remains a very 
important factor in the decision making process.  A similar assessment is made for building 
contractors on non-traditional projects where a non-formalised approach to non-price criteria 
is used to shortlist before a second stage of bidding on price occurs.  When selecting a 
building contractor four cases [B(C), E(R), E(C), D(R)] had a strong desire for price as the 
primary selection criteria.  In these cases prequalification is considered to have addressed 
non-price issues and so it is appropriate to procure on the basis of price.  In both the 
construction and roads cases, the decision to go beyond a lowest price bid seemed somewhat 
dependent on the skills and experience of the staff procuring.   
 
6.4.2 Government Priorities 
 
All the project managers were aware of Government priority areas and felt that the state 
strategic plans had affected what was approved and funded by Treasury, but had not 
influenced how they procured.  In states where strategic plans existed both the construction 
and road case from that state were aware of the document. 
 
In the case of A(R) and A(C) non-price criteria that relate to Government priorities were set at 
5-10% as a standard component of selection criteria.  In cases B(R) and B(C) there was 
clearly a desire to have criteria related to government priorities included as standard on 
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projects.  However, this as yet, did not appear to be standardised across either department.  
Cases C(R) and C(C) also seemed to have a desire to advance government priorities on 
projects but the project managers had limited and divergent viewpoints about how this was to 
happen and who was responsible for it.  In cases D(R) and D(C) there had been an 
institutional move away from focusing on procurement as a means for delivering policy from 
other areas.  In E(R) and E(C) there was little focus placed on government priorities with 
contractors bidding for work required to submit a cursory response to how local community 
development would benefit from their approach to building. 
 
Of the 37 project managers drawn from ten cases only one project manager from case B(C) 
commented that the achievement of government priorities on projects was audited, but upon 
examination it was found to be an informal monitoring process, rather than a formal audit. 
 
6.5 SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
 
In all cases the approach taken to the supply chain was largely hands off, viewing the 
management of the supply chain as the lead contractor’s responsibility.  At times project 
managers would recognise the importance of subcontractors on their projects but 
simultaneously bemoan the quality of subcontractor’s work [e.g E(C)].  In two cases C(C) and 
C(R) there was talk of partnering principles being overlaid on contracts, but otherwise there 
was little perception of partnership with subcontractors.   
 
Prequalification is both more common and covers more categories of work in the roads cases.  
Additionally, four of the five roads cases required prequalified subcontractors to work on their 
projects with only B(R) not prequalifying subcontractors but instead locking lead contractors 
into using the subcontractors proposed in their winning tender.  For construction, 
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prequalification operates at a lead contractor level but only case C(C) prequalifies 
subcontractors. 
 
In all cases lead contractors get performance feedback on projects.  In both construction and 
roads cases where a subcontractor is prequalified, or has been identified as a critical 
component of a project, they are likely to have been written into the contract, they will receive 
direct feedback from Government.  It is rare in the construction cases for a subcontractor to be 
given feedback given that four of the five construction cases do not prequalify subcontractors.  
Subcontractors on roads projects are far more likely to receive feedback, given that four of the 
five cases prequalify subcontractors and the other case [B(R)] looks to write subcontractors 
into the contract. 
 
Almost every project manager commented that performance feedback happens on projects but 
post project reviews were not something that as an organisation they placed sufficient 
emphasis on as they tended to move onto the next project. In all cases, and for all project 
managers, supplier development was not a term that they seemed familiar with.  Further, even 
when it was explained, relatively little of their organisation’s activities were recognised as 
supplier development.  
 
6.6 TENDERING COSTS 
 
Government generally tries to limit the tendering costs incurred by the supply chain when 
bidding on government projects.  For all cases, when selecting building contractors, there 
were either project value thresholds or informal rules, that effectively limited the number of 
building contractors bidding on projects.  Generally on large projects or non-traditional 
projects Government is well aware of the tendering costs involved with bidding on those 
projects, so shortlists are drawn up before inviting full tenders.  This was particularly evident 
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in cases A(R) and B(R) for their alliance projects and in case D(R) on PPP projects.  However 
in case E(R) and D(R) the organisations’ appetite for traditional lowest tender projects 
appeared to have made project managers less aware of the implications of their tendering 
approaches for the supply side.  They appeared to have lost sight of supply side tendering 
costs in their desire to get low prices via price based competition. 
 
When procuring consultants, there are still thresholds in some cases [e.g. A(C), B(C), E(C) 
Department 1], but because the cost of consultant contracts is not as great, the use of 
thresholds appeared to be focused on being able to engage a consultant quickly. 
 
In terms of the tendering costs on the client side, when tendering projects and prequalifying 
bidders, there was little evidence that project managers were aware of the costs absorbed by 
Government.  However, in case B(R) they noted that previously they had prequalified 
consultants and subcontractors but had found the process too labour intensive.  D(R) has also 
abandoned the prequalification of subcontractors due to its time consuming nature.   
 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 show the various state 
construction and roads cases and their procurement approaches mapped onto the theoretical 
framework.  A number of trends are evident in the data.  When looking at the cross case 
comparisons for construction and roads cases drawn from the same state, a number of trends 
can be seen.  In three states [A, B & C] the roads cases recorded a higher rating for procuring 
in a manner more befitting of public value creation whilst in states D and E there was little 
discernible difference between the roads and construction cases.  There are a number of other 
trends evident when viewing the cross case results within the same state.   
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Figure 6.2: Cases A(C) and A(R)  
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When examining state A (see Figure 6.2), both A(C) and A(R) are enabled to procure non-
traditionally and they take a broad view of VFM.  Further they attempt to advance 
Government Priorities as standardised non-price criteria via the procurement process and are 
mindful of the tendering costs that non-traditional projects impose on the supply side.  The 
biggest difference between the roads and construction case in state A is that the roads case is 
more actively attempting to manage the supply chain. 
 
Figure 6.3: Cases B(C) and B(R)  
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For state B (see Figure 6.3) it is known that B(R) procures non-traditionally and attempts to 
advance Government Priorities through policy by-products as part of the procurement 
process.  Further B(R) believes they need to have a higher a degree of supply chain 
involvement and is aware of minimising costs for the supply chain, particularly when inviting 
bids on non-traditional projects.  In contrast B(C) is almost totally procuring traditionally, 
defines VFM narrowly, and whilst recognising the opportunity the procurement process 
represents to advance government priorities, is procuring in a traditional manner that does not 
incorporate policy by-products.  It is passive in its approach to the supply chain but does try to 
limit the numbers bidding on their projects through shortlisting processes.   
 
Figure 6.4: Cases C(C) and C(R)   
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For state C (see Figure 6.4) the roads organisation [C(R)] has a broader perspective of Value-
for-Money than C(C).  In both C(R) and C(C) there was some focus on advancing 
Government Priorities via projects but it was inconsistently applied and there was little 
coherence in the eyes of project managers as to how this was being pursued.  Both cases 
sought a higher degree of involvement and partnership with their supply chain and are 
cognisant of limiting the tendering costs incurred on the supply side.   
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Figure 6.5: Cases D(C) and D(R) 
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For state D (see Figure 6.5) both construction and roads cases define VFM narrowly and have 
moved away from viewing policy by-products as an appropriate focus for Government 
procurement.  They are passive in their approach to the supply chain and the roads case due to 
its preference for traditional procurement is perhaps not as strong on minimising tendering 
costs for the supply chain as it might be. 
 
Figure 6.6: Cases E(C) and E(R) 
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For state E (see Figure 6.6) both cases E(C) and E(R) defined Value-for-Money narrowly 
largely in financial terms and were only slightly interested in creating policy by-products as 
part of the procurement process.  Both cases are passive in their approach to the supply chain 
allowing lead contractors to do the actual management of supply.  Given the frequency of 
traditional procurement and creating price based competition in the marketplace there 
appeared to be some areas where their approaches wasted resources on the supply side. 
 
Figure 6.7 focuses on the construction cases whilst Figure 6.8 shows the roads cases when 
mapped onto the theoretical themes of the research as identified in the literature. Generally 
the roads cases defined Value-for-Money more broadly e.g A(R), B(R) and C(R), although 
cases A(C) and B(C) also did.  This broader definition in the cases of A(R), B(R) and A(C) 
enabled non-price criteria in the selection process and more non-traditional procurement 
approaches to be used.  Whether Government Priorities were advanced seemed to be 
somewhat consistent across the states between their roads and construction cases.  So for 
instance it was consistent in cases A(C) and A(R) that Government Priorities were part of 
how they procured, as it was in cases B(C) and B(R).  In cases C(C) and C(R) there was some 
intention to advance Government Priorities but they were inconsistently pursued.  In cases 
D(C) and D(R), as well as E(C) and E(R) it was clear that incorporating Government 
Priorities was not a part of how they undertook standard procurement.  There was only a 
small difference between the roads and construction cases with respect to pursuing policy by-
products with roads cases pursuing by-products slightly more.  It was clear that the roads 
cases generally worked slightly more in partnership with their supply chain than construction 
cases drawn from the same state.  This was evident in cases A(R) and C(R) and in the 
construction cases only case C(C) sought some real partnership with its supply chain.  There 
was little difference between most of the cases on tendering costs with only cases E(C), E(R) 
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and D(R) being so focused on encouraging price based competition they had lost sight of the 
possibility of by products in terms of Government Priorities. 
 
Figure 6.7: Cross Case Analysis Construction Cases 
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Figure 6.8: Cross Case Analysis Roads Cases 
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Drawing on the results and analysis contained in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Chapter 7 provides 
answers to the research questions. 
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CHAPTER 7  - FINDINGS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore the procurement of construction infrastructure 
projects by Australian State Governments. The purpose of this chapter is to answer the 
research questions and to highlight the contributions of this study in the form of conclusions 
drawn from the data.  Sections 7.2-7.6 present answers to the research questions, whilst 
section 7.7 offers some generic conclusions.   
 
7.2 RESEARCH QUESTION ONE:  How do Australian State Governments 
procure infrastructure projects? 
 
In all but one construction case, building construction projects are procured through a 
centralised delivery agency on behalf of client departments. The exception is case E(C) in 
which procurement is decentralised and client departments are empowered to procure their 
own building construction projects. 
 
Roads projects are procured by specialist road agencies featuring a mix of centralised and 
decentralised procurement.  Decentralised procurement is evident in regional offices for small 
projects and maintenance contracts, but the bulk of construction projects are procured 
centrally, particularly for larger, or more complex projects. 
 
For both roads and buildings, contracts are awarded predominantly to prequalified consultants 
and lead contractors.  Projects are procured using a two-staged process with the first stage 
being prequalification and the second stage, bidding.  In the roads sector there is an increasing 
use of prequalification to address subcontractor elements of projects.  Only one of the 
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construction cases sampled C(C) requires that prequalified subcontractors are engaged on 
their construction projects.  
 
The most frequently used procurement approach in both building and roads sectors is the 
traditional approach with separated phases of design and construct, and separate contracts for 
consultants and contractors.  There are clearly pockets of activity within both roads and 
building agencies using non-traditional procurement approaches to integrate the design and 
construction disciplines so that they take place concurrently.  Non-traditional approaches are 
generally used by government on larger projects with elements of perceived project 
complexity.  For the construction cases, managing contractor and D&C approaches are 
favoured when trying to integrate the design and construct disciplines.  The roads sector uses 
Alliance and Early Contractor Involvement approaches but there is also a distinct flavour of 
experimenting with a return to direct management of programs of works.  BOOT/PPP 
approaches are increasingly being explored by governments in both the building and roads 
sectors as a means of delivering projects. 
 
For both building and roads agencies procuring projects, Treasury plays an important role.  
Treasury acts as gatekeeper to public finances, but also a scrutiniser and shaper of the 
procurement approaches proposed.  From the perspective of project managers, Treasury 
exhibit a strong desire for the cost certainties more commonly found in traditional 
procurement approaches than the non-traditional procurement approaches where design and 
construction are frequently occurring concurrently.   
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7.3 RESEARCH QUESTION TWO:  What does Value-for-Money mean to 
Australian State Governments when procuring infrastructure projects? 
 
Many of the project managers noted that Value-for-Money was not the same as lowest price 
and defined VFM in broader terms.  Value-for-Money is a complex multidimensional 
construct that is not a fixed concept.  It varies from project to project depending on what a 
client values for those procuring building projects which can reflect time, cost or quality 
issues.  Others believe VFM takes into consideration innovation and implies non-price criteria 
must be considered.  There were four major themes that emerged from the data. 
No single universal definition.  The meaning of Value-for-Money differs from project to 
project.  It is important to select the right procurement approach for a particular project, 
and depending on the approach selected, VFM may be different.  Some of this is 
dependent on how much design is done before the documents are tendered, and 
therefore how much risk is still attached to a project, or whether the risk has been 
designed out. 
Financial Perspective – a strong theme emerging from the data was that of the delivery 
agency justifying expenditure on projects, the belief that competition from the market 
demonstrates VFM and comparing bids from the market against estimates.  A lot of the 
focus of these activities seems to be centred around providing cost certainty for clients. 
Client Perspective – the preferences of client departments have an impact on VFM as pursued 
via the procurement process by the delivery agency.  The delivery agency is very much 
focused on justifying costs to clients, and providing cost and time certainty. 
Complexity – the larger or more complex a project, the more non-price criteria are considered 
and become part of the selection criteria.  For these projects VFM represents more than 
just lowest cost.   
However, there is considerable gap between how project managers define VFM in broad 
terms and how they procure, frequently on the basis of lowest cost.   
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7.3.1 Research Question Two (a):  To what extent is Value-for Money an objective for 
Australian State Governments when procuring infrastructure projects? 
 
Value-for-Money is overwhelmingly considered a very important objective for project 
managers procuring both building and roads construction projects.  There was no discernible 
difference as to how much of an objective or the level of the priority attached to Value-for-
Money by project managers.  All of respondents (100%, N = 37) indicated that VFM was a 
critical objective of their procurement activities underpinning all of their activities when 
procuring projects.  It was variously described as a major objective, a responsibility to the 
public to have the maximum impact with taxpayer funds, of critical importance and 
inescapably part of everything they do. 
 
7.4 RESEARCH QUESTION THREE:  What selection criteria are used by 
Australian State Governments when selecting both building consultants and 
contractors? 
 
A mixture of price and non-price selection criteria are used, however price remains the 
dominant selection criterion. That said, all the cases apply prequalification when selecting 
based on lowest price.  Non-price criteria are a more prominent feature of non-traditional 
procurements and these criteria are generally given a higher weighting of the overall selection 
criteria when compared to traditional procurements.  Consultants are generally selected on a 
higher ratio of non-price criteria to price criteria than contractors.  In some cases where the 
selection criteria are not formalised, an assessment is made of the service being offered (non-
price) but then price criteria are considered to ensure the project cost is within an acceptable 
range.  Typical non-price criteria considered in the selection of consultants involve primarily 
assessing the experience and track record of the people being proposed.   
 
For the weighting of building contractors, the level of non-price criteria set were highly 
variable and influenced by a range of factors including; the procurement approach, project 
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complexity, appetite of client and the project manager for innovation and risk.  Typically non-
price criteria when selecting contractors are focused on the proposed team, their track record, 
and the proposed methodology. 
 
In some cases, project managers indicated that by being prequalified a consultant or 
contractor has addressed non-price criteria and therefore the matter does not need to be 
included again in a tender submission process.  There was one case where project managers 
were mandated to accept the lowest price, although this was done with some consideration of 
risk to the client.  However, to consider any non-price criteria the approval of the agency’s 
chief executive was required, which meant that non-price criteria were not usually 
incorporated as part of the selection criteria.   
 
In some cases, non-price criteria are linked to Government Priorities and contracts have 
standard clauses where contractors must submit bids describing how they will address 
Government Priority criteria.  Government priority criteria most often address training, and 
local content, but can also include public art, indigenous employment, etc depending on 
project scope and location.  In the agencies that consider government priority criteria, it is 
typically set at a weighting of 5-10%.  There was also one case where a separate weighting 
was attached to past performance on government projects and set at 5-10%. 
 
7.4.1 Research Question Three (a):  Are non-price criteria used? 
 
Non-price criteria are used in the selection of both building consultants and contractors.  
However, their use is variable and range from 0-100% depending on the project and client 
appetite for non-price criteria.  Non-price criteria are not always formalised as selection 
criteria and given a weighting (e.g 20%).  Instead, non-price criteria are sometimes used less 
formally as pass or fail criteria during a shortlisting process.  Applicants who pass the criteria 
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hurdle will then be asked to submit a full tender, while those who fail do not advance to the 
tendering stage.  In some cases the prequalification requirements are considered to have 
addressed non-price criteria and they believe that to repeat this exercise in the tender for a 
project is wasteful and unnecessary duplication.   
 
7.5 RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR: How is infrastructure procurement linked to 
Australian State Government priorities? 
 
Most project managers were broadly aware of their state government’s strategic plans and or 
government priorities where such documents were widely disseminated.  However, 
infrastructure procurement is, at best, loosely linked to Australian State Government 
priorities.   
 
Project managers were largely unaware of how their projects aligned with the strategic plan of 
the State Government, but assumed that for a project to be funded there must be alignment.  
Project managers believe the alignment of a project with the strategic plan is established in 
the project planning phase when the funding case is made to Treasury, and not in the project 
delivery phase.  Project managers working in centralised agencies delivering construction 
projects for client departments are not always privy to the nuances of the project planning 
phase that takes place between the client department and treasury.  However, roads project 
managers also responded believing the alignment happened earlier in the project planning 
phase. 
 
Project managers procuring building projects believe that the focus of client departments is on 
core business and not on creating policy by-products.  Policy by-products become more of an 
interest when they are within the policy objectives of the client department.  For instance a 
department of education & training procuring a school might be interested in ensuring that 
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apprentices are trained during the construction phase because that activity falls under the 
policy domain of the broader department’s objectives.  However, a department of health 
might see less relevance to their direct policy activities of having apprentices trained on a 
hospital redevelopment project. 
 
Where internal delivery agencies justify their business unit’s existence by client departments 
choosing to procure through them, the project managers did not feel in a position to drive 
government wide policy via procurement. 
 
Some standard approaches are used to incorporate into projects non-price criteria designed to 
address Government Priorities.  However, these do not appear to be audited or performance 
measured in a rigorous way and seemed to be, at best, inconsistently applied and highly 
dependent on the inclination, skills and experience of the individual project manager.  
 
7.6 RESEARCH QUESTION FIVE: How is Supply Chain Management 
undertaken by Australian State Governments when procuring infrastructure 
projects? 
 
There appears to be very little Supply Chain Management conducted by Governments on their 
projects. There has been a shift from internal works departments actually building facilities 
towards project managing the acquisition and maintenance of facilities through their life 
cycles.  Consequently, most of the design and construction previously undertaken by 
government has been outsourced to private sector firms.  As a result the management of the 
supply chain is viewed as the domain of lead contractors.  The government adopts a ‘hands-
off’ approach to the supply chain viewing its management as the lead contractor’s 
responsibility.   
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However, there is a disconnect between government acknowledging that subcontractors often 
let them down on their projects, and their seeming unwillingness to engage with, or change 
the way the supply chain is managed.  In fact, one could almost go so far as to conclude that 
government does not view the construction industry as a supply chain, and instead views it as 
a fragmented array of trade capability.  They do not view interactions with subcontractors as 
interacting with a business and there is very little perception of partnership with 
subcontractors.   
 
There is very little activity in the area of supplier development undertaken.  Supplier 
development was not a term that respondents appeared familiar with.  There were instances 
where they had cited examples of things their organisation did in the area, but they did not 
recognise the activities as being part of the government’s responsibility.  
 
7.6.1 Research Question Five (a): How are lead contractors and sub-contractors 
selected? 
 
Lead contractors are selected by the Government on a mixture of price and non-price criteria 
with the dominant discourse being prequalified lowest price tenderers.  Subcontractors are 
selected by lead contractors.  Lead contractors are required to seek the government’s approval 
of the subcontractor selection but in most cases this is little more than a formality.  There are 
some instances in which prequalified subcontractors must be engaged.  There are also some 
instances in which lead contractors submit bids that include particularly desirable 
subcontractors, then government will bind those subcontractors into the contract.  
Prequalifying subcontractors is a larger part of roads project procurement than it is for 
building project procurement.  Government is not generally exposed to the basis upon which 
subcontractors are selected, but there was one case in which government mandated they be 
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selected on the basis of Value-for-Money and lead contractors needed to explain their 
decision if they selected anything but the lowest priced tenderer. 
 
7.6.2 Research Question Five (b): How is performance feedback given to lead 
contractors and sub-contractors? 
 
Generally, formal performance feedback is given to lead contractors during the course of, and 
after a project is completed, both in the form of written reports and verbally at on-site 
meetings.  Formal feedback is rarely given to subcontractors as they are not considered to be 
parties to the contract.   
 
Poor performance by subcontractors is an important issue, governments will voice 
dissatisfaction to lead contractors and expect them to deal with the situation.  However 
governments are reluctant to get too involved in the lead contractors’ supply chain, as they do 
not want to interfere in the relationship between contractor and subcontractor.   
 
Positive initiatives in the area of relationships and feedback include governments involving 
what were considered key subcontract packages in the on-site partnering meetings on some 
non-traditional projects and in some cases subcontractors formed constructive relationships 
with government surveillance teams, especially when they contained trade expertise.  
Project managers question whether the consistency and quality of feedback given to 
contractors enables contractors to actually plan improvement activities. There was a 
widespread acknowledgement from project managers that project reporting both during and 
particularly post project was an area in which government could improve.   
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7.6.3 Research Question Five (c): How does current performance affect future 
contract/project opportunities? 
 
In theory poor performance on government projects has a negative effect on future work 
opportunities.  Contractors can be removed from prequalification registers or in some cases 
have their status downgraded, and therefore lose access to future opportunities to bid on 
projects.  However, in practice this happens rarely, and good performance does not seem to 
correlate positively with future work opportunities in the way that one might suspect.  The 
acknowledged inconsistencies in the way the performance review processes are undertaken 
appear to be part of the problem.  So project managers have ambiguous data to work on and 
many conclude that that they cannot preference a contractor strongly on prior performance 
because in so doing they might unfairly punish another contractor who has performed well but 
the respective project manager for any one of a number of reasons, had not completed the 
project reviews. 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION  
 
There is a strong focus on getting something done but the processes that follow on like project 
review and audit appear to lack consistency and sophistication in approach.  This may be 
related to the lack of sophistication in information systems for dealing with post contract 
processes, and so building a bank of information about contractors and subcontractors is not 
happening, and represents significant opportunity for improvement.    
 
Triangulation in the form of drawing on; a multidisciplinary theoretical framework to guide 
the data collection and explore the phenomenon; multiple data collection techniques 
(interviews and document analysis), and multiple informants from cases was used to build 
trustworthiness of this research (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Cavana et al. 2001).  Credibility was 
established by undertaking a systematic approach to data collection and analysis as well as 
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employing these various approaches to triangulation.  However it should be noted that for 
cases E(C) and E(R) there were only two respondents from each case and the trustworthiness 
of these cases might be viewed as lesser than the other eight cases.   
 
Given the nature of qualitative research, external validity or being able to generalise the 
findings to a broader population is not possible or even desirable.  The findings as outlined in 
this chapter are bound to the context of public sector infrastructure procurement in which they 
were collected, and are hence not for example transferable to infrastructure procurement by 
private sector clients.  Likewise these findings may only have limited applicability to more 
transactional procurements (e.g. stationary) undertaken by public sector clients or to 
infrastructure procurement undertaken in various jurisdictions and nationalities given 
different social, political and industrial conditions existing.   
 
Chapter 8 presents an in-depth discussion of the findings and draws upon appropriate 
previous research and theory from the extant literature. 
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CHAPTER 8 – DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary purpose of this study was to understand the practice of construction project 
procurement by project managers on behalf of Australian State Government agencies in order 
to explore the alignment between procurement and the creation of public value.  Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 provided the empirical findings in their aggregate form, whilst Chapter 7 provided 
answers to the research questions. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical 
discussion of the findings. In doing so, the key themes that emerged from the findings are 
linked to existing theoretical perspectives in the literature.  Policy implications informing the 
practice of infrastructure procurement are also drawn from the data.  This chapter highlights 
some of the most interesting discoveries of the research.   
 
Section 8.2 provides a discussion of the findings focused on the cohort of project managers 
procuring infrastructure projects for State Governments.  Section 8.3 discusses the 
procurement approaches used whilst section 8.4 focuses on value-for-money.  Section 8.5 
focuses on supply chain management and section 8.6 provides a discussion of tendering costs.  
Section 8.7 provides a discussion of innovation, whilst section 8.8 addresses policy by-
products and section 8.9 presents the conclusions.  Sections 8.10 and 8.11 reflect upon the 
research undertaken, discusses the limitations and points to areas of potential future research.   
 
8.2 PROCUREMENT COHORT   
 
The nature of procurement undertaken by the sample cohort of project managers is best 
described as strategic, complex and focused on the delivery of best value-for-money 
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outcomes; hence the APCC (2008) would classify project managers as procurement 
professionals. The project managers procuring infrastructure for State Government agencies 
are highly experienced and almost entirely male.  Only one respondent from case C(C) was 
female from an architectural background with roads projects all procured by males from a 
civil engineering background.  Those procuring have either spent an overwhelming proportion 
of their career in the public sector or have been career civil servants.  They have, on average, 
more than 20 years experience in both the public sector environment and the procurement of 
infrastructure.  Most project managers are degree qualified in the areas of architecture, 
construction and engineering and whilst their study will have contained procurement related 
material, few of them hold procurement specific qualifications as is advocated by the APCC 
(2006; 2008).   
 
Over the course of their careers, the project manager cohort interviewed are likely to have 
experienced the period of Public Administration, been part of the shift to New Public 
Management led practices, and are now experiencing the post-NPM phase.  The results 
showed that project managers felt that further political input was needed to make Value-for-
Money more tangible and operational.  This suggests that procurement professionals are 
either not comfortable with a value-creation decision making role, or do not feel empowered 
to make these public value judgement laden decisions in the post-NPM environment.  It may 
also suggest that procurement is not viewed strategically by Government and the rest of the 
public sector and hence the status of those procuring is not sufficiently senior and therefore, 
not deemed to warrant direct interaction or exposure at the political level. 
 
Public Value Management as articulated by Moore (1995) is not being practiced by these 
project managers.  This might be because they are not senior enough within the organisation 
to actively engage in political management as espoused by Moore (1995) or they realise that it 
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would be too risky to do so.  In some instances, where a project manager was particularly 
senior and experienced, there was evidence of engaging with the political environment.  This 
was more common in the roads sector where experienced roads officers seemed to merit the 
trust of, and are consulted by their politically elected authorisers.   
 
8.2.1 Policy Implications 
 
Given that the project managers have been in the public sector for an average of 20+ years, 
there is the possibility that they have been heavily indoctrinated in the ways of NPM and may 
not be equipped for the post-NPM environment.  They may need training to adapt, and may 
not feel comfortable or equipped for a role in which they are more actively seeking value 
creation and gaining the authorisation of the political level.  Given the complexity of 
infrastructure procurement, combined with the experience and age profile of the project 
managers, there is also the danger that there will have been little thought invested in 
succession planning within Government over the NPM influenced period of outsourcing.  
Given that the State Governments have increasingly divested themselves of infrastructure 
design and construction capability it is possible that the remaining experienced core of project 
managers are remnants of a bygone era.  It is therefore difficult to know where the next 
generation of project managers will come from or whether they have already been recruited.  
It is also likely, given the changed role of the Government in infrastructure delivery, that the 
next generation of project managers will not get the same enculturation into the infrastructure 
procurement and therefore not have the same level of experience and expertise which may 
lead to the Government having a lessened capability to deliver. 
 
This appears particularly evident in the construction cases where less internal capability has 
been retained, and especially so in cases where NPM has been pursued aggressively [e.g. 
E(C)] and where activities of Government have been outsourced to such an extent that the 
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skills needed to procure and manage assets of this complexity may not have been retained.  
Clearly the construction cases have outsourced to a higher degree than the roads cases and the 
possibility exists that construction cases have not retained or developed the necessary skill 
sets to continue procuring complex assets in the future.  This may require Government to 
change its approach to procurement in the construction sector and either undertake more 
alliance type procurements, or directly undertake some construction, to develop skills in their 
own organisations. 
 
There is an opportunity for organisation development by engaging project managers in 
professional development.  This could include, for example, secondment to the commercial 
sector to gain insights into different approaches to procurement.  This approach to 
professional development might be based on an exchange program with commercial 
organisations. 
 
If the public sector wishes to redress the gender inequity in infrastructure procurement then it 
may have to undertake targeted recruitment or identify good internal candidates for either 
promotion or development.  Alternatively government might work with professional bodies to 
attract female engineers and architects. 
 
8.3 PROCUREMENT APPROACH  
 
There was clear evidence of the impact of NPM thinking in public works and roads agencies 
in the outsourced approach to construction of infrastructure where Government acts very 
much as a facilitator (Gray & Jenkins 1995).  Infrastructure procurement by the State 
Governments is undertaken in a manner that is generally outsourced and centralised.  
However there has been the retention of core capabilities in some areas.  
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8.3.1 Construction 
 
In all of the construction cases apart from case E(C) projects are predominantly outsourced to 
private sector providers in both the design and construction disciplines.  Projects are centrally 
procured for client departments and project managed by agencies with expertise in procuring 
projects.  These agencies are also predominantly geographically centralised, with some 
patches of regional procurement, but large projects are procured invariably through central 
offices.  Ideologically NPM appears to have had a profound impact on how case E(C) 
procures buildings via decentralised procurement in departments and devolved decision 
making.  In case E(C), the ability of the centralised policy unit, that administers 
prequalification, to influence procurement approaches in departments appeared weaker.  
Direct works is a less prevalent trend in the construction cases.  However, there are some 
exceptions to outsourcing for example in the areas of heritage buildings where there is not 
perceived to be a market (market imperfection) which is a classic justification for government 
intervention (Aulich & Nutley 2001, p.5).  There is also some internal capacity within some 
building agencies for direct labour and emergency recovery. 
 
8.3.2 Roads 
 
In the roads cases, projects were also predominantly outsourced to private sector providers in 
both the design and construction disciplines.  The roads cases feature more decentralised 
procurement as regional offices manage sections of the road network and either procure 
projects outright, depending on the value and complexity of a project, or in partnership with 
centralised expertise, or alternatively have input into a project’s centralised procurement.  The 
roads cases feature less outsourcing as they have retained more internal capability in both 
design and construction.  There appeared to be an ideological move back towards undertaking 
more work in-house and a recognition that this was crucial in order to both maintain and 
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develop internal skills and expertise.  Internal construction capacity is a considerably larger 
feature in roads agencies, and an additional capacity for construction can be accessed via 
partnering with local government.   
 
8.3.3 Supply Market 
 
The nature of the supply market and relationship in the roads and construction cases is 
different.  In the roads sector Government is more or less the sole client for roads contractors, 
whilst for construction contractors, there is a much greater diversity of markets for what they 
produce and suppliers can have other important non-Government clients.  As a result, there 
tends to be more stability in the relationships between roads suppliers and roads procurers 
than there is in construction suppliers and construction procurers.  Of the three levels of 
Government (Federal, State and Local) that procure roads this research focused solely on 
procurement at a State Government level as their agencies are the most significant procurers 
of major roads projects, although this is sometimes in conjunction with Federal Government 
funding, and services metropolitan, rural and regional locations.  Given that roads procurers at 
a State Government Level are effectively in a monopoly position their ability to exert 
influence on the supply chain is significant.    
 
The results showed that roads departments do engage in elements of supplier development 
and a larger degree of specification and prequalification of subcontractors and that may be a 
consequence of the greater stability in the relationship. This stability may relate to the 
recognition that supplier development is an investment that will provide a return. On the other 
hand the construction cases also engage in some supplier development but do not specify or 
prequalify to such a large an extent.  Construction is not in the same position to influence 
supply chain approaches on its projects and may not see supplier development as a 
worthwhile investment.  In both construction and roads cases, there is probably less supplier 
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development than there might be and this seems to be a construction industry wide issue 
which may be a result of the temporary nature of projects and hence relationships.   
 
8.3.4 Policy Implications 
 
It has been noted that NPM influenced decentralisation leads to the erosion of responsibility 
and accountability (Minogue 2000; cited in O’Flynn 2007) and this seems to be evident in 
case E(C) where departments are engaging private sector providers to make, or advise, on 
many public value laden decisions.  The move back towards increased internal capacity in the 
roads cases seems to be a post-NPM redefining of the role of roads agencies and the skills and 
competence needed to perform that role.  Perhaps this has been a rebalancing of Government 
activities based on the recognition that procurement practices had become overly outsourced 
under NPM to the point, or were approaching the point, where the roads agencies lacked the 
internal capability to select suppliers and hence deliver quality assets. 
 
A number of factors perhaps place the roads agencies in a better position to procure using 
traditional approaches.  Roads cases have more internal design capability which enables them 
to better comprehend and assess the designs proposed by consultants.  In particular, this 
enables them to further develop design documents which are seen to contain grey areas of the 
design that might be considered as risky.  Grey areas in design documents complicate project 
and budget management because they may enable contractors to submit contract variation 
claims further down the track.  Through having the capacity to further develop design 
documents, roads agencies can more confidently tender in the knowledge that there are less 
likely to be unforseen issues that make traditional procurement a problem, and subject to 
contract variations from the builder.  Additionally by exploiting regional offices’ local 
knowledge of conditions to influence design and supply specifications a more intimate 
understanding is achieved of how specifications influence the maintenance requirements of a 
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road over the course of its life cycle.  Furthermore, the dependence of roads suppliers on 
Government contracts as well as the more established relationships between suppliers and 
procurers provides roads agencies with more opportunities to engage suppliers in partnering.  
All of these factors perhaps enable roads agencies to use traditional procurement approaches 
more successfully and explain why roads agencies more frequently undertake traditional 
procurement with separate contracts with consultants and contractors.  The greater internal 
capacity, local knowledge, and more established relationships with suppliers enable 
traditional procurement to be undertaken with a higher degree of certainty and confidence. 
 
8.4 VALUE-FOR-MONEY 
 
Value-for-Money was considered a crucial objective by all of the procurement managers 
interviewed.  The results of this study extend the findings of Murray (2002), who found that 
the primary focus of procurement in UK local government was VFM, to the field of 
infrastructure procurement by State Governments in Australia.  Project managers were acutely 
aware of the implications of spending public funds and the duty upon them to discharge that 
responsibility diligently. When attempting to define VFM the following six major themes 
emerged from the interviews: 
1. The meaning of Value-for-Money differs from project to project - This is in keeping with 
theoretical perspective espoused by public value management of embracing accountability by 
defining value locally (Moore 1995; Smith 2004; Stoker 2006).  This also fits with the 
jurisdictional interpretations of best value in local government in which value must be 
negotiated locally (Communities & Local Government 2010; Best Value Scotland 2009; Best 
Value Commission 2007).  The lack of universal approaches to defining VFM in the cases fits 
with Love et al. (2008) whose investigation of one Australian State Government found that 
procurement approaches in an Australian State Government were risk driven and that a best 
value procurement approach to selecting contractors can not be prescriptive.   
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2. Financial Perspective – In the construction and roads cases, the financial perspective was 
fundamentally important.  Price is clearly a major factor in determining what is ‘best value’ 
but not the only factor.   In the construction cases, a strong theme evident was that of the 
delivery agency justifying expenditure on projects and providing cost certainty to client 
departments and treasury.  Whilst the roads cases did not to justify VFM to clients there was a 
view that competition from the market demonstrates this requirement especially where there 
was a focus on comparing bids received against estimates. 
3. Client Perspective – In the construction cases, the preferences of client departments have an 
impact on VFM as pursued via the procurement process by the delivery agency.  This is 
different from roads where an organisation-wide perspective of VFM influences procurement.  
This client perspective of VFM was very important in building projects, as centralised 
agencies largely procure for others, and in cases where they are free to use private sector 
providers, the agencies’ legitimacy is dependent on clients procuring through them. Roads do 
not have this same client complexity as they procure on behalf of their own organisation.   
4. Complexity – In both construction and roads cases, the larger or more complex a project, 
the greater the likelihood of VFM becoming more than just financial considerations and the 
greater the likelihood of non-price criteria being considered as part of the selection process.  
In some instances VFM becomes more focused on value adding through innovation whilst 
recognising that the way to achieve that end was by getting project teams working 
collaboratively.  The focus is on engaging a team (consultants, contractor and subcontractors) 
that can successfully deliver the project, but also work as part of a non-traditional project 
team.  In procuring for large or complex projects agencies were more embracing of 
innovation, where considered appropriate, whilst recognising the political and public interest 
a large project can attract.   
5. Design – The scope of a project, its design and the consideration of an asset’s use and life 
cycle are intrinsically linked to the value created by any project and these were viewed as 
 279
important elements of assessing VFM.  The consideration of an asset’s life cycle was more 
prevalent in the roads cases, perhaps because the roads agencies have responsibility for the 
ongoing maintenance of the road over the course of its life cycle, whereas construction cases 
hand over a built asset to a client department, which then assumes responsibility for ongoing 
maintenance.   
6. Political authorisation – Project managers were conscious of how the political environment 
could shape and influence VFM on a project.  The authorisation from the political 
environment is required to legitimise interpretations of Value-for-Money.    
A consistently used definition of VFM was in keeping with Juran and Gryna’s (1988) ‘value 
for money’ definition of quality which acknowledges the combination of being best for 
customer use, and the importance of price. Hence, best value would appear to be providing 
the most ‘value’ as assessed by the user.   
 
8.4.1 Selection Criteria  
 
The selection criteria used on projects are extremely variable.  There were many project 
managers who believed that their organisational view was that non-price criteria are covered 
by prequalification.  Non-price criteria are typically more a feature of non-traditional projects 
but are not always used as formalised selection criteria.  Some project managers used non-
price criteria informally as part of a shortlisting process to determine which parties will be 
invited to tender.  Project managers make qualitative assessments of whether or not a party 
has the experience to deliver a project.  If they do not believe a party has a suitable track 
record then they will not be included on the shortlist invited to submit a full tender.  Non-
price criteria may relate to Government priorities.  Higher weightings of non-price criteria are 
used in the design area, where qualitative assessments are made of the service being offered 
and the price.  Project managers determine selection criteria, based largely on the project’s 
characteristics.  In construction cases, the determination of selection criteria takes place in 
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consultation with the client department, whilst in roads cases, the regional office is the client 
whose knowledge of local conditions might influence the selection criteria.  The selection 
criteria used often reflect the VFM assumptions of the project being procured and the client 
values.  Whilst project managers acknowledge generally that VFM does not mean lowest 
price, the procurement undertaken by project managers was largely undertaken on the basis of 
lowest price, albeit from bids submitted by prequalified tenderers.   
 
8.4.2 Policy Implications 
 
Murray (2002) found that whilst VFM was viewed as the primary objective of procurers in 
local government there was little guidance and advice provided to inform those procuring 
about the nature and components of VFM and how it might be achieved.   
 
Value-for-Money is an important objective to project managers procuring infrastructure. 
Consequently, there is a strong case for authorisers in the political domain to provide 
guidance and direction.  In most jurisdictions, guidance frameworks exist and focus on 
probity in the procurement processes rather than the delivery of policy by-products.   
 
There was general convergence between the definitions of VFM offered by project managers 
in both the construction and roads cases.  However, there was a higher degree of focus on life 
cycle in the case of the roads cases, perhaps due to the fact that they inherit the ongoing 
maintenance of the asset. The dominant view of VFM was a financially driven view which led 
to NPM influenced traditional procurement practices. Wong et al. (2000) noted in their UK 
based study that public sector clients are compelled to select lowest cost and price was clearly 
an important factor in all decision making processes when selecting both contractors and 
consultants. By contrasting how project managers define VFM with how they procure, it was 
apparent that in many instances, the project manager’s skills and knowledge are not fully 
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engaged by the way in which they procure.  The decision to go beyond a lowest price bid is 
somewhat dependent on the skills and experience of the staff procuring but also influenced by 
the authorising environment.  Project managers seem comfortable using non-price criteria in 
the consultant area where contract values are less and the accountability requirements are 
different, but are significantly less at ease when using non-price criteria to evaluate 
contractors.   
 
There were three levels of non-price criteria usage and understanding.  At the first level 
project managers use the non-price criteria covered by prequalification regarding a 
contractor’s history, experience, financials etc.  At the second level project managers take 
account of the non-price criteria covered by prequalification but also include non-price 
criteria linked to the requirements of a project which might be, for example the early 
engagement of specialist subcontractors.  At the third level project managers take account of 
the non-price criteria covered by previous two levels and additionally use appropriate policy 
by-product related non-price criteria.  There were very few procurement professionals 
operating at level three.  For project managers to engage with level three non-price criteria 
requires their organisations to enable and legitimate project managers use of non-price criteria 
on projects and this necessitates some tolerance of and for, experimentation with non-price 
criteria.  This requires training for project managers in using non-price criteria, but perhaps 
more significantly the promotion of the messages of this training more widely within 
Government to educate the authorising environment of politicians and treasury.    
 
In many cases accepting the lowest tender will be an entirely legitimate thing to do.  
However, in many jurisdictions, for example in Queensland, when a lowest tenderer is not 
selected the community has the right to access information held by the Government under the 
Right to Information (RTI Act 2009).  Where a party requests and is informed they have 
submitted the lowest tender but were not selected then there is likely to be considerable 
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negative media exposure as a result of not having selecting the lowest tenderer.  
Unfortunately in these cases the media may have little interest in, or regard for, the reasons as 
to why a non-lowest cost tender was accepted, which may relate to technical aspects of 
projects that are not easily digestible or able to be communicated in a few column inches or in 
sound bytes.   
 
Perhaps because of the larger elements of political and public interest, as well as risk and 
complexity involved in non-traditional projects for these cases VFM focuses on non-price 
criteria; assembling a project team, and innovation.  Non-price criteria is used in a way that is 
ad hoc and not grounded or documented and there was little information about how the non-
price criteria percentage was converted to financial terms for comparison and decision 
making. 
 
8.5 SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT   
 
The approach to managing the supply chain differs between the construction and roads cases.  
As noted earlier in the roads cases the relationship between the supplier and procurer is a 
more stable relationship based on the absence of other clients for roads suppliers.   
 
8.5.1 Construction 
 
In the construction cases, the approach to managing the supply chain is passive and the supply 
chain is viewed as the lead contractor’s responsibility.  There is little requirement for 
prequalification at a subcontractor level unless a particular subcontract package is determined 
to be critical to a project.  Lead contractors select subcontractors, and in some instances, it is 
mandated that they select subcontractors on the basis of lowest price.  The project managers 
understand the important role of subcontractors, and acknowledge that subcontractors let them 
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down on their projects but there is little perception of partnership with subcontractors.  
Feedback is primarily directed towards lead contractors and only to subcontractors who are 
prequalified, or included in the contract.   The construction cases seemed blinkered in their 
approach and unable to see any prospective change in the way supply chains are managed.  
They appeared unwilling to take ownership of supply chain management, and reluctant to 
innovate or to attempt to do things differently.   
 
8.5.2 Roads 
 
In the roads cases there was a slightly more involved approach to supply chain management.  
More developed prequalification systems exist covering lead contractors but also a larger 
variety of subcontract works and there is considerably more specification around materials 
such as asphalt and gravel mixes etc.  Feedback is directed towards all prequalified parties 
working on a project.   The roads procurement officers were actively thinking about how they 
could influence the supply chain to create competence and capacity, and address issues like 
skills development within the industry.  One approach that seemed to be increasingly popular 
was through direct management but also alliance contracts where Government staff work in 
conjunction with contractors. 
 
8.5.3 Similarities 
 
There were a number of similarities between the supply chain management practices across 
the cases. All project managers commented that they undertook regular reporting during the 
life of projects, using both formal and informal channels, but those were more a feature of 
non-traditional contracts.  The project managers question the usefulness of the feedback 
provided by them, and note that little performance feedback is given except if things go 
wrong.  Performance has little effect on future work, except in the case of very poor 
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performance.  Supplier development was not a term familiar to the project managers.  There 
was little offered in the way of supplier development, although there were some initiatives but 
these were not recognised as supplier development activities.  In some cases, both in 
construction and roads agencies, there was an appetite for non-traditional, relationship-based 
procurement.  Undertaking relationship-based procurement appeared reliant upon the 
acceptance and approval of the authorising environment; treasury and politicians.    
 
8.5.4 Policy Implications 
 
The volume of procurement made by government clients provides significant leverage and 
influence in attempting to drive change initiatives through the construction industry.  This is 
particularly so in roads sector where it is likely contractors will only undertake major roads 
projects for the Government, whereas in the building construction sector there is also a 
significant private sector demand. 
 
Dainty et al. (2001) note that in construction supply chains, the main contractor often shields 
the subcontractors from any of the improved terms and conditions made available by public 
sector clients.  So even if the main contractor and public sector client have entered into a more 
relationship based non-traditional working arrangement the benefits of this may not transfer 
down the supply chain to the subcontractors.   If Government clients are mandating the 
selection of subcontractors on a lowest price basis, then they are indeed forcing lead 
contractors to act as a barrier to improved performance of the supply chain. 
 
Government clients do not view the supply side in construction as a supply chain.  Instead 
they view the supply side as a fragmented array of trade capability.  They do not regard 
themselves as interacting with a business and therefore do not view subcontractors on their 
projects as wanting to be engaged in supplier development.  Krause (1999) believes a key 
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component of supplier development is effective communication between clients and suppliers 
relating to performance, incorporating both formal and informal information.  Project 
managers commented that communication was not a strength of their organisation’s approach, 
was weaker post project completion and that they tended to move onto the next project.   
 
Most Governments undertake SME development and performance improvement activities. 
Within Australia at State and Federal levels authorisation clearly exists to undertake activities 
in this area. In Victoria it is covered by the activities of the Department of Innovation, 
Industry and Regional Development, whilst at a Federal level it is under the activities of the 
Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research.  Broad authorisation exists to 
pursue SME development goals but it is not authorised through the mechanism of 
infrastructure project procurement.  The reality is that a Department responsible for SME 
development expends public funds on these activities whilst another Department within 
Government awards infrastructure projects without considering SME development related 
activities.  In effect, it is possible for the Government department procuring to reward 
contractors who carry out their contract by means in opposition to the Governments SME 
development policies. 
 
All state governments use various prequalification schemes for contractors that take on the 
lead role on their projects.  By administering prequalification, Government has already made 
a significant financial investment and has collected detailed information about much of the 
supply chain.  There appears to be considerable scope and opportunity to use the existing 
prequalification systems to proactively engage the supply chain in supplier development 
activities.  The roads cases are potentially in an even stronger position to engage in supplier 
development given they have more developed supplier relationships and also maintain a 
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higher level of expertise in terms of design and construction capability that can be drawn 
upon as part of the process. 
 
The modern approach to supplier development that is now entrenched in the automotive 
industry involves engaging in performance measurement and performance improvement of 
the supply chain.  This is invariably initiated by the original equipment manufacturers.  Whilst 
it is unlikely that the personnel engaged in infrastructure project procurement would be 
qualified to engage in performance measurement and performance improvement activities, 
they are in a position to mandate it through contract conditions. 
 
8.6 TENDERING COSTS  
 
There was little difference between the roads and construction cases with their approach to the 
cost of tendering.  There was clear evidence of Governments’ effort to limit transaction costs 
on the supply side as part of standard procurement practices.  Agencies tailor their 
prequalification and selection processes on projects to reduce the transaction costs imposed on 
bidders in order to minimise waste on the supply side.  Government agencies limit the 
numbers bidding on contracts with select tender approaches in which they match appropriate 
contractors identified from prequalification systems to a specific project.   
 
For contracts of low value, Government is able to engage single source purchasing from 
prequalified suppliers and in some instances non-prequalified suppliers.  This was particularly 
evident in the area of consultant contracts where sometimes there are pre-existing and pre-
negotiated rates with consultants from a ‘consultant panel’ that enables them to be engaged 
without calling for tenders.   The approval process in the consultant area is generally more 
relaxed because the contracts awarded are not as high in value, and the engagement for the 
provision of professional services depends more on the individual and their experience and 
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expertise.  Given the value of contracts awarded to consultants are smaller, project managers 
do not feel under as much pressure about the decisions made with respect to the lessened 
consultant contract value.  Single sourcing can also be used for construction contracts, but 
only for contracts of low value, and all agencies have a project value threshold that, once 
exceeded, require construction contractors to be prequalified.   
 
The findings show that all agencies have prequalification systems that were an integral part of 
the way that they procure. The attitude of project managers was that prequalification systems 
contribute to the achievement of overall best value which is consistent with Palaneeswaran et 
al. (2003) and Jennings and Holt (1998). 
 
Whilst Government was clearly conscious of the transaction costs it was imposing on the 
supply side, there appeared to be little consideration of the transaction costs absorbed on the 
Government client side.  Two cases had abandoned prequalification approaches for 
consultants and subcontractors as they felt the costs incurred by Government were excessive.  
Another theme expressed was Treasury’s scepticism of non-traditional contracts involving up 
front transaction costs for Government in establishing relationship based procurements and 
project teams.  From Treasury’s perspective the expenditure of funds on building 
relationships with project teams was hard to justify as Value-for-Money.  In the all cases there 
was limited awareness of the costs involved in tendering projects, assessing bids, and 
maintaining prequalification registers. 
 
8.6.1 Policy Implications 
 
Treasury is perhaps reticent to expend public funds on building relationships in non-
traditional projects because they understand that projects do not always proceed to the 
construction phase.   To have spent money upfront on a project that does not then get built is 
viewed very negatively by the taxpayer and can be a political liability.  For the supply side, a 
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project that they have spent time and resources working on that is then not fully realised 
involves significant tendering costs and opportunity costs in the form of the work they could 
have been doing. A recent high profile example is the Australian Federal Governments 
anticipated $43 Billion infrastructure investment in the National Broadband Network 
(DBCDE 2009). This initiative was first presented as part of the Australian Labor Party’s 
electoral campaign in 2007.  Once the Labor party formed Government it then cancelled a 
competing initiative from the previous Liberal Government.  Tenders were called for and 
proposals were received from six bidders by the closing date of 26 November 2008 (DBCDE 
2009).   On 15 December 2008 one bidder was removed for not having complied with the 
requirements, and then on 7 April 2009 the Federal Government announced that request for 
proposals had been cancelled as none of the bids represented Value-for-Money and that the 
Federal Government was going to construct the facility themselves (DBCDE 2009).  In this 
case the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has estimated that more than $30 million 
was wasted on the tender process, including $17 Million on the Government side and $13 
Million on the supply side (The Australian 2010; Ramli 2010). Clearly considerable financial 
expenditure has been made by both the client and the supply side.   
 
Much of the cost associated with the tendering process involves multiple potential suppliers 
repeating the same work inputs and competition comes from how the competitors intend to 
deliver the project.  If, as in the case where design and construction phases are separated, 
more of the process steps were carried out in-house and only once, the costs associated with 
tendering could be reduced for both the client and the supply side. 
 
8.7 INNOVATION  
 
One of the strong themes to emerge from the results was the risk aversion or preparedness to 
innovate displayed by Government.  Government’s focus when procuring infrastructure was 
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on introducing innovation that delivered cost savings, or allowed more features to be built for 
the same price.  This is not consistent with the risky nature of innovation that recognises that 
innovation will not always yield benefits.  Case C(R) used non-price criteria focused on how 
contractors would innovate.  However, whilst looking at innovation in selection criteria case 
C(R) awards contracts on the basis of lower price 80% of the time.   
 
The barriers to innovation in the public sector were seen to be institutional in the authorising 
roles of Treasury and Politicians and the procuring agencies’ culture.  There was also 
significant resistance exhibited by the risk averse nature of client departments.  In the 
construction cases, innovation was often considered a priority by a procuring agency, but less 
so by client departments, politicians and treasury.  This was not an issue in roads who procure 
their own projects but they were influenced by politicians, treasury and exhibited their own 
cultural biases.  
 
8.7.1 Policy Implications  
 
The stable conditions under which the Public Administration model thrived are long since 
gone.  Potts (2009) believes that innovation is a crucial component for policy and government 
services to remain effective in an evolving economy.  In today’s post-PA, and potentially 
post-NPM environment, public sector innovation is essential and needs to be institutionalised 
to ensure a steady flow of innovation and sustain improvement in the delivery of public 
services (Albury 2005).  Potts (2009) postulates that, in the universal striving for efficiency, 
the public sector has eliminated the good waste that comes from attempting to innovate, and 
has become constricted as to its innovation.  However, it needs to be acknowledged that 
innovation is risky, and may fail, costs incurred may be seen as ‘waste’ of resources rather 
than ‘learning’.  Innovation is wasteful because good policy solutions and service provisions 
cannot be known in advance and therefore necessitate experimentation.  There is a risk versus 
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reward trade-off in the public sector where the outcome of innovation can be political 
embarrassment and electoral failure, which perhaps explains the limited political acceptance 
of innovation.   
 
Moore (1995) believes that managers need to experiment with ideas that seem plausible, 
whilst Albury (2005) believes that public managers need to have the skills, opportunity and 
motivation to innovate effectively and successfully.  Whilst there are few easy answers for 
Government on innovation it does seem that procuring agencies might want to think about the 
skills, opportunity and motivation of their project managers as suggested by Albury (2005).  
Prior to innovation, the procuring agencies need to think about trying to build internal 
innovation capacity (Moore 1995, p.211).  Perhaps, Rhodes and Wanna’s (2007) public value 
ladder offers some useful guidance on a way forward by encouraging the organisation to 
consider innovations that feature lower risk.  This might necessitate experimentation and 
piloting on smaller infrastructure projects.  The current logic seems to have been to innovate 
on larger projects where the benefit can be realised from integrating design and construct 
disciplines. 
 
Open slather innovation is frequently not appropriate in the context of infrastructure projects.  
For example, the Bruce Highway is the biggest traffic carrier in Queensland and has had 
sections of it queried over whether the road surface has caused accidents (ABC 2005).  It is 
currently in the midst of a $600 million upgrade (QDMR 2010). When procuring roads, the 
risk entailed in failed innovation may have very serious consequences in the form of road 
accidents and fatalities.   
 
State and Federal Governments currently encourage innovation through grants and tax 
incentives.  State Governments may wish to consider whether a proportion of the 
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infrastructure budget might be allocated to an innovation pool that could be deemed for 
innovation in infrastructure project construction. 
 
8.8 POLICY BY-PRODUCTS 
 
There is little recognition of the procurement process as a means to create additional public 
value in the form of policy by-products on Government infrastructure projects.  Examples of 
policy by-products as part of the procurement process might include training apprentices, 
regional or indigenous involvement policies and public art. 
 
There are instances where selection processes were designed to achieve Government priorities 
when procuring and, in these cases, there were standardised non-price selection criteria on 
contracts valued in the range of 5-10% of the total selection criteria.  It was not clear from the 
interviews exactly how the percentage weightings of non-price criteria are arrived at, or 
exactly how they are used in computation of the overall result.  Whilst some procurement 
officers attempted to create more public value through recognising policy by-products in the 
procurement process, these were pursued inconsistently, and at the instigation of project 
managers who often have differing understandings of how they apply.  Policy by-products are 
not rigorously pursued and there is an inconsistent approach to assessing the outcomes 
achieved.  Outcomes are not audited and hence do not appear to be a high priority, and given 
these outcomes, this undoubtedly influences the level of involvement of by-products on 
projects.  Project managers did not appear to be engaged in trying to deliver Government 
Priorities through their project delivery process and their focus was very much on getting 
infrastructure built.   
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8.8.1 Alignment with Strategy 
 
All of the project managers procuring are aware of the broader level strategies of government.  
They commented that strategic plans of Government influence which projects receive funding 
as part of the budgetary process so if a project is funded it has been identified as part of the 
strategic plan.  However, whilst believing their procurement is undertaken in keeping with 
Governments strategies they have little involvement with, or exposure to, that strategic 
process aligning their procurement activities with this broader level strategy.  Project 
managers assume that there is a link between organisation wide strategy and what they 
procure but believe strategy has little input into how things are procured, i.e. the pursuit of 
policy by-products.  For example the strategic plan might outline policy intent such as 
improving health care, of which the construction project outcome from that policy intent 
might be building General Practice super clinics.  The project is approved and built because it 
is in the strategic plan to address improvement in healthcare but the details of how the project 
is to be built is not necessarily contained in the strategic plan or attendant policies.   
 
8.8.2 Construction  
 
Construction projects are largely procured through centralised internal delivery agencies 
whose project managers procure for client departments.  When procuring construction 
projects, Government is largely focused on creating a facility from which services within the 
policy domains of a client departments can be provided.  For example when building a school, 
a department of eduction is seeking to create public value by delivering outcomes within their 
policy domain i.e. educational services to communities.  Project managers view the focus for 
client departments as core business in the form of outcomes within their departments’ policy 
domains and not in viewing the procurement process as a means to create policy by-products.   
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However, the recent stimulus package has delivered buildings for schools and is associated 
with the Federal Government’s wider education revolution strategies. Part of the design and 
delivery criteria for schools halls has been that they must be available as a ‘community 
resource’.  Furthermore, the focus of the stimulus package is job creation.  These are 
examples of government seeking to deliver policy by-products through construction in the 
education sector. 
 
8.8.3 Roads 
 
Roads cases do not procure for client departments and instead view their regional office as the 
client.  This means that when roads departments procure they are largely focused on 
delivering within the policy domains of roads. 
 
8.8.4 Influences 
 
The physical location of a project has an influence in shaping and driving Government 
Priorities incorporated on projects.  These can range from incorporating the views of a local 
politician through to a “place management” approach to all government construction in an 
area. The incorporation of Government priorities appeared to be driven by and dependent on, 
the mindset, experience and approach of the project manager procuring the project. 
 
Some cases appear to have a change in mindset where they are no longer viewing the 
procurement process as a means to create value, and instead are solely focused on what it is 
that is being procured.  So the procurement process is not being viewed as the means to create 
social benefits and or other economic flow on effects.  Some project managers felt that to 
procure and pursue policy by-products was ‘too hard’ or ‘just not worth it’.  Some project 
managers were unsure about whether they were allowed to attach preference to local 
procurement and how that procurement practice by Government related to overarching 
competition and free trade policies.   
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8.8.5 Policy Implications 
 
The project managers sampled were not involved in the strategic planning to determine which 
projects were to be pursued, which for a number of reasons, is an interesting finding.  This 
highlights the potentially problematic nature of the public sector’s hierarchical structure and 
shows that the project managers interviewed do not engage with, or are excluded from, the 
political management processes advocated by Moore (19995). It also suggests that the view of 
procurement is not as integrated with the delivery of strategy as it might be (Kraljic 1983; 
Murray 2001). Perhaps because project managers have limited insight into this process and 
hence they appeared somewhat disconnected from the delivery of policy by-products that 
advance Government Priorities.  However, it should be noted that State Government Strategic 
Plans are a relatively new phenomenon and may not yet be fully embedded within the case 
study departments.  
 
For construction cases, there are only two examples where client departments are tied to 
procuring through the delivery agency.  In two of the other three instances client departments 
choose between the internal agency or private sector providers.  In one other case departments 
were empowered to procure construction.  This means that the centralised delivery agency has 
less ability to influence government wide procurement approaches.  Case E(C) shows that, 
with a decentralised procurement structure, there is less ability to coordinate and drive cross-
Government initiatives like the procurement of policy by-products.  Further, one of the 
departments from case E(C) largely outsources all procurement activities and decision making 
to a private sector company.  It seems highly unlikely in this procurement approach that the 
private sector provider would be procuring in a manner that focused on achieving cross 
Government priorities.   It seems unlikely also that the private sector provider would focus on 
rewarding contractors who deliver government priorities.  Figure 8.1 describes a procurement 
model which considers both the impacts within the policy domain of the infrastructure being 
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constructed and the policy by-products that may be created.  The evidence suggests that, 
currently, project managers only see the direct policy achievements created by procuring 
infrastructure and not the opportunities for advancing policy by-products that align to the 
broader strategic intents of Government.  
 
Figure 8.1: A Policy by-product approach to Public Sector Procurement 
 
Construction 
Project Procurement 
 
Construction Project 
Driving & 
Delivering 
Government 
Priorities 
 
Policy By-products 
Apprentice Training 
Equity and Employment 
 
Regional Sustainability 
 
SME Development 
 
Social Cohesion 
Hospital School 
Direct Policy
Numeracy  
Literacy 
Emergency Services 
Health Promotion 
 
 
Given the non-tied nature of procurement in some state construction cases, the delivery 
agency perhaps does not feel empowered to instruct client departments to include policy 
objectives of other department’s policy domains in their projects.  This is partly a result of the 
delivery agencies’ reliance on government departments to procure through them to ensure 
their viability as a department.  Government seeks to be a client of choice for contractors, and 
does not want to add more bureaucratic processes to their approach.  Incorporating policy by-
products needs to be done in a way that considers the supply side and adds real value to the 
process.   
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Moore’s (1995) strategic triangle tests a strategy on whether it is substantively valuable, 
legitimate and politically sustainabile, and operationally and administratively achievable.  The 
pursuit of targeted policy by-products via the infrastructure procurement process would 
appear to be legitimate given widepsread Government policy and investment in areas like 
SME development and apprentice training etc.  Whether the procurement of policy by-
products can produce substantive value appears likely given the significant expenditure on 
infrastructure.  However, what remains unclear is whether the achievement of policy by-
products is operationally and administratively feasible and how policy by-products shoud be 
best pursued.  It is also unclear whether this investment will be judged by political overseers 
as legitimately producing enough value to justify the administrative effort expended.  It is 
likely that some experimentation will be needed in this area to pilot approaches to delivering 
policy by-products via the infrastructure procurement process. 
 
Figure 8.2 presents the W.K. Kellogg Foundation (2001) basic logic model which is a 
systematic and visual way to present the relationship between planned work and intended 
results.   
Figure 8.2: The Basic Logic Model 
 
Source: W.K. Kellogg Foundation (2001) 
 
Figure 8.3 articulates the proposed approach being the reverse logic of the W.K. Kellogg 
Foundation (2001) model and starting by thinking about the impacts Government aims to 
achieve when it procures infrastructure projects.  Instead of beginning with resources, inputs 
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and activities, Government should consider, determine and make explicit the intended impacts 
they desire to achieve for a community before planning commences for a project’s 
procurement.  Then ensues a process of working backwards and considering what  the critical 
achievements are, that must be put in place at each phase to facilitate the successive stages.  
For example, to achieve the desired impacts, what are the outcomes that will need to be 
created?  This reverse logic suggests Government as a client should begin by thinking about 
the impact it hopes to make in a community and then planning its procurement with those 
impacts very clearly in focus. Furthermore as most projects are a result of expressed local 
need or pressure it enables the integration of community knowledge both from regional 
agencies and from potential users of the project as well as being a means of resolving disputes 
that arise from time to time about such government interventions. 
 
Figure 8.3: Reverse Logic Impact Driven Procurement Approach 
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Source: Adapted from W.K. Kellogg (2001) 
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8.9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Ideally all Government procurement is undertaken to maximise the creation of public value.  
The construction of infrastructure by Australian State Governments undoubtedly creates 
public value.  Infrastructure projects provide the public sector with considerable scope to 
create public value, both via the services delivered from the physical asset and in the form of 
policy by-products via the procurement process. However, the results of this study show that 
agencies are predominantly focused on delivering what Graycar (2007) called core-business, 
focussing on optimising procurement outcomes for client departments as opposed to 
outcomes for government as a whole.    Lowest cost is still the dominant approach to 
procuring, albeit from prequalified suppliers, and it is clear that there are barriers to pursuing 
value based approaches not predicated on lowest cost.    
The procurement undertaken is somewhat reminiscent of the pre-Toyota JIT approach, which 
is in keeping with the findings of the Latham (1994) and Egan (1998) report on construction. 
The desire for probity and public accountability when awarding lucrative government 
contracts, means that most Government contracts are subject to open and competitive bidding.  
The strong desire by Government for price based competition appeared to be motivated by 
probity reasons, because they have not developed methods of assessing non-price criteria that 
are robustly defensible and explainable to the electorate.   
 
Perhaps, as a result, project managers are not relentlessly pursuing value creation 
opportunities (policy by-products) via the procurement process, and hence not acting as 
entrepreneurially or innovatively as Moore (1995) advocates. In fact public managers are not 
encouraged to act entrepreneurially or to innovate in their procurement activities.  When they 
do, it is largely as a result of their own initiative because they think it is what a project 
requires.  Moore (1995) advocates a shifting role for public managers that they become 
explorers and strategists who seek to discover, define and produce public value, rather than 
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technicians. If public managers are to create value for the communities they serve then they  
there is a need to strengthen the policies that influence authorisers.  Using Moore’s logic 
(1995, p.211) operational managers should seek, find and exploit opportunities to create 
public value through policy by-products. 
 
The evidence suggests that Governments are not delivering the type of ‘joined-up’ approach 
to construction procurement that would create public value through policy by-products in a 
range of policy domains.  In the public sector context, the pursuit of multiple policy 
objectives means that procurement should be viewed as a lever for government to deliver 
broader outcomes for the communities they serve.  Therefore any procurement strategy in a 
public sector agency must be cognisant of its place in achieving the mission of the wider 
public sector organisation and articulate how it contributes to its achievement.  Given that the 
project managers reported being somewhat disconnected from the process of Government 
strategies, it appears that they are focused on what Ellram and Carr (1994) called 
implementing strategy and what Cousins et al. (2006) described as undeveloped procurement.  
Given the multiple objective nature of Government it would perhaps not be an appropriate 
role for procurement to be driving the government’s strategy (Ellram & Carr 1994).  
However, it might reasonably be expected that procurement would be viewed more centrally 
as having an important role to play in supporting the strategies of other functions within 
Government to drive the overall strategy of Government.  The evidence from the cases was 
that project managers were not engaging with the political level as advocated by Moore 
(1995) and their engagement with the rest of government was also limited, in that they were 
not privy to the alignment of their projects with the strategic plan.  The results showed that 
project managers have low involvement in strategic planning, perhaps because of the 
hierarchical structure of the public sector, and there was little internal integration of their 
activities with those in other areas of Government.  Given this limited strategic contribution, 
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the status of procurement within Government is clearly not currently viewed as a strategic, 
value adding function. 
 
Public value management approaches have a contribution to make to the increasingly post-
NPM public sector, informing both theory development and practice.  Rainey and Chun 
(2005) have questioned the universal application of business techniques in public sector 
organisations wondering what adaptations or adjustments might need to be made.  A strength 
of Public Value is that it embraces distinctive and unique complexities of the public sector 
and does not attempt to merely apply business logic to the public sector.  O’Flynn (2007) 
argues that a more pragmatic approach to selecting providers to deliver public services creates 
more opportunities for the maximisation of public value.  In the context of infrastructure 
procurement this research contends that this means moving beyond mere private sector ideals 
and advancing policy by-products in addition to constructing infrastructure.   
 
Moore (1995) identifies five principles under which greater value can be produced, of which 
one is increasing the quality of public activities per resource expended.  Moore (1995, p.212) 
comments that increased value can often be gained by building new qualities into old 
activities or creating solutions to new problems, of which incorporating policy by-products 
would seem to be an alternative solution.  Part of the reason for the lack of focus on policy 
by-products might be because of the manner in which parliament votes in favour of funding 
particularly initiatives.  By voting funds to an initiative politicians legitimise government 
activity in a particular area.  If the parliamentary vote is for construction of roads, then to 
spend that money on something else is a misapplication of parliamentary funds.   
 
Australian State Government agencies procuring are acutely aware of the importance of 
procuring VFM.  The procuring agencies view VFM from a predominantly financial 
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perspective, albeit incorporating whole-of-life costing, but few Managers defined VFM more 
broadly in terms of delivering policy by-product outcomes or achieving government priorities. 
They felt that taking the decision to spend additional money, even where it produced 
commensurate, or greater value, was more difficult to justify.  Whilst aware of the 
organisations’ operational role in creating project value through shaping procurement 
approaches, selection criteria and weightings, they also felt that other parts of Government 
influenced the value that could be created from a project.  In particular, treasury’s role in the 
budgetary process and client preferences shaped the value creation opportunities encapsulated 
in any construction project.  The procurement professionals were cognisant of some 
additional public value creation opportunities the procurement process presents.  In some 
jurisdictions, the efforts to standardise some policy by-product seeking non-price criteria on 
projects is an attempt to build in some additional benefits into the way projects are procured.  
When policy by-product non-price criteria are considered upfront when initiating a project, 
how much they actually influence projects seems somewhat variable, non-standardised and 
influenced by a project’s location, and the skills, vision and drive of the individual project 
manger.  The approach to auditing projects against delivering non-price criteria is not as 
rigorous as it could be, and communicates clearly to those procuring that policy by-products 
are not valued.   
 
There is very little active management of the supply chain undertaken by the client 
organisation, with the supply side largely left to organise itself.  The prequalification system 
is somewhat underutilised in the contribution it could make to both the engagement and 
development of the supply chain and minimisation of tendering costs on both sides.   
 
Figure 8.4 presents the revised theoretical framework.  The research encapsulates some of the 
variables that should be considered in the pursuit of public value via infrastructure 
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procurement.  The responses from interviewees validated four of the elements of the model 
(Value-for-Money, Policy Objectives, Supply Chain Management and Tendering Costs) as 
being important elements of public value in the procurement of public sector infrastructure.  
The interviews with managers also suggested that the appetite and willingness of the 
organisation to innovate was another crucial element that needed to be considered.  Treasury 
were perceived as loathe to devote capital procurement funds to innovation. 
Figure 8.4: Revised Theoretical Framework 
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8.10 REFLECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Whilst this thesis took some 4.5 years to complete, the genesis of the ideas behind this 
research has been in incubation over a period of some 7-10 years.  From observing the move 
away from CCT to best value approaches in local government in both the UK and Victoria, 
Australia, and to discussing the selection of building contractors with Professor Derek Walker 
in the Construction Management discipline.  A scoping study titled: Feasibility Study Linking 
Best-Value Procurement Assessment to Outcome Performance Indicators was submitted to 
the Cooperative Research Centre for Construction Innovation (CRC-CI) in 2000, and then 
approved, and completed in 2003.   
 
Post this study it was hoped to undertake an action research project with an industrial partner 
to develop and pilot a rigorous and robust system for investigating non-price criteria in the 
procurement of infrastructure.  The feedback from the client side indicated that they were not 
currently viewing procurement as a means of delivery other government priorities and it was 
felt that it was perhaps not ready for the ideas being espoused.  Then it was felt that a better 
approach would be to focus on how the State Governments were procuring infrastructure and 
what value meant to them.   The focus became to investigate how procurement was 
undertaken in the industry.     
 
Over the course of this research thirty-seven interviews were undertaken, which included 
more than 300,000 words being brought together for transcription and analysis.  This was a 
heavier burden than anticipated, and having the collected the data, the researcher felt a strong 
degree of attachment to it and investment in presenting the material well.  In particular, the 
compiling of results chapters involved many, many painstaking months of pouring over the 
transcripts and re-listening to interview recordings, to distil the responses from project 
managers into the summaries contained within this thesis.  The researcher had read qualitative 
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texts and paid attention to experts advising that qualitative data was rich, messy, and complex 
etc but it is one thing to have read the texts and another thing to have actually experienced it.  
In the course of undertaking a qualitative project of this magnitude the researcher learnt 
greatly from the process of actually doing the research. 
 
The project undertaken was exploratory in nature.  One of the strong elements and great 
successes of the project was in recruiting participants.  Only one identified participant that 
was invited to participate in the study declined to do so.  As part of the research design there 
is a trade-off between the number of cases examined and the depth of research in each case, 
which includes the number of interviewees representing each case.  A case could be made 
suggesting the researcher focus on less jurisdictions.  However, when you set about collecting 
data you are not entirely sure in advance how many participants you are going to get.  In the 
end the multi-jurisdictional nature of the study makes the study a national undertaking that 
would not have been possible if half the states had declined to participate.   
 
The fact that most of the cases featured highly experienced project managers also raises the 
possibility there might have been some interviewee bias as a result of the organisations having 
a role in providing contact information for project managers to then be contacted.  However, 
the experienced cohort interviewed might actually be representative of the wider project 
manager population. 
 
Placed in the same position as the researcher was at the start of this project again it stands to 
reason that the same set of uncertainties would also be faced.  As a result the approach 
adopted would be very similar, particularly for the recruitment of cases and interviewees.   
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However, that is not to suggest there is nothing the researcher would like to do better next 
time.  One of the most profound learnings from the research was about interviewing as a 
research data collection approach.  There is considerable complexity and skill involved in 
being a good interviewer and it definitely seemed that the quality of the interviewing 
improved as the interviewer gained more experience.   
 
The project could have been achieved differently by focusing the level of analysis at that of 
the construction project by perhaps focusing on historical project data and analysing how 
various procurement approaches led to different levels of public value being created.  This 
would have constrained the project to a smaller set of issues, and focused less on the 
perspective of the project managers whose role is to procure for Government.   One prominent 
scholar suggested to the researcher that this would have been a good way to proceed but 
ultimately the researcher felt more connected to, and engaged with, the project that has been 
undertaken.   
 
8.11 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The area of infrastructure procurement in Australia has not garnered a great deal of academic 
attention and has been somewhat under-researched given the large fiscal investment by 
Governments.  As a result of having undertaken this research, considerable future research 
opportunities arise.  The study could also be extended to incorporate the one state government 
and the two territory governments (NT & ACT) not included in the study.  There is 
considerable scope for undertaking comparative studies in other jurisdictions and within 
different levels of government within Australia. 
 
This research was primarily focused on the perspective of those procuring infrastructure 
projects rather than a policy perspective of how infrastructure is meant to be procured.  
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However, the research did not focus enormously on the world of work in which project 
managers operate.   Hence, research exploring the pressures and constraints experienced by 
project managers in the workplace is an area ripe for future research.   
 
Further research might investigate how the 5-10% non-price criteria directed at achieving 
policy by-products in some environments are currently being used to aid decisions.  One 
contractual approach to procurement that might be of worth further investigating is the 
D&C+M model used by some of the roads cases.  A longitudinal study investigating 
maintenance in the post completion years could compare costs for D&C procured projects and 
D&C+M projects. 
 
Further research may more rigorously explore the policy environment to compare that 
perspective to the findings of this research which would provide an interesting contrast 
between how infrastructure is supposed to be procured and how it is currently actually being 
procured.   
 
Alternatively future research could also focus on a range of perspectives on the delivery of 
policy by-products via the procurement process including the project manager, infrastructure 
policy, elected representative, client department and community perspectives.  Also, as 
previously considered, future research may investigate developing methods of assessing 
policy by-product non-price criteria with an industry partner.   
 
Also, having done this research and discovered that a number of State governments seek to 
use non-price criteria in construction project procurement, the original project that was the 
genesis of this research might be appropriate.  This would bring a level of rigour and 
transparency that would provide contract procurers and contractors with systematic 
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information and enable policy by-products to be overtly incorporated in contracts.  The 
stimulus package involving school buildings has made the twin strategies of improving 
education infrastructure and keeping construction firms in business and construction workers 
in work overt government policy.  This stimulus is providing a public good through improved 
education infrastructure with policy by-products of keeping the construction industry 
occupied and reducing unemployment levels. 
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APPENDIX C – SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
? Intro: Procurement Systems, Supply Chain, Value for Money assessment or judgement, 
non-price criteria, Strategy, Government objectives & priorities. 
? Informed consent: signoff  
 
Interviews - Roads:  
To begin I was wondering if you could tell me a little bit about your background and 
experience in projects and procurement?  
 
Operational Aspects of Procurement Work: 
? How is centralised or decentralised is Construction Project Procurement in each 
organisation? Procurement organized in your organisation: regional offices, major projects 
etc? $ values, complexity? 
? What type of procurement work is undertaken by your department? $Dollar value 
? Do you have discretion about when to tender? No discretion? 
? Can you describe a recent (substantial) procurement? Describe the process for me  
? Are there government policies that impact on the way you procure?  
? What are the criteria for selecting a main contractor ?– (e.g prequalification etc)   
? How do you deal with non price criteria? Weighted? 2 envelope system? 
 
Prequalification: 
? What are the criteria for admission on to the prequalification list? Self assess? 
? When was your prequalification list last reviewed? How often is it reviewed? Annually? 
Biannually? 
 
Contracts/Procurement Approaches: 
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? Are contracts structured and managed in accordance with $ value of projects? 
? Are there thresholds: $K ?  < 250K? that mandate certain contractual management 
approaches?  
? Looking at this diagram by Walker and Hampson (2003, p.13) where do you think the 
projects you procure fall?  
? Can you mark the diagram with the types of approaches you use, and provide estimates on 
the percentages of each type?  
 
Supply Chain Management: 
? Could you tell me a little bit about how your supply chain operates? 
? How are subcontractors selected?  
? Do major contractors submit subcontractors as part of their bid? Key packages 
nominated?  What input do you have into that? 
? Do you impose selection criteria on main contractors for the selection of subcontractors? 
or are you involved in the selection decision of subcontractors? 
? Are subcontractors required to be prequalified? 
? Do you undertake any supplier development activities for subcontract sector? If so what? 
? Is there feedback on performance given to main contractors?  Does that effect 
opportunities for future work? 
? Is there feedback on performance given to Subcontractors? Does that effect opportunities 
for future work? 
? Its well documented that supply chain relations in construction are adversarial - How do 
you get main contractor and subcontractor working together?  
? Do you have measures in place to facilitate better working relationships? Procurement 
approaches? 
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Strategy – Government Priorities: 
? Is there a link between the way you procure and the State Strategic Plan?  
? To what extent are you asked to deliver policy objectives for other departments when 
procuring? e.g. train apprentices, environmental design etc 
? Have you been asked to deliver policy objectives for another department on any recent 
project you procured? How does this happen? 
? Is there a method for prioritising which Government objectives will be advanced on a 
particular project? Who determines those?  How often does that happen? Is it $ 
dependent? Is it more of a focus on large $ projects? Does the budgetary environment 
make that easy to do? 
? Are your projects currently audited against Government objectives?  Would make any 
difference if you were? 
? Do you think you get a whole of government approach/response to Procurement? 
 
Value - Quality: 
? Would you tell me a bit about Value for Money and how that relates to your work?   
? To what extent is purchasing Value for Money an objective?  
? What does Value (Best Value or Value for Money) in the Procurement process mean to 
your department?   
? How does your department form policy on things like Value for Money? 
? How do you pursue Value for Money through your procurement work? 
? To what extent do you perceive that there are barriers to procuring best value for money in 
your department?  What are they?  Did they have an impact on any recent procurement? 
 
Roads Project - Scenario – Procuring Best Value 
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A: You are going to widen and upgrade an existing road in regional _____.  The project is 
estimated to be worth $38.4 million.   
? How would you procure in this case? 
? What would Best Value be in this case? 
? Are there Government objectives that you would seek to advance? 
? Who would determine these priorities? 
B: There is a policy change advocating the local purchase of materials.  To source 
environmentally friendly natural gravel materials locally there will also be a significant 
environmental compliance costs for the quarry to begin new works and extract the materials.  
By sourcing gravel materials locally for this project the budget is exceeded by $6.5 million  
? How do you deal with this? 
 
Demographic information about Procurement Officers  
? How long have you been in your current role?  
? How long have you worked in procurement? 
? What was your previous work experience before procurement? 
? What educational or qualification background do you have? 
? Do you have any purchasing related qualifications?  
? Age range: 1) <35, 2) 35-49, 3) >50 
? How long have you worked in government? 
? Have you worked in the private sector? – if so, how long? 
? Are you a member of any professional bodies? 
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APPENDIX D – PUBLICATIONS 
 
1. Staples, WJ & Dalrymple, JF (2008) ‘Current Issues in Public Sector Construction 
Procurement’ Proceedings of the 22nd Australia New Zealand Academy of 
Management Conference, December 6-9 Auckland, New Zealand 
 
Moore (1995) believes that public managers should be encouraged to be 
entrepreneurial and innovative so as to search for the most valuable use of the public 
assets and resources entrusted to them for deploying.  Infrastructure investment in 
roads and buildings accounts for over $30 Billion of Australian State Government 
expenditure annually (Government of SA 2007; Government of WA 2008; NSW 
Government 2007; Queensland Government 2007; Victorian Government 2008).  As a 
result of this significant investment, the procurement process has the potential to 
deliver very significant payoffs for the community.  This research examines how 
public managers procure construction projects and the extent to which they view the 
procurement process as an opportunity to deliver more than just a physical facility. 
 
2. Staples, WJ & Dalrymple, JF (2007) 'Best Value Public Sector Construction Project 
Procurement: Challenges and Opportunities', The Eighth International Research 
Conference on Quality Innovation and Knowledge Management, India Habitat Centre 
New Delhi, 12-14 February, ISBN 978-0-7326-2297-8  
 
Public Sector Construction accounts for $4.9 billion in the 2006-07 Victorian State 
Budget and approximately $8 billion dollars in the Queensland 2005-06 State Budget.  
Consequently, innovation in the procurement processes has the potential to produce 
very significant payoffs for the community.  This paper presents an overview of a 
proposed innovative procurement framework designed to achieve best value outcomes 
for the public sector client.  Within such a framework, the provision of a robust 
decision making tool should enable public sector procurement officers to take account 
of non-price criteria in their decision making with a transparent approach to sharing 
the decision making criteria with the contractors seeking to secure the contract.  
Further, the approach to public sector procurement of construction being advocated is 
one in which a broader perspective of value for money is considered.  The paper 
discusses the challenges and opportunities for public sector clients seeking to drive 
innovation through their supply chains.  Future research will involve piloting the Best 
Value Procurement Framework in order to evaluate the benefits.   
 
 
3. Staples , WJ & Dalrymple, JF (2006) 'Developing a ‘Best Value’ Approach to Public 
Sector Construction Procurement' Proceedings of the 20th Australia New Zealand 
Academy of Management Conference, December 6-9 Yeppoon, Australia  
 
This research focuses on the concept of ‘best value’ when perceived from the 
perspective of the public sector client.  In the case of ‘best value’ in the business 
enterprise, ‘best value’ is that which returns greatest value to the business enterprise’s 
shareholders. However, in the case of the public sector, ‘best value’ is more complex. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of non-price criteria in the procurement 
process is desirable, but that it has proved to be somewhat difficult to come to terms 
with dealing with non-price criteria in practice. Public sector procurement officers 
face the requirement to make auditable and publicly defensible decisions. This 
research therefore seeks to develop a rigorous ‘best value’ framework for public 
sector construction project procurement with a view to piloting the framework. 
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4. Dalrymple, JF, Boxer, LJ & Staples , WJ (2006) ‘Cost of Tendering: Adding Cost 
without Value?’, Chapter 9 of Clients Driving Construction Innovation: Moving Ideas 
into Practice (Eds Brown, K., Hampson, K. & Brandon, P.), CRC for Construction 
Innovation, Australia.  
 
5. Dalrymple, JF, Boxer, L & Staples , WJ (2006) 'Cost of tendering: adding cost without 
value?', Proceedings of the Second International Conference for the CRC for 
Construction Innovation, February 12-14, Gold Coast, Australia  
 
Uncertainty about the cost of tendering has led to research being conducted to 
understand the cost of tendering within the Australian construction industry.  This has 
involved reviewing work done in Australia and overseas as well as exploring the 
efforts within the construction industry to collect cost of tendering information.  While 
there is currently awareness of the cost of tendering and that efforts should be taken to 
minimise this cost, there is little precise understanding of it in terms of value or how it 
happens. This paper explores the barriers to understanding the cost of tendering.  
Throughout the worldwide construction industry tendering is acknowledged to be 
complicated, adding considerable cost to construction.  Efforts to understand the cost 
of tendering are confounded by issues that are both visible and invisible to formal 
accounting of the construction process.  This paper intends to demonstrate the 
problems and their causes.  Anecdotes are derived from the literature, observations of 
construction purchases, and interview data to demonstrate the barriers to 
understanding the cost of tendering.  This is augmented by corresponding observations 
of other major purchases.  Problems and causes are described in terms of these 
anecdotes.  Because of the diverse activities undertaken by constructors and 
limitations of accounting categories, expenses associated with tendering are difficult 
to capture and quantify.  These problems are explained through examples.  Even in 
those cases where there are genuine intentions to capture costs of tendering there is a 
failure to do so.  It appears that implementation difficulties are so insurmountable that 
either people do not bother or management redirects effort from collecting cost of 
tendering data.  It is also shown that the expense of tendering and uncertainty of 
outcomes leads tenderers to engage in concealed behaviour to reduce the uncertainty 
and cost associated with tendering.  That is, collusion.  For this reason especially, it is 
concluded that tendering and associated costs need to be understood in greater detail.  
 
6. Dalrymple, JF & Staples, WJ (2004) ‘Exploring Best Value’ Proceedings of the 1st 
International Business Research Conference, Victoria University, Melbourne, 
November 2004, ISBN 0-646-44191-4 
 
Rees and Gardner (2003) felt that ‘Best Value’ could be seen as tackling the 
embedded culture of local government.  Whilst there has been a lot written about best 
value and its development there is still no precise definition of best value.  The 
concept of best value has attracted varying interpretations.  It has been a difficult to 
define and is an evolving concept.  The current state of the literature on best value will 
be examined in this paper.  Particular attention paid to the experience in Victoria and 
Scotland.   Best value will be explored from the perspective of both the business 
enterprise and public sector. 
 
7. (2004) Feasibility Study Linking Best-Value Procurement Assessment to Outcome 
Performance Indicators - CRC for Construction Innovation  
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This report is based on the Feasibility Study Linking Best-Value Procurement 
Assessment to Outcome Performance Indicators. The origins of the research lie in, 
inter alia, “Rethinking Construction’ – The Report of the Construction Task Force to 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr John Prescott, on the scope for improving the quality 
and efficiency of UK construction, also known as The Egan Report after its author, Sir 
John Egan. The research is predicated on the general fact that any circumstance where 
quality and efficiency of processes has not been fully addressed will almost certainly 
result in waste, where waste is generally used to describe any circumstance where cost 
is added without the addition of commensurate value. In any situation where there is 
waste in the process, the client of the process will be deprived of the delivery of ‘best 
value’ in the delivery of the project, product or service. In the case of construction 
projects, the concept of ‘best value’ must be viewed from the perspective of the client. 
The perspective of the public sector client may be very different from the perspective 
of the business enterprise client and, indeed, within the set of business enterprise 
clients, the perspective may be very different for a property developer and an 
investment institution. The project explores the concept of best value from the 
different perspectives and focuses on the concept of best value when perceived from 
the perspective of the public sector client. The project was designed to investigate 
three strands of ‘Best Value’: 
? Linking outcome performance indicators to a Best Value Procurement Framework 
? Tendering costs 
? Construction SME Performance Improvement and Optimisation 
 
The findings of this report will be of benefit to the construction industry and in 
particular to public sector procurement agencies, purchasers of construction works, 
those involved in other types of major purchases and small-to-medium sized sub-
contracting enterprises. 
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APPENDIX E – PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT –  
PROJECT  INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
Project Title: Public Sector Construction Procurement 
 
Investigators:  Mr. Warren Staples and Professor John Dalrymple  
 
Dear _____,  
 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. This 
information sheet describes the project in straightforward language, or ‘plain English’. Please 
read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding 
whether to participate.  If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the 
investigators.   
 
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted? 
 
The Public Sector Construction Procurement Project is an RMIT research project being 
undertaken by Warren Staples as part of his PhD research studies in the School of 
Management supervised by Professor John Dalrymple.  In this project we are contacting 
state government agencies involved with procurement of construction and roads to explore 
how procurement is undertaken operationally.  The project will also examine the way in 
which decisions are made about value for money.  The research has been funded by RMIT 
and the research plan for this project has been approved by the Business Portfolio Human 
Research Ethics Sub-Committee. 
 
Why have you been approached? 
 
We have selected the organisation you work for as because it has considerable experience 
in the area of public sector construction procurement.  We would like you to participate in an 
interview to talk about how you procure construction projects.  We have obtained your details 
from the publicly available webpages of your organisations website or via a recommendation 
from a work colleague. 
 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed? 
 
It is expected that 30 participants involved in construction procurement will participate in this 
research project and discuss a range of issues including how procurement is operationally 
undertaken, value for money and government priorities. 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do? 
 
We would like to you talk to us about how you procure construction projects so that we can 
gain valuable insight from your experience.  We anticipate that the whole interview will take 
between 60 and 90 minutes to complete and will take place during work hours in your place 
of work. 
 
What are the risks or disadvantages associated with participation? 
 
There are no risks in participating in this research project.  You are free to withdraw at any 
time.  If you withdraw, any data that you have provided will be destroyed.  The researchers 
will audio-tape and take notes of the interviews and you may request at any stage that your 
comments are not recorded or written down.  If you are concerned with any aspect of the 
interview, you should contact Warren Staples or John Dalrymple, as soon as convenient.   
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Either will discuss your concerns with you confidentially and suggest appropriate follow-up, if 
necessary. 
 
What are the benefits associated with participation? 
 
This study explores an important and somewhat under researched area in the Australian 
public sector.  It is hoped that the study will contribute positively to the view of procurement 
profession in the public sector and that participants will benefit from the knowledge created 
and insights gained into the best practice approaches from other jurisdictions.     
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
 
The information provided by you will be used to understand how the procurement of 
construction is undertaken in the public sector.  The information collected in the interviews 
will be used to write reports, conference papers and academic publications. In any reports or 
publications that we produce your identity will be kept confidential.  Only pseudonyms will be 
used and identifying details will be masked.  The interview tapes and notes will be kept 
securely in a locked cabinet at RMIT for a period of 5 years, upon completion of the project, 
before being destroyed.    However, you should be aware that it may also be disclosed if (1) 
it is to protect you or others from harm, or (2) if a court order is produced or (3) you provide 
the researchers with written permission. 
 
What are my rights as a participant? 
 
As a participant, you have the right to: 
? The right to withdraw their participation at any time, without prejudice. 
? The right to have the tape recorder turned off at any time 
? The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be 
reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the 
participant. 
? The right to have any questions answered at any time. 
 
Whom should I contact if I have any questions? 
Warren Staples          Professor John Dalrymple 
School of Management      School of Business 
255 Bourke Street, Level 3, Room 13    PO Box 944 
RMIT University       The University of Notre Dame Australia 
Melbourne Vic 3000       Broadway NSW 2007 
Telephone: 03 9925 5964      Telephone: 02  8204 4152 
Email: warren.staples@rmit.edu.au                  Email: jdalrymple@nd.edu.au 
 
What other issues should I be aware of before deciding whether to participate? 
 
There are no other issues that you should be aware of before you decide to 
participate. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Warren Staples    Professor John Dalrymple 
 
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the Executive 
Officer, RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee, Research & Innovation, RMIT, GPO Box 
2476V, Melbourne, 3001.    
Details of the complaints procedure are available at:  
http://www.rmit.edu.au/rd/hrec_complaints  
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APPENDIX F  – INFORMED CONSENT 
Public Sector Construction Project Procurement 
 
RMIT HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
Prescribed Consent Form for Persons Participating In Research Projects Involving 
Interviews.  
 
PORTFOLIO OF Business 
SCHOOL/CENTRE OF Management 
Name of Participant:  
Project Title: Public Sector Construction Procurement 
  
Name(s) of Investigators:        (1) Warren Staples Phone: 03 9925 5964 
                                                (2) John Dalrymple Phone:  
 
1. I have received a statement explaining the interview involved in this 
project. 
2. I consent to participate in the above project, the particulars of which - 
including details of the interviews - have been explained to me. 
3. I authorise the investigator to interview me. 
4. I give my permission to be audio taped:     Yes    No 
5. I acknowledge that: 
 
(a) Having read the Plain Language Statement, I agree to the general 
purpose, methods and demands of the study. 
(b) I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at 
any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously 
supplied. 
(c) The project is for the purpose of research and/or teaching. It may 
not be of direct benefit to me. 
(d) The privacy of the information I provide will be safeguarded.  
However should information of a private nature need to be 
disclosed for moral, clinical or legal reasons, I will be given an 
opportunity to negotiate the terms of this disclosure.  
(e) The security of the research data is assured during and after 
completion of the study.  The data collected during the study may 
be published, and a report of the project findings will be provided 
to participants.   Any information which may be used to identify 
me will not be used. 
 
Participant’s Consent 
 
 
Name:  Date
: 
 
(Participant) 
 
 
 
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the 
Chair, Portfolio Human Research Ethics Sub-Committee, Business Portfolio, 
GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, 3001.  The telephone number is (03) 9925 5594 
or email address rdu@rmit.edu.au. Details of the complaints procedure are 
available from: www.rmit.edu.au/council/hrec 
 
 
